Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Qteq Pty Ltd

This proceeding was brought by the ACCC against Qteq Pty Ltd and Simon Ashton in the Federal Court of Australia. It arose out of dealings in the coal seam gas industry, where Qteq supplied goods and services to well operators. The ACCC alleged that over a period from June 2017 to June 2019, Qteq made six attempts either to enter into, or to induce others to enter into, contracts, arrangements or understandings containing cartel provisions.

The case was not framed around one completed cartel agreement. Instead, it focused on a series of alleged attempts involving different counterparties and different commercial settings. The judgment headings identify three allegations involving Pro-Test, two involving Easternwell and one involving Firetail. Those allegations touched on customer allocation, tender conduct, market sharing and non-compete restraints. That makes the case commercially important because it deals with the kinds of discussions that can arise in real business development activity, especially in concentrated or specialist markets.

The Court record also shows that the ACCC alleged the conduct was carried out principally through Mr Ashton, with the conduct and intention of other Qteq personnel also relied on. Mr Ashton was separately alleged to have personally attempted to induce each competitor or likely competitor to enter into each alleged arrangement. So this was not only a case about corporate exposure. It also raised personal exposure for a senior executive involved in the discussions.

The published headings break the case into six alleged attempts. The first three concerned Pro-Test. They were described as a 2017 customer allocation understanding, a 2017 QGC tender understanding and a 2019 market sharing understanding. The next two concerned Easternwell and were described as non-compete agreements in 2017 and in 2018-2019. The sixth concerned Firetail and was described as a September 2017 understanding.

The catchwords summarise the alleged cartel provisions at a high level. They say the proposed arrangements would have allocated customers, limited bids and prevented, restricted or limited the supply of services in competition with Qteq. Those are classic cartel themes. They go to the heart of whether competitors are being asked to stop competing and instead coordinate who gets work, who bids, or who supplies.

The headings also show that the Court examined a wide range of commercial material and conduct. For the Pro-Test allegations, the Court looked at discussions between Mr Ashton and Mr Dabrowski, a dinner at Kingsley’s, a meeting at Qteq’s offices, and pricing provided for GeoPSI to Pro-Test. For the Easternwell allegations, the Court looked at discussions beginning in November 2017, a first Qteq NDA, its rejection, later contact about that document, and then a second Qteq NDA and revised version in 2018-2019. For Firetail, the Court examined email chains on 19 and 20 September 2017, access to equipment, communications with customers and the company’s financial position.

That level of detail matters for business readers because it shows how cartel cases are often built. They are not limited to formal contracts. Courts can examine dinners, phone calls, draft documents, pricing exchanges, tender timing, internal perceptions of competitive threats and the surrounding commercial context.

The central issue was whether Qteq and Mr Ashton had attempted to make, or attempted to induce others to make, contracts, arrangements or understandings containing cartel provisions under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). The catchwords show the Court had to decide whether the alleged counterparties were competitors or likely competitors of Qteq at the relevant times, and whether the conduct was merely unilateral or instead amounted to an attempt to arrive at, or induce, an understanding.

That distinction between unilateral conduct and an attempt to reach an understanding is important. A business can make its own strategic decisions about pricing, tenders or customers. But once it starts trying to coordinate those matters with a competitor or likely competitor, the legal character of the conduct can change. The Court therefore had to look closely at what was said, what was proposed, what documents were circulated and what the commercial purpose of the conduct was.

The headings show the Court also considered the purpose condition and the competition condition for the alleged cartel provisions. In practical terms, that meant asking whether the proposed terms were directed at allocating customers, limiting bids or restricting supply in competition, and whether the parties were in a competitive relationship of the kind required by the legislation.

There was also a statutory interpretation issue about s 45AC and the scope of the deeming provisions, including whether a broader definition of party applied in attempt or attempt-to-induce cases. In addition, the Court considered defences and exceptions, including an exclusive dealing exception raised in relation to the Easternwell allegations.

The clearest overall result appears in the catchwords. They state that five of the six attempts alleged by the ACCC were established, and that this was so in relation to both the first respondent, Qteq, and the second respondent, Mr Ashton. That means the ACCC substantially succeeded on liability.

