Greer v Bandjalang Aboriginal Corporation Prescribed Body Corporate RNTBC (No 3)

Greer v Bandjalang Aboriginal Corporation Prescribed Body Corporate RNTBC (No 3) [2025] FCA 1674 is a Federal Court decision about whether interlocutory injunctions should stay in place after a major change in an employer’s governance. The injunctions had previously stopped Bandjalang from terminating Ms Greer’s employment and from starting a misconduct investigation while her Fair Work claim proceeded.

The court held that the later appointment of a special administrator under the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) was a material change in circumstances. Because the former directors no longer controlled the corporation and no longer had power to make employment decisions, the threat that had justified the injunctions had dissipated. The orders were therefore set aside.

For business readers, this is best understood as a case about adverse action risk, interim court orders and changing control of an organisation. It is not a case about unfair contract terms, even though the topic labels attached to the record suggest otherwise.

Ms Greer was the Chief Executive Officer of Bandjalang. The judgment says she had repeatedly complained that she was being threatened and bullied by a small group of members, including at least two directors. In July 2025, she made a complaint to SafeWork NSW about her treatment.

The next events were central to the dispute. An email dated 6 August 2025 purported to call a “member led general meeting” at which a resolution was to be proposed to terminate her employment. The proposed reasons included that she had made the SafeWork NSW complaint, as well as allegations of serious misconduct, breach of contract, fraud and threats. On 10 August 2025, after that meeting, a “formal notice of termination” signed by two directors was sent to her.

The validity of the meeting and any resolutions passed at it was disputed. That matters because the court was dealing with an urgent and contested employment conflict, not a settled factual record. Ms Greer then commenced Federal Court proceedings alleging, among other things, that Bandjalang had contravened and was threatening to contravene section 340 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by purporting to terminate her employment and otherwise taking adverse action because she had made complaints about her treatment, including the SafeWork NSW complaint.

Longbottom J granted interlocutory injunctions restraining Bandjalang from terminating her employment and from commencing a misconduct investigation. Those orders were designed to preserve the position while the underlying claims were litigated.

The turning point came on 11 December 2025, when a special administrator was appointed to Bandjalang under the CATSI Act. Bandjalang then urgently applied to set aside the injunctions. Its argument was not simply that the earlier orders had been wrong when made. Instead, it said the governance structure had changed so significantly that the balance of convenience no longer supported keeping the orders in place.

The immediate legal issue was narrow but important. The court had to decide whether interlocutory injunctions made on 10 October 2025 should be set aside. The relevant principle was straightforward: under the Federal Court Rules, the court may vary or set aside an interlocutory injunction, and the authorities recognise that this can occur where there has been a material change in circumstances.

So the real question was whether the appointment of a special administrator materially changed the circumstances that had originally justified the injunctions. Longbottom J had earlier found a prima facie case of breach of section 340 of the Fair Work Act in respect of the SafeWork NSW complaint, and had concluded that the balance of convenience favoured interim relief. Rangiah J therefore had to reassess that balance after the governance change.

The court’s focus was practical. The earlier injunctions had been granted because of a particular threat: that some directors might terminate Ms Greer’s employment or investigate her for misconduct because she had made a workplace complaint. The court had to ask whether that threat still existed once the directors lost office and a special administrator became the only person with power to conduct the corporation’s affairs, including employment decisions.

The court treated the appointment of the special administrator as a substantial governance change. The judgment summarised the practical effect of the CATSI Act provisions relied on by the court. Upon appointment, the office of each director became vacant. No person other than the special administrator could perform or exercise a function or power as an officer of the corporation. The special administrator became responsible for the conduct of the corporation’s affairs and had control of its business, property and affairs, including the power to engage or discharge employees.

That statutory shift mattered because the alleged section 340 risk had been tied to the conduct of directors. Once those directors no longer had any power of control over Bandjalang’s affairs, they could no longer terminate Ms Greer’s employment or carry out any investigation into alleged misconduct on behalf of the corporation. In the court’s words, they could not take action during the special administration that could cause Bandjalang to contravene section 340 in the way previously feared.

The special administrator, Mr McQuoid, gave evidence about his role and concerns. He said his aim was to restore the corporation to financial and organisational health and then return control to members. He said he needed to review Ms Greer’s employment to determine whether Bandjalang could continue to afford her salary. His audit was expected to conclude in early January 2026, and his preliminary view was that the corporation could not afford to continue employing her.

He also deposed that the corporation’s financial position was uncertain, that current liabilities might exceed current assets, and that he had significant concerns about the way the corporation had been managed over the previous 12 months or so. Those concerns included a lack of basic financial oversight, failure to remit employee superannuation deductions and failure to pay workers’ compensation premiums. He had formed the view that the corporation could operate efficiently with only one full time employee, and that the role should be a business manager paid less than half of the CEO’s salary. He also said that because his appointment was only for six months, decisions or changes needed to be made quickly and effectively.

