Universal City Studios LLC v Telstra Limited

Universal City Studios LLC v Telstra Limited [2025] FCA 1390 is a Federal Court copyright site-blocking decision under s 115A of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). The applicants, led by Universal City Studios LLC and including other film rights holders, sought orders requiring Telstra and many other Australian carriage service providers to disable access to 52 target online locations, with separate urgent target online locations also addressed in the orders.

The Court was satisfied that the evidence established that the primary purpose or effect of each target online location was to infringe, or facilitate the infringement of, copyright in one or more cinematograph films. It also inferred that the applicants had not licensed or consented to the relevant copying or communication, and described the infringement as flagrant. The result was a detailed set of blocking and ancillary orders dealing not only with initial blocking, but also redirection pages, mirror sites, associated new sites, temporary suspensions, extension procedures and compliance costs.

The commercial story is a rights-enforcement application by major film copyright owners against Australian internet providers. The applicants were not, on the available text, suing the operators of the target websites directly in this proceeding. Instead, they used the site-blocking regime in s 115A to ask the Court to require Australian carriage service providers to disable access to online locations outside Australia.

That matters because site-blocking cases are often less about proving a conventional damages claim against a known infringer and more about stopping access to a network of online locations that are said to be making protected content available without permission, or helping users get to it. The respondents included Telstra and other providers grouped in the orders by brand families such as Optus, Vocus, TPG Telecom, Aussie Broadband and Superloop.

The available judgment text does not set out a full narrative for each target site. It does not, for example, give a complete public description of each site's branding, ownership, interface or exact operating model. What it does make clear is that the Court accepted the applicants' case at the level required by s 115A. The Court found that each target online location had the primary purpose or effect of infringing copyright or facilitating infringement in cinematograph films, and that the applicants had not granted any licence or consent for that conduct.

The Court also recorded that the applicants had complied with the statutory notification requirements as far as reasonably possible. That is an important procedural step in site-blocking matters, because the legislation expects notice efforts before orders are made. The Court then moved from those findings to a practical enforcement framework aimed at disabling access and dealing with the common problem of websites shifting domains, URLs or IP addresses to evade blocking.

The central legal issue was whether the Court should grant injunctions and ancillary orders under s 115A requiring Australian carriage service providers to take reasonable steps to disable access to the target online locations. In practical terms, the Court had to decide whether the statutory threshold for blocking had been met and whether the discretion to grant relief should be exercised.

The catchwords show that the applicants relied on presumptions in ss 126, 131 and 115A(5A), as well as deemed admissions as to ownership of copyright. The available text does not reproduce the full wording of those provisions, so this page should not overstate their technical operation. At a practical level, however, the judgment makes clear that the applicants relied on statutory shortcuts and evidentiary aids to help establish matters such as copyright ownership, subsistence and the character of the online locations for the site-blocking regime. The Court accepted that reliance.

The Court also recorded that the applicants had complied with the notification requirements in s 115A(4) as far as reasonably possible. It was then satisfied that the evidence established that the primary purpose or effect of each target online location was to infringe, or facilitate the infringement of, copyright in one or more cinematograph films. The Court further inferred that the applicants had not granted any licence or consent to the owners or operators of the target online locations to copy or communicate the films.

Another important point is the Court's description of the infringement as flagrant. That finding, together with the other matters recorded in the catchwords, meant the evidence weighed heavily in favour of granting the injunctions. So the legal issue was not only whether the sites fell within the statutory concept, but also whether the overall discretionary picture supported making detailed blocking orders. The Court concluded that it did.

The Court granted the site-blocking orders and a substantial set of ancillary orders. For the main target online locations, each respondent had to take reasonable steps within 15 business days of service of the orders to disable access. The orders also provided that if a new disabling obligation arose under the mirror-site mechanism, the respondent had 15 business days after that obligation arose to act.

The Court made clear that a respondent would be taken to have complied if it implemented one or more of the approved technical methods. Those methods were DNS blocking, IP address blocking or re-routing, URL blocking, or any alternative technical means agreed in writing between the applicants and the respondent. If a respondent used a different method from those specifically listed, it had to notify the applicants of the step or steps implemented.

The orders also required reasonable efforts to redirect users who tried to access blocked locations to an explanatory webpage. That webpage had to tell users that access had been disabled because the Court had determined that the website infringed or facilitated the infringement of copyright. The webpage could be hosted by the applicants or by the respondent, depending on the implementation choice.

The Court built in practical flexibility for network operators. A respondent would not be in breach if it temporarily declined or ceased blocking where, on reasonable grounds, suspension was necessary to maintain network or system integrity, upgrade or troubleshoot the blocking system, avert or respond to an imminent security threat, or preserve its ability to block criminal content or comply with statutory obligations including under s 313(3) of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth). But there were conditions: unless precluded by law, the respondent had to notify the applicants by the next business day, and the suspension could last no longer than reasonably necessary and in any event no longer than 3 business days unless agreed or allowed by the Court.

