Aeronautical Resource and Consultancy Pty Ltd trading as ARC Helicopters v CMA-CGM Société Anonyme au Capital de 234 988 330 Euros

This proceeding arose from the shipment of a specialised helicopter from Melbourne to Malta. ARC Helicopters said the helicopter was needed for firefighting-related work and that delivery timing was commercially critical. The shipment moved under a sea waybill naming CMA-CGM as carrier.

ARC alleged that the carriage contract required delivery on 9 July 2023, later waived to no later than 11 July 2023, and that time was of the essence. Instead, the helicopter was delivered on 8 August 2023. It also arrived damaged. CMA-CGM admitted that the rotor tail was damaged during transhipment at Valencia and admitted breach of Art 3 r 2 of the Australian Rules. Even so, the dispute did not narrow to a simple damages assessment. ARC also alleged delay, deviation, refusal to offload, refusal to cooperate with mitigation, and broader contractual, bailment and consumer law wrongdoing.

This judgment is therefore not a final ruling on the whole cargo dispute. It is an interlocutory decision dealing with three practical questions that often shape commercial litigation: whether an additional plaintiff can be joined, whether the plaintiff must provide security for costs, and whether some legal issues should be carved out and decided early as separate questions.

ARC pleaded a detailed commercial story. It said it was in the business of providing firefighting support services and had leased the helicopter under a helicopter operating lease agreement dated 22 September 2021. ARC alleged that CMA-CGM took possession of the helicopter at the Port of Melbourne as carrier for reward under an agreement made up of the waybill, a booking confirmation dated 22 May 2023, and conversations and statements involving Mr Timothy Chibs and Mr Steve Smith of NGL Melbourne.

ARC's case was that the voyage should have resulted in delivery at Malta by 9 July 2023, or at the latest 11 July 2023. ARC also pleaded that CMA-CGM was obliged to undertake the voyage with reasonable dispatch, without unjustified deviation, and using a seaworthy vessel with competent crew, management and discharge arrangements. ARC linked those alleged obligations to the commercial purpose of delivering firefighting equipment to support services in Greece during a period of extreme fire risk.

ARC further alleged that the APL Detroit reached Gioia Tauro in Italy on 11 July 2023 instead of discharging at Malta, and that this was a deviation from the agreed voyage. ARC said it asked for the helicopter to be offloaded and later asked for discharge or repair in Spain so the helicopter could be flown to Greece, but that CMA-CGM refused. The helicopter was then transhipped at Valencia and eventually arrived in Malta on 8 August 2023 in damaged condition. ARC said it suffered substantial loss, including loss of contracts, although the reasons note that those contracts had not been particularised nor adduced in evidence at that stage.

The court was not deciding the final merits of ARC's cargo claim. Instead, it had to determine three interlocutory disputes.

First, ARC sought to join its director and CEO, Mr Timothy Chibs, as a second plaintiff under rr 9.02 and 9.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). Mr Chibs proposed to bring a personal negligence claim for injury said to arise from learning of the delivery delay, and a Victorian statutory claim for damages or compensation linked to alleged consumer law contraventions. The court had to decide whether his proposed claims raised common questions with ARC's claims, arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions, or should otherwise be heard together to avoid multiple proceedings. A key issue was whether those proposed claims were reasonably arguable.

Second, CMA-CGM sought security for costs. It argued that ARC was impecunious and that there was a real risk ARC would be unable to pay a costs order if CMA-CGM succeeded in its defence. ARC argued, among other things, that an order for security could stultify the proceeding.

Third, CMA-CGM sought early determination of carriage-law issues. It wanted summary judgment on ARC's pleading that the Australian Rules did not apply to the contract of carriage, or alternatively separate determination of whether ARC's claim was limited to 13,000 units of account. The court had to decide whether that kind of preliminary process would have sufficient utility at this stage.

Mr Chibs said his proposed claims were sufficiently connected to ARC's existing case because they arose from the same shipping events. He identified common questions such as the factual matrix surrounding the contract of carriage, the incidents during the voyage, the alleged representations relied on in the consumer law claims, and causation and loss. He also argued that, as ARC's sole director and shareholder and the person making relevant decisions for the company, his joinder would help ensure all issues were finally determined together and avoid multiple proceedings.

