HKW25 v National Disability Insurance Agency

HKW25 v National Disability Insurance Agency [2025] FCA 1379 is a Federal Court decision about whether a person with severe mental health conditions could continue litigation under a pseudonym and stop publication of identifying information. The Court was not deciding the final judicial review claim against the NDIA. It was deciding an interlocutory application for suppression under Pt VAA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

The Court granted the application. It held that suppression was necessary to protect the applicant's safety and also considered that open identification would prejudice the proper administration of justice because it would likely aggravate the very disabilities connected to the proceeding and undermine the applicant's safe access to the Court. The order was made until further order, meaning it remains open to later reconsideration.

The applicant brought a judicial review proceeding against the National Disability Insurance Agency under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). The judgment says the challenge concerned a decision and certain conduct of the NDIA that allegedly inhibited the applicant's participation in preparing a plan of supports under s 32(1) of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth). The Court did not explain the underlying merits in detail, and this judgment did not decide them.

Before filing the proceeding, the applicant asked to use a pseudonym. A registrar allowed that on an interim basis until the issue could be argued before the Court. At the first case management hearing on 24 September 2025, the applicant sought a formal suppression order. The initial evidence came through an affidavit from the applicant's solicitor and included reports from two mental health professionals. One report was from a psychiatrist in 2012 in the context of an apparent compensation claim. The other was from a psychologist in 2023 for the general purpose of explaining the applicant's impairments and their impact.

The judge said those reports were not directly addressed to whether suppression was necessary in this proceeding. That mattered because the statutory test is necessity, not general sensitivity. Counsel for the applicant submitted that disclosure of the applicant's identity could expose him to targeting or contact connected with his defence service and, more importantly, that public disclosure of his sensitive mental health history could worsen his condition. The judge indicated that the evidence at that stage did not rise above assertion, so the applicant was given an opportunity to file supplementary material.

The NDIA did not oppose that course and did not wish to be heard on the suppression issue. The interim pseudonym protection remained in place. A note was also placed on the court file requiring any requests for public inspection of documents to be referred to the judge's chambers.

The supplementary evidence became central. The applicant's own affidavit described chronic complex post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic severe major depression and other mental health comorbidities. He said he lived in a perpetual state of distress, depression and hypervigilance, had made numerous suicide attempts, and went to enormous lengths to protect his anonymity. He described profound fear that if his name were published, reporters or members of the public might investigate his service record or contact him about his past. He said he had spent decades avoiding contact with former friends, colleagues, students and family members, had no social media presence, and regarded renewed contact from people from his past as deeply destabilising and life threatening.

He also said the request for a pseudonym was not about embarrassment or social status, but about being able to access the legal system safely to enforce his rights. The matter later went to mediation before a registrar, but remained unresolved, so the proceeding itself continued.

The legal question was whether the Federal Court should make a suppression order under s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) so that the applicant could continue to be identified only as "HKW25" and so that information revealing or tending to reveal his identity could not be disclosed or published. The Court had to approach that question against the background principle of open justice. Section 17 recognises that the Court's jurisdiction is usually exercised in the open, and s 37AE requires the Court to take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice.

The relevant grounds were in s 37AG. For this case, the important ones were necessity to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice and necessity to protect the safety of any person. The Court stressed that the grounds are closed and that the word "necessary" does real work. The authorities cited by the judge make clear that embarrassment, inconvenience and personal sensitivity are not enough. So the issue was not whether anonymity would be helpful or desirable. It was whether the evidence showed that suppression was necessary because the risk of harm or prejudice could not adequately be avoided another way.

The Court granted the application. It ordered, on the grounds specified in ss 37AG(1)(a) and (c), and until further order, that the applicant continue to be known by the pseudonym "HKW25" and that disclosure or publication of information revealing or tending to reveal the applicant's identity be prohibited.

On safety, the Court accepted that the applicant's evidence directly engaged with the impact that disclosure of his identity would have on him, including the threat it would pose to his health and possibly his life. The judge said that, given the seriousness of the anticipated harm, it did not need to be probable, but in any event accepted that it was probable. The applicant's evidence was consistent with the presentations described by his treating professionals. On that basis, the Court held that a suppression order was necessary to protect the applicant's safety.

The Court also dealt with the proper administration of justice ground. The judge noted that the evidence did not expressly say the applicant would abandon the case if his identity were revealed, and said evidence of that kind would likely engage s 37AG(1)(a). Even so, the judge considered that the ground was engaged because suppression was necessary to secure for the applicant safe access to the courts to vindicate the rights he said had been infringed. The litigation concerned supports the applicant received or hoped to receive in respect of his disabilities. If prosecuting the review openly would likely aggravate those very disabilities, then the proper administration of justice would be prejudiced.

