Anthony v Apple Inc

This decision sits inside a much larger fight about how Apple and Google run their app ecosystems. Beach J said four proceedings were before the Court in a joint trial over several months. Two were Epic's own cases against Apple and Google. The other two were representative proceedings brought on behalf of users and developers who said they were affected by similar conduct.

The class actions were not simply complaints that app store fees were high. They were framed as competition law proceedings. The central commercial allegation was that Apple and Google used restrictive conduct in app distribution and payment markets, and that this allowed them to charge developers materially higher commissions on paid app downloads and in-app digital content than would have been charged in a more competitive market.

That distinction matters for business readers. A platform fee can look like an ordinary commercial term, but in a competition case the Court may ask a different question: what would the fee have been if the market had worked without the impugned restrictions? That is the overcharge issue that gave these class actions their separate importance.

In the Apple class action, the applicants were David Anthony and Dark Ice Interactive Pty Ltd. Mr Anthony was an iPhone user who purchased apps and in-app digital content on iOS during the relevant period. Dark Ice was a developer applicant and also appeared in the Google class action.

In the Google class action, the applicants were Brett McDonald and Dark Ice Interactive Pty Ltd. Mr McDonald was an Android device user who purchased apps and made in-app purchases through the Play Store during the relevant period.

The group members in each class action included both sides of the platform. On Apple, the represented groups included people who purchased iOS apps or in-app digital content through the Australian App Store, and people who supplied iOS apps or in-app digital content through that store. On Google, the represented groups included equivalent Android purchasers and developers using the Australian Play Store.

That structure is commercially important because the Court also said pass-through had been deferred. In other words, even if developers were overcharged, a later question may be whether some of that burden was passed on to users through higher prices. This judgment did not decide that split.

The public extract does not reproduce the full detailed liability reasoning, but it does identify the broad conduct in issue. The catchwords refer to restrictive conduct in distribution and payment markets, imposition of restrictive contractual conditions, substantial lessening of competition, and alleged contraventions of section 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). The catchwords also refer to alleged contraventions of sections 45 and 47 and alleged unconscionable conduct under section 21 of the Australian Consumer Law.

For Apple, the extract says Epic alleged Apple forced app developers to use the App Store to distribute apps to the broad base of iOS users and to use Apple's payment system for purchases of in-app digital content by iOS users. For Google, the extract says Epic alleged Google hindered realistic and practical distribution of apps to Android devices outside the Play Store by imposing contractual and technical restrictions, and that Google also imposed its payment system for in-app digital content purchases.

The key point for this class action judgment is that the Court did not treat liability as a fresh, separately developed story here. Instead, Beach J said these reasons should be read together with the Epic judgments and that the findings in those cases on market definition, market power and anti-competitive purpose formed part of the foundation for these reasons.

The legal issue in these representative proceedings had two layers. The first was liability, but the Court said the class applicants' case on liability was on all fours with Epic's case, subject to the relevant period limitation. The second was the issue unique to the class actions: whether the alleged contraventions caused app developers to pay materially higher commissions on paid app downloads and in-app purchases of digital content than they would otherwise have paid.

To answer that second question, the Court said it had to consider a retrospective hypothetical. That is, what fee would Apple and Google have charged absent the impugned conduct? The judge contrasted that with a different kind of hypothetical used in competition analysis more generally, namely the future with-and-without test used to assess anti-competitive effect.

This distinction is important for businesses because it shows how a competition case can move from liability to money issues. It is one thing to say conduct lessened competition. It is another to estimate what the commission would have been in a more competitive market, over what period, and for which kinds of apps or developers.

The Court also signalled that there may not be one single counterfactual figure. Different figures might apply at different times or in different scenarios. That matters in practice because app businesses often face changing fee programs, different app models, and different revenue thresholds over time.

Dark Ice gives the case a practical SME angle. It was the second applicant in both class actions and the extract records specific details about its app portfolio and commission arrangements.