The court accepted that there was some factual overlap, but that was not enough. The judge focused on whether Mr Chibs' proposed claims were reasonably arguable. The available reasons show close attention to the actual pleading. Mr Chibs alleged that he suffered nervous shock on 4 July 2023 when told there had been a major disruption to the service carrying the helicopter and that the APL Detroit might omit Malta. He alleged further nervous shock on 5 July 2023 when told that the vessel would not be delivering the helicopter to Freeport. He said he was admitted to hospital on 6 July 2023 for 65 days and placed into a medically induced coma.

The judge identified major legal difficulties. The proposed negligence claim pleaded that CMA-CGM owed Mr Chibs a duty of care not to cause him injury or loss, including physical harm and mental distress, but the basis for that duty was not pleaded. On the reasoning available, the court had grave doubts that the law recognised a duty of care in the circumstances alleged. The judge also noted a timing problem. Some pleaded particulars of breach occurred after Mr Chibs had already been placed into an induced coma and therefore could not logically have contributed to his personal injuries.

The court also pointed to statutory personal injury issues under the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic). The reasons note that the proposed pleading did not frame the claim pursuant to that Act. The judge referred to matters such as foreseeable risk, precautions a reasonable person would have taken, pure mental harm, recognised psychiatric illness, and causation. The reasons specifically note that no recognised psychiatric illness had been pleaded, despite the statutory framework dealing with mental harm and damages for economic loss resulting from negligence.

In short, the court did not refuse joinder merely because Mr Chibs was a director seeking to add a personal claim. It refused joinder because, on the material before it, the proposed personal claims appeared to face serious legal and pleading problems.

One of the most commercially important parts of the reasons concerns agency. ARC's pleaded case relied critically on an allegation that NGL and Mr Smith acted as agent for CMA-CGM in negotiating the contract of carriage. CMA-CGM denied that, although it admitted that CMA-CGM Group Agencies (AU) Pty Ltd acted as its ship's agent in Australia.

The judge reviewed the documents then before the court. Those documents included an NGL tax invoice to ARC, a shipper's letter of instruction dated 22 May 2023, a booking confirmation sent by CMA-CGM to NGL, an NGL loading report dated 1 June 2023, and the waybill itself. The court said that, on the evidence currently before it, it was difficult to conclude that NGL was acting as agent for CMA-CGM, though that issue was left for trial.

The documentary discussion is practical and worth reading closely. The shipper's letter of instruction strongly suggested that NGL was acting as agent for ARC. The waybill identified CMA-CGM Group Agencies (AU) Pty Ltd as agent for the carrier and did not refer to NGL. The NGL invoice and loading report also did not clearly support ARC's agency allegation. That did not finally decide the issue, but it showed how much the case may depend on the paper trail.

For businesses, this is a reminder that freight arrangements often involve several entities with different roles: carrier, freight forwarder, port agent, logistics provider and shipper-side intermediary. If a dispute later turns on who promised what, or who knew a shipment was urgent, the answer may depend less on assumptions and more on the exact wording of the documents.

The court ordered ARC to provide security for CMA-CGM's costs in the amount of $50,000. The security had to be provided by payment into court or by an irrevocable bank guarantee from an Australian authorised deposit-taking institution by 19 October 2025. The proceeding was stayed until security was given, and if ARC failed to comply, an application could be made on 20 October 2025 for dismissal.

This is commercially significant. Security for costs does not mean the plaintiff's case is hopeless. It is a protective order made where there is a sufficient risk that the plaintiff will not be able to satisfy a costs order if the defendant succeeds. The catchwords record that the court was dealing with an impecunious plaintiff and a risk that the plaintiff would be unable to pay a costs order, while also considering ARC's argument that security might stultify the proceeding.

For a business claimant, a security order can be a major turning point. It affects cash flow, leverage, settlement pressure and the practical ability to continue litigating. Even where some liability is admitted, as here in relation to cargo damage, the plaintiff may still need to fund procedural steps before the court reaches the real dispute about the extent of recoverable loss.

CMA-CGM also tried to obtain early determination of carriage-law issues. It sought summary judgment on ARC's pleading that the Australian Rules did not apply, or alternatively separate determination of whether ARC's claim was limited to 13,000 units of account.

