EV20 Consulting Group Pty Ltd v Paperless Warehousing Pty Ltd (No 2)

This case sits inside a broader software dispute between EV20 Consulting Group Pty Ltd and Paperless Warehousing Pty Ltd. The public judgment here is not the first decision in the matter. It is a follow-up decision called a No 2 judgment, delivered after the Court had already given reasons in April 2025 about default judgment.

The immediate issue was not to decide the whole software dispute from scratch. Instead, Paperless asked the Court to correct two errors in the earlier reasons. The Court accepted that it had made those errors and revisited the earlier result. That procedural step mattered because it changed the position of one individual and corrected the reasoning about another.

The judgment shows that Paperless had brought a cross-claim against EV20 and several individuals. The cross-claim involved copyright infringement, authorising copyright infringement and misuse of confidential information. The Court's orders identify the subject matter as parts of the Paperless warehouse management system, including server software, specified programs, front-end client software, a program called Model.vb, source code, a decryption password and technical means used to enforce or measure concurrent-user licensing.

The commercial picture that emerges is a dispute about software development, licensing and services in relation to a warehouse management system. The pleadings referred to EV20 developing an impugned WMS, granting or purporting to grant licences to EV20 customers to use Paperless WMS or the impugned WMS, and offering services in relation to those systems. The No 2 judgment does not fully retell how that relationship developed, but it clearly shows the dispute was about identified software works and identified confidential technical material, not just general know-how.

In the earlier judgment, Burley J had decided that default judgment should be entered against Mr Symons, but not against Mr Pearce or Mr McKerrell. After Paperless filed draft orders, it pointed out two problems in the earlier reasons.

The first problem was factual and procedural. The Court had referred to a defence document as if it contained admissions by Mr Symons. It did not. That defence had been filed on behalf of a number of parties, but not Mr Symons, so those admissions could not be used against him in the way the earlier reasons had suggested.

The second problem was that the Court had overlooked part of the pleaded case against Mr Pearce. In particular, the Court had missed a cross-reference to a pleading that said EV20's relevant activities were done with the approval of, at the direction of, under the control of, or with the actual or constructive knowledge of each individual cross-respondent, including Mr Symons and Mr Pearce.

That meant the Court had to answer two linked questions. First, could it vary the earlier default judgment decision? Second, once the errors were corrected, what did the pleadings and deemed admissions justify by way of judgment against the individuals?

The Court said it could vary the earlier decision because a decision under rule 5.23 is interlocutory. It does not finally determine the rights of the parties. Under rule 39.05(c), interlocutory orders may be varied. The Court also referred to the broader principle that the interests of justice can justify reopening a judgment where the Court has proceeded on a misapprehension of fact or law.

Burley J held that it was in the interests of justice to revise the earlier reasons. The Court said both corrections raised by Paperless were correct. The result was to affirm the earlier decision as it concerned Mr Symons, but on a corrected basis, and to alter the earlier decision as it concerned Mr Pearce.

The important point is how the Court got there. The Court made clear that, for the purposes of rule 5.23, the relevant allegations in the cross-claim could be deemed admitted. The Court said that, having regard to those admissions, it was unnecessary to go beyond the pleading to conclude that each of Mr Symons and Mr Pearce was liable for authorising infringement of the pleaded acts of copyright infringement.

For Mr Symons, the Court also said a similar cross-reference in the pleading dealing with breaches of confidentiality was sufficient to conclude, on the face of the deemed admissions in the pleading, that he was liable to default judgment for that cause of action as well.

This is an important procedural nuance. The Court was not saying that it had heard and accepted a full body of contested evidence proving every underlying fact after trial. It was saying that, in the default judgment context, the pleaded allegations were enough because they were deemed admitted. That is why business readers should be careful not to overread the decision as a final merits ruling on every factual controversy in the broader dispute.