In the Apple context, Dark Ice entered into a developer agreement and developer program licence agreement with Apple on 6 May 2013. It developed several iOS apps, including Pocket Cal kJ, which used a freemium model, Pocket Cal kJ Pro, which was a paid app, and other free apps that did not offer in-app purchases. From 6 May 2013 until late 2020 or early 2021, Dark Ice paid Apple 30% commissions on paid iOS app downloads and in-app digital content purchases. Since 22 December 2020, it had been enrolled in Apple's small business program and paid 15% commissions on relevant paid downloads and in-app digital content.

In the Google context, Dark Ice supplied Android apps through the Play Store. The extract records that its Pocket Cal/kj Android app was free to download but offered an in-app purchase, while Pocket Cal/kj Pro Android was a paid app. Until 1 January 2022, Dark Ice paid 30% commission on all in-app purchases within its Android apps downloaded through the Play Store. After that date, the commission reduced to 15%.

These details matter because they show why the Court was cautious about fixing one universal counterfactual commission. A developer's actual fee burden can vary depending on date, app type, whether the app is free or paid, whether there are in-app purchases, and whether the developer qualifies for a reduced-rate program.

Beach J said the overcharge issue only arose if there was a finding of liability based on the same case Epic brought against Apple and Google, and he said those liability findings had been made. He also said that his findings in the Epic proceedings on market definition, market power and whether the conduct had an anti-competitive purpose should be taken as part of the foundation for these reasons.

On the overcharge question itself, the Court said there was a lot to be said for the class applicants' position that, in a counterfactual without the impugned conduct, competition or effective competition would likely have lowered prices. The judge recorded the applicants' argument that commercially rational firms without market power would have responded to competitive threats by lowering commissions, and that credible threat of new entry made prompt reductions more likely.

The Court then reached the key public conclusion: on the evidence as a whole, the counterfactual commission rates would likely have been materially less than the commissions actually charged by Apple and Google during the relevant period. But the Court did not say by how much. The judge said he would need to hear further from the parties after they had considered the reasons, and he was not convinced there should be a single figure for the counterfactual commissions.

The Court also expressly said it was not dealing with loss and damage at this first stage. So this was an important step in the case, but not the final step.

If your business depends on a major app platform, this case is best read as a reminder that platform rules, payment mandates and commission percentages can all be legally connected. The Court's approach shows that a commission is not always analysed as a simple standalone fee. It may be examined as part of a broader market structure shaped by restrictions on distribution, payments and entry.

That does not mean every platform fee is unlawful, or that every developer will have a viable claim. Competition cases are evidence-heavy and often turn on market definition, counterfactual analysis and detailed economic material. This judgment also shows that even after liability findings are in place, the Court may still need substantial further work before it can quantify overcharge or determine loss and damage.

For business owners, the practical reading is operational. Keep records that let you reconstruct what happened over time. Store developer agreements and policy updates. Track commission changes by product type and date. Separate paid downloads, subscriptions and in-app purchases. Record whether you had realistic alternatives outside the platform and whether fees were absorbed by your business or passed on to customers.

The judgment is dated 12 August 2025. The hearing dates listed in the public extract show a lengthy joint trial running across March to July 2024. The Court's orders in both representative proceedings stood over the further hearing to a date to be fixed, reserved costs, and imposed confidentiality orders over the written reasons except for the oral summary and republication of that summary.

That means the case was not finished by this judgment. The Court had reached an important conclusion on the overcharge issue in principle, but had not completed the quantification exercise and had not determined loss and damage. Readers should therefore treat this as an intermediate but commercially significant stage in the litigation.

This page is based on the public Federal Court material for Anthony v Apple Inc [2025] FCA 902. The public text itself says the reasons should be read together with Epic Games, Inc v Apple Inc [2025] FCA 900 and Epic Games, Inc v Google LLC [2025] FCA 901, and that those decisions provide the foundation for the class action reasons.

Because public disclosure of the written reasons was restricted and the available text is truncated, this page should be read as a careful public explainer of what can be said confidently from the accessible material. It does not attempt to reconstruct confidential reasoning or to state a final damages outcome that the Court had not yet determined.