Aaron Sansoni Group International Pty Ltd v Manti (No 3)

Aaron Sansoni Group International Pty Ltd v Manti (No 3) [2025] FCA 1568 is a Federal Court costs judgment following a contempt application brought inside a larger commercial dispute. The Court had already decided, in earlier reasons, that some contempt charges against Francesco Manti and Theresa Manti were made out and others were not. This later judgment dealt with the practical question that often matters most to litigants after an interlocutory fight: who pays the legal costs, how much, on what basis, and when.

For business readers, this is not a case about broad market regulation or day-to-day compliance systems. It is a case about litigation economics. It shows that even where a party proves some breaches of court orders, the Court may still award only part of that party’s costs. It also shows that the label "contempt" does not automatically produce indemnity costs or immediate recovery.

The judgment is especially useful for businesses already in court proceedings. It demonstrates how the Court may treat a contempt application as one step in a wider case rather than as a standalone event. Once the Court takes that view, it may be less willing to award indemnity costs and more willing to leave taxation until the end of the main proceeding. That can materially affect cash flow, settlement pressure and the commercial value of bringing the application in the first place.

The costs reasons give only a limited account of the underlying dispute. They say the broader proceeding arose out of Mr Manti’s dismissal as an employee or officer of ASGI. The judgment then focuses on the contempt application that ASGI filed on 22 January 2025, alleging that Mr Manti and the former second respondent, Ms Manti, had contravened court orders and were guilty of contempt.

ASGI filed separate statements of charge. Mr Manti faced six charges, but ASGI later said it was content for charge 3 to be adjourned indefinitely and that it did not press charge 4. Ms Manti faced two charges. In the earlier reasons delivered on 9 October 2025, the Court found that charges 1 and 2 against Mr Manti were made out, while charges 5 and 6 were not. For Ms Manti, charge 2 was made out and charge 1 was not.

The Court also dealt with penalty in those earlier reasons. Mr Manti was fined $10,000 for breaches of paragraphs 2(a) and 3 of the 16 December 2024 orders. No penalty was imposed on Ms Manti. After that, the parties filed written submissions on costs, and the Court determined the issue on the papers.

ASGI sought indemnity costs against Mr Manti for the contempt application. It generally did not seek a costs order against Ms Manti, but it did seek indemnity costs against both respondents for two specific matters: the hearing on 28 February 2025, which had to be adjourned after a substantial body of material was filed shortly before the hearing, and an unsuccessful application to re-open. Mr and Ms Manti, who represented themselves, argued for no costs order or a much narrower order.

The legal issue in this judgment was not whether contempt had occurred. That had already been decided. The Court instead had to work out the costs consequences of a partly successful contempt application brought within a larger proceeding.

That required the Court to address several practical questions. First, should the ordinary rule that costs follow the event apply, and if so, how should it operate where some charges succeeded, some failed, and some were not determined? Secondly, should ASGI receive indemnity costs because contempt proceedings often attract that kind of order? Thirdly, should the costs of the adjourned hearing on 28 February 2025 be dealt with separately? Fourthly, should any costs order be made against Ms Manti? Finally, should the costs be taxed immediately, or should the usual rule for interlocutory costs apply so that taxation waits until the end of the proceeding?

The Court approached those questions by starting with the general principles under s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and the Federal Court Rules 2011. It noted that the costs discretion is broad but must be exercised judicially, and that the ordinary rule is that costs follow the event, although a successful party may receive less than all of its costs or costs may be apportioned based on success on issues.

The Court also recognised that in contempt proceedings costs ordinarily follow the event and that it is common practice for costs to be awarded on an indemnity basis. But the Court emphasised that there is no general principle or rule of law requiring indemnity costs in every contempt case. That point mattered because ASGI argued that indemnity costs should follow from the contempt findings, while the respondents argued for no order or a much narrower one.

For a business owner, the legal issue can be put simply. If you bring an enforcement application inside a larger court case and only partly succeed, how much of your legal spend are you likely to recover, from whom, on what basis, and when will you be able to recover it? This judgment is the Court’s answer to that question on these facts.

Moshinsky J made four key orders. First, Mr Manti had to pay ASGI’s costs of the hearing on 28 February 2025. Secondly, he had to pay half of ASGI’s costs of the interlocutory application dated 22 January 2025 to date, excluding the 28 February hearing costs already dealt with separately. Thirdly, those costs were to be on a party and party basis and taxed if not agreed. Fourthly, ASGI’s request for immediate taxation was refused, and its request for a costs order against Ms Manti was also refused.

In reaching that result, the Court started with the ordinary position that costs follow the event. It then looked at the actual pattern of success. In relation to Mr Manti, of the charges that were pressed, ASGI succeeded on two and failed on two. Charges 3 and 4 were not determined, but the Court considered that the costs associated with those charges were best seen as part and parcel of the overall contempt application rather than something to be reserved and dealt with separately later. In relation to Ms Manti, one charge succeeded and one failed.