Importantly, he stated that if action were taken in respect of Ms Greer’s employment, it would result from his investigations, audit and judgments about how best to restore the corporation to financial health and good corporate governance. He said he would not have regard to the dispute, the claims filed by Ms Greer, or any complaints or enquiries she had made, except to the extent matters arose from his statutory duties.

Rangiah J set aside the interlocutory injunctions. The court accepted that the appointment of the special administrator had brought about a substantial change in Bandjalang’s governance and that this changed the balance of convenience.

The key reasoning was that the fundamental factor underlying Longbottom J’s earlier orders was the risk that some directors would, in contravention of section 340 of the Fair Work Act, attempt to terminate Ms Greer’s employment or conduct a misconduct investigation because she had made a complaint to SafeWork NSW. Once the special administrator was appointed, that threat had dissipated because the former directors no longer had any control over the corporation’s affairs and no power to take those steps.

The court accepted that the special administrator would likely make decisions about Ms Greer’s employment and might conduct an investigation into misconduct. But the court treated that as a different issue. On the evidence before it, any such action by the special administrator would be taken for what he perceived to be in the best interests of Bandjalang, and not because Ms Greer had made a complaint to SafeWork NSW.

Ms Greer challenged the special administrator’s evidence about the corporation’s financial position and about the need for any redundancy. She pointed out that the audit had not yet been concluded. The court said those submissions were largely beside the point for the present application. The injunctions had been granted because of a threatened contravention of section 340. They were not to be maintained as a general protective measure against the possibility that her employment might later be terminated for an entirely different reason.

The court also addressed the possibility that the administration would end and the directors might later return, reviving the earlier risk. It said that was only one of several possibilities. If that circumstance later arose, it would be open to Ms Greer to make another application for interlocutory injunctions.

One of the most useful parts of the judgment for employers is the court’s clear separation of two different Fair Work pathways. The injunctions were tied to an alleged section 340 adverse action problem. In substance, that allegation was that Bandjalang, through certain directors, had acted or threatened to act against Ms Greer because she made a workplace complaint.

The court then said that if the special administrator later decided to make her position redundant and there was no genuine basis for that redundancy, she could seek an unfair dismissal remedy under section 390 of the Fair Work Act, including reinstatement. That does not mean the court decided there would be an unfair dismissal. It means the court recognised that a later dismissal by a different decision-maker for a different stated reason would raise a different legal question.

For businesses, this distinction matters. Adverse action focuses on prohibited reasons, such as acting against an employee because they exercised a workplace right or made a complaint. Unfair dismissal focuses on whether a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, or whether a claimed redundancy was genuine. The same employment dispute can move between these categories depending on who acted, when they acted, and why they acted.

That is why decision-making discipline matters so much. If an employee has made a complaint, later employment action should be carefully documented. The organisation should be able to identify the actual decision-maker, the legal authority they held at the time, the operational or financial reasons relied on, and the evidence supporting those reasons. Mixed motives, informal board action and poor records can make that much harder.

This case does not say that appointing an administrator wipes away employment risk. It says something narrower and more practical. If an interim order was granted to stop a specific threatened contravention by specific decision-makers, and those decision-makers later lose all power to act, the court may conclude that the original threat no longer justifies the order.

That can be highly relevant for corporations, not for profits and other organisations facing governance breakdown, external intervention or urgent restructuring. A court will look at the real source of the risk. If the source disappears because control has shifted to an independent statutory officeholder, the court may reassess whether the injunction should continue.

At the same time, a new controller must still act lawfully. If they dismiss an employee, investigate misconduct, restructure roles or make positions redundant, those steps can still be challenged under the appropriate legal framework. The point is that the legal framework may change. A complaint-based adverse action case is not automatically the same as a later redundancy or unfair dismissal dispute.

Businesses should also note the procedural lesson. Interim orders are often granted quickly to preserve the status quo. They are not final findings. If there is a serious change in circumstances, such as a change in control, insolvency event or statutory appointment, it may be worth considering whether the balance of convenience has shifted enough to justify a fresh application.

Does this case mean an administrator can dismiss staff without risk? No. The case only says that the existing injunctions should not remain in place once the original section 340 risk had dissipated. Any later dismissal still needs its own legal basis and may still be challenged.

Does a governance change automatically end an injunction? No. The court must be satisfied there has been a material change in circumstances and that the balance of convenience no longer supports the order.

What should an organisation record when control changes? It should record who now has legal authority, what statutory or governance framework applies, what employment decisions are being considered, and the operational or financial reasons for those decisions.

What if the old decision-makers later return? The court said a fresh injunction application could be made if the earlier risk later re-emerged.

The judgment was delivered on 22 December 2025 by Rangiah J in the Fair Work Division of the Federal Court of Australia. It concerned an urgent application heard the same day. The orders made by Longbottom J on 10 October 2025 were set aside. The judgment also records that the special administrator was appointed on 11 December 2025 and that his audit was expected to conclude in early January 2026.

The decision is procedural and interlocutory in nature. It should not be read as a final determination of the underlying employment dispute.