The Court also dealt with urgent target online locations by consent. Different compliance deadlines applied to those urgent locations. Telstra, Vocus, TPG Telecom, Aussie Broadband and Superloop had to act by 10.00 am on 18 November 2025, while Optus had to act by 4.00 pm on 19 November 2025. Equivalent redirection, suspension, variation and extension machinery applied to the urgent orders as well.

One of the most commercially important parts of the orders is the mechanism for dealing with evasive conduct. The Court recognised that a blocked website may reappear at a different domain name, IP address or URL outside Australia. Under the mirror-site procedure, if the applicants and their solicitor form a good faith belief that a website already covered by the orders has moved to a different online location, they may file and serve a written notice on the respondents and the Court identifying the new domain name, IP address or URL and certifying the basis for the good faith belief, with brief reasons.

Once that notice is given, the respondents have 7 business days to notify the applicants and the Court if they object to disabling access to the newly identified location. If a respondent objects, or if the Court otherwise considers it appropriate, the proceeding is relisted for further directions. If no respondent objects within time and the Court does not require relisting, the respondents must then take the required blocking steps after receiving notification that the Court does not require the matter to be relisted. The urgent orders contain a parallel mechanism, with a 15 business day compliance period after that notification.

The orders go further than simple mirror sites. They also allow the applicants to file and serve an amended originating application seeking further orders in respect of additional target online locations that appear to be associated with existing target online locations. The association can be based on name, branding or the identity of the operator, and the new location must appear to be making available online, or facilitating access to, the same or substantially the same content as the existing target online location. That is a separate pathway from the mirror-site notice process and is aimed at associated sites rather than just moved addresses.

The procedure for those associated-site applications is also spelled out. The applicants must serve the amended originating application and supporting affidavit evidence within 7 days of filing, and must give notice in accordance with s 115A(4). Any respondent wishing to be heard must notify the applicants and the Court within 5 business days of service. If no respondent gives notice, the Court may determine the application on the papers without further notice and without an oral hearing.

Just as importantly, the orders preserve a challenge pathway for affected operators. The owner or operator of any target online location, and the owner or operator of any website claiming to be affected by the orders, may apply on 3 days' written notice to the Court and all parties to vary or discharge the orders. The application must set out the orders sought and be supported by evidence showing the applicant's status and the basis for the variation or discharge. In practical terms, that means a legitimate operator who says its site has been wrongly caught, or whose interests are materially affected, is not left without a remedy. But the timetable is short, so speed and evidence matter.

The Court ordered the applicants to pay compliance costs calculated at the rate of $50 per domain name that is the subject of DNS blocking. There was one order dealing with urgent blocking compliance costs and another dealing with the main order set. The Court also made no order as to costs generally. For businesses, the practical point is that implementation costs were not left entirely with the carriage service providers. The rights holders had to contribute on the basis specified by the Court. If your business may be on the receiving end of similar orders as a network operator, this is an important operational detail for budgeting and internal process design.

The orders operate for 3 years from 12 November 2025. They can be extended, but not automatically. An applicant seeking an extension must apply at least 28 days before expiry and file a minute of orders together with a solicitor's certification. That certification must confirm recent attempts to access each relevant target online location, a good faith belief that the location has not permanently ceased to have the primary purpose or effect of infringing or facilitating infringement, and that the relevant domain names, URLs or IP addresses have not permanently ceased to enable or facilitate access. The applicant must also give the respondents at least 7 days' notice. If a respondent objects, the matter can be relisted. If no respondent objects, the Court may extend the orders without a further hearing.

The orders also require the applicants to notify respondents if they form a good faith belief that a blocked domain name, IP address or URL has permanently ceased to enable or facilitate access to a target online location, or has permanently ceased to have the primary purpose or effect of infringing or facilitating infringement. Once that notice is given, the respondents are no longer required to continue blocking the relevant location. This is a useful reminder that the blocking regime is not meant to continue blindly where the factual basis has fallen away.

For business owners, the broader lesson is about service design and risk allocation. The Court's findings were directed to online locations whose primary purpose or effect was infringing or facilitating infringement, but the practical reach of the orders shows that businesses should think carefully about indexing, linking, search functions, embedded content, user-upload systems and traffic-generation models. If your platform depends on helping users find unauthorised content, the fact that you do not host the file yourself may not protect the business model. If you are a legitimate operator, maintain clear contact details, records of rights and permissions, and evidence of lawful operation so you can respond quickly if your service is ever affected by a blocking order.

This page is based on the published Federal Court judgment text for Universal City Studios LLC v Telstra Limited [2025] FCA 1390, including the catchwords and orders. The available text clearly states the Court's high-level findings, the statutory basis relied on, the structure of the orders, the compliance deadlines, the challenge mechanisms, the extension process and the compliance cost orders.

Some factual detail remains limited because the available text is truncated around the schedules and does not provide a full narrative description of each target online location. For that reason, this page focuses on what the Court decided and how the order framework operates in practice, rather than speculating about the detailed operation of each site.