The Court considered possible issue-by-issue approaches. For example, it could have made costs orders in ASGI’s favour for the successful charges and no order for the charges the respondents successfully defended, especially because the respondents were unrepresented and had not incurred legal fees in the ordinary sense. But the judge concluded that this would be difficult to administer on a taxation. Instead, the Court adopted a broad-brush approach and awarded ASGI half of its costs.

The Court also decided that the costs relating to the contempt application against Ms Manti should be payable by Mr Manti rather than by Ms Manti. The reason given was that Ms Manti did not play an active role in the relevant events and conduct, and her role in the litigation was very limited.

As to the 28 February 2025 hearing, the Court treated that separately because the hearing had to be adjourned after a substantial body of material was filed shortly before it. In those circumstances, the Court considered it appropriate that Mr Manti pay ASGI’s costs of that hearing.

One of the most commercially important parts of the judgment is the refusal of indemnity costs. ASGI argued for indemnity costs, and the Court accepted that in contempt proceedings it is common practice for costs to be awarded on that basis. The Court also referred to authority recognising that in many contempt cases there will be powerful discretionary considerations favouring indemnity costs.

But the Court drew an important line between common practice and legal entitlement. It said there is no general principle or rule of law that costs in contempt cases must be awarded on an indemnity basis. That meant the Court still had to look closely at the character of this particular application.

Moshinsky J concluded that, in this case, the contempt application was best characterised as an interlocutory skirmish forming part of the overall proceeding. The broader proceeding arose out of Mr Manti’s dismissal as an employee or officer of ASGI. The judge said the contempt application seemed somewhat of a distraction from progressing the proceeding, although it had some utility in exposing factual detail relevant to the case generally.

That characterisation drove the result. Because the application was treated as a side contest within the larger litigation, rather than as a separate and self-contained enforcement proceeding, the Court considered party and party costs more appropriate than indemnity costs. For businesses, that is a significant point. Even serious allegations and some proved breaches do not guarantee a more generous costs order if the Court thinks the application mainly complicated or diverted the main case.

ASGI also asked the Court to have the costs taxed forthwith, or determined on a lump sum basis forthwith, rather than waiting until the end of the proceeding. The Court refused that request.

The judgment refers to r 40.13 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, which provides that if an order for costs is made on an interlocutory application, the party in whose favour the order is made must not tax those costs until the proceeding is finished. The Court noted that it can depart from that position and order immediate taxation, and that this is commonly done in contempt applications. Even so, the Court decided not to do so here.

The reason was consistent with the rest of the judgment. Because the contempt application was best characterised as an interlocutory skirmish within the broader proceeding, the Court considered it appropriate that the costs be taxed at the end of the proceeding. That means ASGI obtained a costs order, but not immediate quantification and recovery through taxation.

For businesses, this timing issue matters almost as much as the percentage recovery. A costs order that cannot be taxed until the end of the main case may offer less immediate commercial benefit than expected. It can affect budgeting, provisioning, and settlement strategy. A business deciding whether to bring an interlocutory enforcement application should therefore think not only about whether it may win costs, but also about when those costs are likely to become recoverable in practice.

This case is best read as a practical warning about the cost consequences of enforcement applications inside larger litigation. If your business believes another party has breached court orders, a contempt application may still be justified. But this judgment shows that the Court may later ask a series of practical questions that go beyond whether some allegations were proved.

The Court may look at how many charges actually succeeded, how many failed, whether some were abandoned or adjourned, whether the application advanced the main proceeding, and whether the costs can sensibly be separated by issue. If the answers point to mixed success and administrative difficulty, the Court may use a broad-brush percentage approach rather than trying to allocate every dollar of legal spend to a particular charge.

The judgment also shows that procedural conduct matters. The adjourned hearing on 28 February 2025 produced a separate adverse costs order because a substantial body of material was filed shortly before the hearing. That is a reminder that late evidence and poor litigation discipline can create direct cost exposure independent of the final merits result.

Businesses should also be realistic about the difference between party and party costs and indemnity costs. Even where contempt is established, the Court may still award only party and party costs. In practical terms, that usually means the successful party may recover less than its full legal spend.

This page is based on the Federal Court judgment Aaron Sansoni Group International Pty Ltd v Manti (No 3) [2025] FCA 1568, dated 11 December 2025. The reasons expressly state that they should be read together with the earlier judgment Aaron Sansoni Group International Pty Ltd v Manti [2025] FCA 1229, dated 9 October 2025.

The present judgment provides a strong basis for explaining the costs outcome, including the mixed success analysis, the broad-brush 50% costs order, the separate order for the adjourned hearing, the refusal of indemnity costs, and the refusal of immediate taxation. It does not provide a full narrative of the underlying contempt conduct or the broader merits dispute. Readers wanting the full factual background should read the earlier reasons as well.