Galinovic v Singtel Optus Pty Limited

This case arose from an urgent attempt to stop a telecommunications provider from terminating services used by the applicant. Ms Christina Galinovic asked the Federal Court to restrain Singtel Optus Pty Ltd and Optus Billing Services Pty Ltd from disconnecting or interfering with several services connected to her account, including broadband, a modem back-up service, an Optus email address and a mobile number.

The application was heard urgently by Meagher J on 22 May 2025. Ms Galinovic appeared for herself. The judgment records that the broader proceeding had already been started, but that no concise statement or sufficient affidavit supporting the originating application had yet been filed. That is important because it shows the Court was dealing with an urgent interim application before the full substantive case had been properly developed.

Ms Galinovic sought wide-ranging interim orders. She wanted the Court to stop Optus from acting on a termination notice dated 24 April 2025, stop any credit management action, require Optus to continue supplying services on the same terms as before, preserve a claimed $20 monthly discount, and require Optus to process what she described as bills of exchange. She also sought protection against what she described as retaliatory conduct.

The commercial setting was straightforward. The services had been supplied since 2021 under Optus Consumer Terms on a month-to-month or non-fixed term basis. The dispute then expanded into arguments about payment methods, discounts, alleged misleading or deceptive conduct, alleged unconscionable conduct, and whether Optus could validly terminate the services.

The judgment identifies the key contractual documents and conduct that shaped the dispute. The starting point was the Optus Consumer Terms. Those terms said Optus could terminate services on 30 days' written notice where the services were on a non fixed-length agreement. The terms also said customers could pay invoices using the payment methods set out in the bill's "How to Pay" section or on Optus' website.

The evidence before the Court included a screenshot showing the accepted payment methods. Those were direct debit, credit, debit or charge card, BPAY, or in-person payment at Australia Post by cash, EFTPOS, cheque or money order. Bills of exchange were not listed.

Ms Galinovic said she paid by bills of exchange. The examples before the Court were handwritten statements written across Optus invoices. The judgment records wording to the effect that the invoice was conditionally accepted for value and surrender for value without dishonour, followed by identifying numbers. Correspondence in evidence showed that Optus had told her it did not accept payment by bills of exchange.

Ms Galinovic also relied on alleged discount arrangements. She contended that an Optus agent had offered her a discounted rate for six months and that this showed a fixed term contract. She also said Optus had not honoured discounts at various times, although the Court noted that the material appeared to show Optus had credited her account from time to time. She further alleged misleading or deceptive conduct, unconscionable conduct, accord and satisfaction, and even possible conversion in relation to the bills of exchange.

The Court did not treat the urgent hearing as a general inquiry into all of those complaints. Instead, it focused on whether any of them justified immediate injunctive relief stopping Optus from exercising its contractual termination rights.

The legal question was not whether every allegation made by Ms Galinovic would ultimately succeed. The immediate question was whether the Court should grant an interlocutory injunction under its powers while the broader case remained unresolved.

The judgment refers to the usual two-part approach for interlocutory injunctions. First, the applicant must show a prima facie case or serious question to be tried. Secondly, the Court considers the balance of convenience, including practical matters such as hardship, adequacy of damages, alternative remedies, delay and the likely consequences of granting or refusing relief.

That framework mattered because Ms Galinovic's submissions were wide ranging. They included arguments based on the Bills of Exchange Act 1909 (Cth), the Banking Act 1959 (Cth), the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax Transition) Act 1999 (Cth), alleged misleading or deceptive conduct, alleged unconscionable conduct, alleged agreement to a six-month discount, alleged accord and satisfaction, and complaints about the way Optus had handled the dispute. She also argued that disconnection would cause irreparable harm to her business and that it was too late to establish alternative services.

The Court's task was narrower. It had to decide whether those arguments, on the material then available, were enough to justify stopping Optus from acting on the termination notice before trial. In particular, the Court had to assess whether the applicant had shown a serious legal issue on the termination point and whether the practical position really required preservation by injunction.

Meagher J dismissed the interlocutory application and ordered Ms Galinovic to pay the costs of that application. The Court held that she had failed to establish a prima facie case or serious question to be tried.

The key reasoning appears at the point where the Court addressed the termination issue directly. The Court said that Ms Galinovic could not succeed on the argument that she had not accepted the termination and that the termination was therefore invalid. The Court also said that, to the extent there had been an offer of a discount on price for a period of time, that did not mean the Consumer Terms ceased to apply. On the terms before the Court, Optus could cancel the service at any time by giving at least 30 days' notice, and notice had been given in accordance with those terms.