The court dismissed that part of CMA-CGM's amended interlocutory application. The catchwords state that the separate question lacked utility. That is an important procedural point. Courts will not always split out legal issues for early determination just because they look significant. A separate question process must be likely to produce real practical benefit. If the issue is too entangled with facts still to be proved, or if deciding it early will not materially simplify the case, the court may refuse to do it.

For businesses, the lesson is that limitation and carriage-rule issues can be central, but they are not always suitable for early standalone determination. If your claim depends on arguments about whether the Australian Hague Rules apply, whether package limitation applies, or whether a carrier has lost the benefit of limitation, those issues may still need to be litigated in the context of the full factual case.

The orders made on 19 September 2025 were clear. ARC was ordered to give security for CMA-CGM's costs in the amount of $50,000 by 19 October 2025, either by payment into court or by irrevocable bank guarantee. The proceeding was stayed until security was provided. If ARC failed to comply, an application could be made for dismissal on 20 October 2025. The costs of the security application were made costs in the cause.

The court otherwise dismissed the amended interlocutory application dated 2 May 2025 and dismissed the interlocutory application dated 26 March 2025. In practical terms, that means ARC's attempt to join Mr Chibs failed, and CMA-CGM did not obtain the separate question or summary judgment relief it sought on the carriage-law issues.

So the immediate result was mixed. CMA-CGM succeeded on security for costs, which gave it a significant procedural advantage. ARC succeeded in resisting the separate question process, but failed in its attempt to add Mr Chibs as a second plaintiff.

This case should be read as a practical warning about preparation, not just legal doctrine. ARC's underlying complaint involved a delayed and damaged helicopter, but the interlocutory judgment shows that commercial litigation often turns on four things before trial: the contract story, the agency story, the loss story and the funding story.

If delivery timing is critical, make sure the urgency is documented in the contract documents and communications with the actual carrier or its clearly identified agent. If your business will suffer downstream loss from delay, preserve the contracts, purchase orders, service commitments and internal records showing that consequence. If you need to rely on statements made by an intermediary, be ready to prove that the intermediary was acting for the carrier and not for you.

This case also shows the limits of trying to combine company and personal claims. Directors and founders often bear the commercial stress of a failed shipment directly, but courts will still require a properly pleaded personal cause of action. Emotional or financial impact alone does not create a negligence duty.

Finally, if your business is considering Federal Court proceedings, think early about adverse costs exposure and the possibility of security for costs. A claim can be commercially strong in part and still be slowed or threatened by funding pressure.

Did the court decide whether the Australian Hague Rules apply? Not finally in this judgment. CMA-CGM sought early determination of that issue, but the court dismissed the separate question application because it lacked utility at that stage.

Does an admitted breach mean the carrier will pay all claimed losses? No. CMA-CGM admitted damage to the rotor tail and breach of Art 3 r 2, but questions about limitation, delay loss, causation and quantum remained live.

Can a director always join a company shipping dispute with a personal claim? No. The court's reasoning shows that factual overlap is not enough. The proposed personal claim must itself be reasonably arguable and properly pleaded.

What should a business do if a shipment is commercially urgent? Put the delivery date, the commercial purpose and the consequences of delay in writing, and make sure those matters are communicated to the actual carrier or a clearly identified agent.

What if the plaintiff cannot provide security for costs? In this case, the proceeding was stayed until security was provided, and the orders allowed for an application for dismissal if ARC failed to comply.

The hearing took place on 29 July 2025 and judgment was delivered on 19 September 2025 by Derrington J in the Federal Court of Australia. The orders required security to be provided by 19 October 2025, with a possible dismissal application returnable on 20 October 2025 if ARC did not comply.

This page deals only with the interlocutory judgment. It does not describe any later steps in the proceeding.

This page is based on the published Federal Court reasons and orders for Aeronautical Resource and Consultancy Pty Ltd trading as ARC Helicopters v CMA-CGM Société Anonyme au Capital de 234 988 330 Euros [2025] FCA 1156.

The published text available for review cuts off before the end of the reasons. Because of that, this page focuses on matters clearly supported by the published orders, catchwords and reasons that are available, including the shipment background, the admitted cargo damage, the joinder application, the security for costs order, the attempted separate questions, and the court's reasoning on those issues up to the point where the published text stops.