The orders show that the judgment was not the end of the proceeding. After delivering reasons on liability, the Court directed the parties to confer and provide draft or competing declarations of contravention, an order extending the time for any appeal proceeding until after judgment on relief, and procedural orders for the preparation and hearing of the relief phase. That indicates the Court dealt with liability first, with declarations, penalties and any other relief to follow.

The published record also shows that the Court conducted a detailed allegation-by-allegation analysis. The headings refer to witness credibility, contemporaneous records, the wording of draft clauses, the structure of QGC tenders, access to equipment, and evidence about whether particular businesses were competitive threats. The Court also considered and resolved issues about purpose, competition and exceptions. However, without setting out a fully verified allegation-by-allegation narrative here, the safest public summary is that five of the six alleged attempts succeeded on liability and one did not.

One of the most useful features of the published judgment structure is the range of conduct it shows the Court examined. This was not a case confined to one formal contract. The headings refer to dinners, meetings, conversations after tender releases, pricing information, draft NDAs, revised draft clauses, email chains, customer communications and evidence about access to equipment and capability.

For businesses, that matters because competition law risk often arises in ordinary commercial interactions. A dinner with a competitor, a follow-up email after a tender release, or a draft confidentiality document can all become central evidence if they suggest an attempt to coordinate market behaviour. The Court’s focus on contemporaneous records also shows why internal discipline matters. Emails, draft mark-ups and pricing exchanges can be more persuasive than later explanations.

The Easternwell allegations are especially instructive because the headings show the Court examined the plain language of specific clauses in draft documents and then considered purpose, competition and an exclusive dealing exception. That is a practical warning that a restraint hidden inside a broader commercial document may still be analysed as a cartel provision if its substance is to stop a competitor from pursuing or performing work except in concert with your business.

The Firetail headings show another important point. The Court looked at whether Firetail was in competition or likely competition by examining incorporation and intentions, access to gauges, discussions with suppliers, customer communications and financial difficulty. So the competition analysis can be fact-heavy and forward-looking. A business does not need to be fully established in the market to be relevant if it is a realistic competitive threat.

Businesses should read this case as a practical warning about competitor-facing conduct. The risk is not limited to obvious price-fixing. The Court record shows allegations involving customer allocation, bid limitation, market sharing and restrictions on supplying services in competition. Those issues can arise in many commercial settings, especially where businesses are discussing tenders, subcontracting, collaboration, equipment access or strategic partnerships.

It is also important that the case involved competitors or likely competitors. In practice, that means your team cannot assume a discussion is safe just because the other business is not currently winning the same work. If it is capable of entering the market, supplying the service, or being perceived as a competitive threat, the competition condition may still be live.

Another practical lesson is that labels do not control the legal outcome. Calling a document an NDA, collaboration agreement or commercial proposal does not prevent scrutiny if the substance of the clause is to stop a competitor from pursuing customers, bidding independently or supplying services except in concert with your business.

For directors and senior managers, the personal exposure point is also significant. The proceeding was brought against both the company and Mr Ashton. Businesses should therefore ensure that competitor contact rules are not just policy documents sitting on a shelf. Staff who attend industry dinners, negotiate tenders, discuss teaming arrangements or circulate draft restraints need training and escalation pathways.

The judgment was delivered on 17 April 2025 by Bromwich J in the Federal Court of Australia. The hearing dates recorded in the judgment were 11 to 15, 18, and 26 to 27 March 2024. The orders made on 17 April 2025 show that the parties were required to confer and provide draft declarations and proposed procedural orders for the relief phase by 7 May 2025, unless further time was allowed.

That means the published decision is a liability judgment, not the final end of the matter. Readers should check whether declarations, penalties, other relief or any appeal have since been determined.

This page summarises the Federal Court proceeding Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Qteq Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 371 using the published judgment record, including the catchwords, orders, introductory paragraphs and detailed judgment headings.

The overall liability result is clear from the catchwords and orders. However, readers wanting the exact finding on each of the six alleged attempts, or the final position on relief and any appeal, should check the full reasons and later court developments.