The Court also referred to a possible broader chilling effect. If suppression were refused in an appropriate case like this, prospective litigants with serious mental health challenges might be deterred from bringing legitimate claims about the administration of government services from which they are or may be beneficiaries. That broader effect formed part of the Court's reasoning on the administration of justice ground.

Importantly, the Court did not treat the order as absolute or beyond review. Because the medical evidence described certain conditions as lifelong and the applicant's presentation as longstanding, the judge considered it appropriate to make the order until further order. But the judgment expressly says that any party, and even a member of the media or the public, could apply to have the order revisited, and the Court would deal with such an application with appropriate haste. The judgment also noted that separate issues about inspection of the court file might later arise under s 37AK and r 2.32(3) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

So the result was a continuing but interlocutory suppression order, not a final and untouchable confidentiality ruling for all purposes.

For most businesses, this case does not change day-to-day privacy compliance. It does, however, show what can happen when a dispute involving highly sensitive personal information reaches court. Open justice remains the default. That means court proceedings, hearings and filed material may become public unless the Court orders otherwise. If a business assumes that health information, disability information or trauma-related material will automatically stay confidential, that assumption is unsafe.

The case is especially relevant for disability providers, employers, insurers, professional services firms and any organisation that may become involved in litigation touching serious mental health conditions. The practical lesson is to separate three questions. First, what privacy and confidentiality obligations apply before litigation starts? Second, what information actually needs to be included in pleadings, affidavits and submissions? Third, if public identification would create a serious risk, what evidence exists to support a targeted suppression application?

This decision also shows that evidence quality matters. The Court was not prepared to make final orders on broad assertions alone. It wanted material that directly addressed the likely impact of disclosure in the proceeding itself. Businesses and advisers should take from that a simple point: if anonymity may be needed, raise it early and support it properly. That may include evidence from the affected person, and where relevant, medical or other professional evidence that speaks to the actual litigation risk rather than only giving general background.

Another practical point is that this case is not authority for a broad proposition that all sensitive matters should be anonymised. The Court repeatedly anchored its reasoning in necessity, serious risk, and the narrow tailoring of orders. Businesses should therefore avoid overreading it as a general privacy shield.

If your business is involved in a dispute where a person's identity or health history may need protection, document handling becomes important well before any suppression application is heard. This case shows that the applicant sought pseudonym protection before filing and obtained interim cover while the issue was considered. That timing reduced the risk of unnecessary public exposure before the Court had ruled.

In practice, businesses should review what identifying details are genuinely necessary in correspondence, witness statements, affidavits and draft court documents. Names, addresses, service histories, family details and medical descriptions should not be included more broadly than needed. Internal circulation should also be controlled. Sensitive material should be stored securely and shared on a need-to-know basis, especially where the dispute itself concerns disability, trauma or mental health.

The judgment also highlights that different confidentiality issues can arise at different stages. One issue is whether a party can proceed under a pseudonym. Another is whether identifying information can be published. A further issue is whether documents on the court file can be inspected. The Court noted that file inspection questions might need separate treatment later. Businesses should therefore avoid assuming that one order solves every exposure risk.

There is also a conduct point. Where a person involved in the dispute has serious mental health conditions, process design matters. Communications should be measured, unnecessary confrontation should be avoided, and requests for information should be proportionate. None of that guarantees a suppression order, but it can reduce avoidable harm and help ensure the dispute is handled in a way that does not make the legal process itself harder to navigate.

The originating application was dated 4 July 2025 and amended on 6 October 2025. The first case management hearing dealing with suppression took place on 24 September 2025. Supplementary affidavit material was then filed in early October 2025, including an affidavit from the applicant affirmed on 10 October 2025. The matter was determined on the papers, and judgment was delivered by Snaden J on 13 November 2025.

The suppression order was made until further order. That means it continues unless and until the Court changes it. The judgment expressly states that a party, or a member of the media or public, may seek to have the order revisited. So although the order is ongoing, it remains interlocutory in the sense that it can be reconsidered later.

This entry is based on the published Federal Court judgment in HKW25 v National Disability Insurance Agency [2025] FCA 1379, delivered on 13 November 2025 by Snaden J. The judgment provides detailed reasons on the suppression application, including the statutory framework, the evidence relied on, the Court's reasoning on safety and the proper administration of justice, and the terms of the order.

The judgment gives only limited detail about the underlying judicial review dispute. For that reason, this page focuses on the suppression ruling itself and does not attempt to draw broader conclusions about the merits of the applicant's claim against the NDIA.