The Court did not change the earlier position concerning Mr McKerrell. It noted that no submissions had been made suggesting a similar error in the earlier finding that there was insufficient material to find him liable for authorising or engaging in infringing conduct.

The orders were commercially significant. First, EV20's own claim against Paperless was dismissed under rule 5.23(1)(b), and EV20 was ordered to pay Paperless's costs of that claim on a party and party basis, to be quantified as a lump sum by a Registrar.

Second, on the cross-claim, judgment was entered against EV20 for copyright infringement, authorising copyright infringement and misuse of confidential information. Judgment was entered against Mr Symons for authorising copyright infringement and misuse of confidential information. Judgment was entered against Mr Pearce for authorising copyright infringement.

Third, the Court made permanent injunctions. Each defaulting cross-respondent was permanently restrained, without Paperless's licence, from reproducing in Australia the whole or a substantial part of any of the identified computer program works in material form, communicating them to the public, or authorising those acts. EV20 and Mr Symons were also permanently restrained from using any of the identified confidential information without Paperless's prior written consent.

Fourth, the Court ordered pecuniary relief by way of an inquiry into Paperless's damages, including additional or exemplary damages, or alternatively an account of the defaulting cross-respondents' profits, at Paperless's election. That means the financial consequences were not finished with the liability ruling. There was still a process to determine the money outcome.

Fifth, the Court ordered delivery up or destruction. For reproductions and documents capable of delivery up, each defaulting cross-respondent had to deliver up for destruction all whole or substantial part reproductions of the computer program works and all documents embodying the confidential information in that party's control, verified by oath or affirmation, within 21 days. For material not capable of delivery up, each defaulting cross-respondent had to permanently destroy it, again verified by oath or affirmation within 21 days.

Finally, the Court ordered the defaulting cross-respondents to pay Paperless's costs of the cross-claim jointly and severally on a party and party basis, with the amount to be determined by a Registrar.

The orders also carried a penal notice addressed to EV20, Mr Symons and Mr Pearce. That is a serious warning. It stated that if a person bound by the order refused or neglected to do an act required by the order, or disobeyed the order by doing an act the order prohibited, that person would be liable to imprisonment, sequestration of property or other punishment.

For business owners, this case is best read as a warning about both software governance and litigation process. On the software side, the orders show how broad the protected material can be. It was not just code in the abstract. The orders identified server software, client software, specific programs, source code, a decryption password and technical means of controlling concurrent users. If your business works with software products, implementation tools or customer licensing controls, you need to know exactly what belongs to whom and what your licence actually allows.

The case also shows that personal exposure can arise from involvement in decision-making, not only from direct hands-on copying. The pleading relied on allegations that EV20's activities were done with the approval of, at the direction of, under the control of, or with the actual or constructive knowledge of the individual cross-respondents. In practical terms, founders, directors, CTOs, product leads and implementation managers should be cautious about approving customer migrations, code reuse, licence workarounds, source-code access or support arrangements involving software that may belong to another party.

Just as importantly, this is a process case. The Court's reasoning was limited to what could be established through the pleadings and deemed admissions in a default judgment context. That means a business can suffer major consequences without a full trial if it fails to engage properly with the proceeding. Here, the result included injunctions, destruction obligations, a damages or profits inquiry, costs and a penal notice.

Businesses should also note the Court's careful distinction between a full merits assessment and a default judgment analysis. That distinction matters when reading the case publicly. It does not reduce the seriousness of the orders, but it does explain the basis on which the Court reached them.

The judgment was delivered by Burley J in the Federal Court of Australia on 14 May 2025. It followed an earlier judgment dated 8 April 2025 in which the Court had directed Paperless to provide draft short minutes of orders and had reached the earlier default judgment conclusions later revisited in this No 2 decision.

This page explains the No 2 judgment itself. Because the Court expressly said these reasons assume familiarity with the earlier judgment, readers wanting the full factual and commercial background should read this decision together with EV20 Consulting Group Pty Ltd v Paperless Warehousing Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 328.