Jackman J dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The Court held that the proposed grounds had no realistic prospect of success and that the primary judge's decision was not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration on appeal.
The Court placed weight on findings made by the primary judge that were not directly challenged by Light & Wonder. In particular, the primary judge had found that the material voluntarily supplied by Light & Wonder suggested it was possible that Aristocrat's confidential information or copyright works had been embodied or used in the design of Dragon Train, but that the material stopped well short of showing whether that had actually occurred.
The primary judge had also found that Aristocrat could not sensibly assess Light & Wonder's assertion of independent creation without knowing more about Dragon Train's underlying design, especially the mathematical rules, formulae and models used to create or implement the game.
The Court also rejected the argument based on the US proceeding. Jackman J drew a clear distinction between primary facts and inferences. The allegations in the US complaint were not all 'information' that Aristocrat objectively possessed. Many were inferences drawn from primary facts such as employee access and objective similarities between products. The Court described Aristocrat's case as circumstantial.
In that setting, the fact that Aristocrat genuinely believed its allegations did not mean it objectively had sufficient information to decide whether to start Australian proceedings.
Another important point was Light & Wonder's own position in the US case. The judgment records that Light & Wonder had sought dismissal there on the basis that Aristocrat's allegations were speculative and implausible. The primary judge had inferred that Light & Wonder would likely say the same about similar Australian proceedings brought without additional evidence, and Light & Wonder accepted that inference before Jackman J. That undermined the submission that Aristocrat already knew enough to sue here.
The Court also rejected the argument that the primary judge had reversed the onus when considering discretion. Read fairly, the primary judge had simply concluded that once the requirements of r 7.23 were met, no good reason had been shown to refuse relief. Jackman J said that was consistent with authority recognising that there will normally be little scope to refuse preliminary discovery where the rule's requirements are satisfied.