That reasoning is important for business readers. The Court did not accept that the applicant's arguments about bills of exchange created the kind of serious legal issue that justified urgent interim relief against termination. The judgment notes that her submissions on serious question were principally directed to the validity of paying by bills of exchange, but the Court did not treat that as enough to stop Optus from relying on the contract's termination clause.

The Court also said there was no reason to preserve the status quo. In fact, the Court considered that the application was not really preserving the status quo at all, but instead sought to deprive the respondents of their contractual right to terminate in accordance with the Consumer Terms. The Court further held that if Ms Galinovic later established losses from wrongful termination, damages were clearly the appropriate remedy.

A major part of the judgment concerns practical transition steps. Ms Galinovic argued that disconnection would cause significant and irreparable harm to her business. She said loss of her email address would disrupt client relationships and that an inoperative mobile number would stop clients reaching her. Those concerns are commercially real for many businesses.

But the Court looked closely at whether the harm could be reduced by timely migration. Optus relied on evidence from Mr Max Petro. According to that evidence, Ms Galinovic could maintain her mobile number if she transferred it before 25 May 2025. Optus had also offered to assist with that process if she requested assistance by 3 pm on 23 May 2025. The evidence was that transferring the mobile number would take between 15 minutes and an hour.

The evidence also said that porting a fixed internet service would take about 48 hours. As for the email address, the Court accepted that Ms Galinovic could not retain her current Optus email address when moving to another provider. Even so, Optus had offered an additional period for her to obtain a new email address and notify customers. Mr Petro's evidence was that this did not take a lot of time to effect.

On that material, the Court concluded that if Ms Galinovic had focused on transitioning her telecommunications services from the time she received the termination notice on 24 April 2025, she would have had ample time to make the necessary arrangements. That finding was central to the balance of convenience. It meant the Court was not persuaded that an injunction was needed to avoid irreparable harm.

For businesses, this is one of the most practical parts of the case. Courts will look not only at the seriousness of the alleged legal wrong, but also at what could realistically have been done to reduce the damage. If migration is possible within the notice period, that can weigh heavily against urgent injunctive relief.

This case is a practical lesson in contract management and operational resilience. If your business uses month-to-month or non-fixed term telecommunications services, you should assume the provider may have a contractual right to terminate on notice. A dispute about billing, discounts or customer service does not automatically suspend that right.

It is also a warning about relying on non-standard payment theories where the contract already specifies accepted payment methods. The Court's focus remained on the agreed terms and the provider's stated payment options. If your business wants to use an unusual payment method, it should be expressly agreed in writing and reflected in the account arrangements. Otherwise, you may find yourself arguing a point that does not stop the provider from acting under the contract.

The case also shows the danger of tying core business identity to a provider-specific email address. The Court accepted that the email address could not be retained when moving providers. That creates a real continuity risk. Using a business-owned domain for email can reduce that exposure because the address can usually move with you even if the provider changes.

Finally, if urgent court relief is being considered, speed and evidence matter. The applicant here was self-represented and the application was urgent. The Court still required a proper basis for concluding there was a serious question to be tried and that the balance of convenience favoured intervention. A business seeking urgent relief should be ready with the contract, the notice, the billing history, evidence of actual operational harm, and evidence showing why migration or damages would not be enough.

The judgment was delivered by Meagher J in the Federal Court of Australia on 22 May 2025. The hearing took place the same day. The applicant appeared in person. The respondents were represented by counsel, with Gadens Lawyers on the record.

The Court noted a complaint by Ms Galinovic that it was procedurally unfair for the respondents' submissions and affidavit to be filed only on the morning of the hearing. The Court was satisfied, however, that the respondents had moved as quickly as possible after being served on 20 May 2025.

The judgment also records that the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman had investigated Ms Galinovic's complaints and would no longer continue handling them. The Ombudsman material quoted by the Court said Optus' response was consistent with the law, good practice in the telecommunications industry, and what the Ombudsman considered fair and reasonable. It also said Optus' decision to terminate was a commercial decision made in line with its customer terms, that adequate notice had been given, and that Ms Galinovic should organise another provider before termination to avoid losing her number and to mitigate potential losses.

Because this was an interlocutory decision, it should be used carefully. It is a strong practical authority on urgent relief, contractual termination rights and migration planning in this factual setting. It is not a final determination of all underlying allegations between the parties.