Quarter Turn Pty Ltd v Reinteractive Pty Ltd (No 6)

This case sits inside a larger Federal Court contract dispute between Quarter Turn Pty Ltd and Reinteractive Pty Ltd. The published reasons in No 6 do not explain the full commercial relationship between the parties or the alleged breach in detail. What they do explain is a procedural fight about how certain documents could be used at trial.

On 16 February 2026, Goodman J made an order under section 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). That order limited the use of particular documents tendered by Quarter Turn. In practical terms, those documents could not be used for any wasted expenditure claim advanced by Quarter Turn in the proceeding.

The judge summarised the reason for that earlier order. The case had been conducted on the basis that Quarter Turn was pursuing a loss of opportunity claim, not a wasted expenditure claim. The Court considered that allowing the documents to be used for wasted expenditure at that stage created a danger of unfair prejudice to Reinteractive.

The prejudice identified by the Court was concrete. If wasted expenditure had been identified earlier, Reinteractive may have defended the case differently. The judgment says that could have included considering lay and expert evidence on the connection between the expenditure and the contract, whether the expenditure would have been recovered but for the alleged breach, and whether the expenditure resulted from Quarter Turn's own unreasonable or improvident conduct.

The Court also noted that Reinteractive may have sought further security for costs.

After the earlier order was made, Quarter Turn asked the Court to revisit it. The application was made orally on 18 February 2026. The narrow question in No 6 was whether the Court should vary the order made two days earlier.

The Court said it plainly had power to vary the order under rule 39.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). But the real issue was not power. It was whether exercising that power would be in the interests of justice.

Goodman J said the interests of justice had to be assessed in all the circumstances of the case. That included finality in litigation and the overarching purpose in section 37M(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), namely the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.

So the decision was not about whether wasted expenditure is a valid damages concept in contract law. It was about whether, at this stage of this proceeding, the Court should reopen an earlier evidentiary ruling when doing so would affect fairness, timing, cost and case management.

The judgment identifies two broad strands in Quarter Turn's application.

First, Quarter Turn argued that any unfair prejudice to Reinteractive could be ameliorated by adjourning the proceeding. The idea was that if the matter were delayed, Reinteractive would have time to adduce the kind of evidence the Court had identified in the earlier reasons. That was an attempt to cure the prejudice by giving the respondent more time.

The Court noted an important qualification. The proposal did not include any offer to provide additional security for Reinteractive's costs. That mattered because one of the forms of prejudice identified in the earlier reasons was that Reinteractive may have sought further security for costs if the wasted expenditure claim had been identified earlier.

Second, Quarter Turn reiterated parts of arguments it had already made, including the contention that Reinteractive should already have put on evidence responsive to the wasted expenditure claim. In substance, that was an attempt to persuade the Court that the prejudice point had been overstated or should not have been accepted in the first place.

For business readers, this distinction is useful. One argument tried to fix the prejudice by changing the timetable. The other tried to revisit the correctness of the earlier reasoning. Both failed.

Goodman J refused the oral application. The Court was not persuaded by either strand of Quarter Turn's argument that it was in the interests of justice to revisit the earlier order.

On the adjournment argument, the Court gave several reasons. The point had not been advanced at the hearing of the original application. No suggestion had been made that it could not have been raised then, and no reason was offered for why it had not been. The proposed adjournment would also add to the length and cost of the trial and would likely involve the recall of at least Mr Liew for further cross-examination. Those consequences counted against reopening the order.

The Court also said that, in any event, the proposed course would not overcome all of the prejudice identified by Reinteractive because no further security for costs had been offered.

On the second strand, the Court held that it was in substance an attempt to re-present previously unsuccessful arguments. Goodman J referred to authority explaining that the rule allowing variation of orders is not to be used so a party can present its case a second time to its better advantage. The Court therefore treated the application as an impermissible re-agitation of points that had already failed.

The result was simple. The application to vary the 16 February 2026 order was refused.

The commercial lesson from this case is about early definition of your loss case. Different damages theories are not just labels. They can change the evidence you need, the experts you brief, the questions asked in cross-examination, and the way the other side assesses cost exposure and settlement risk.

If your business starts a case on one basis and later tries to rely on documents for another basis, the court may see that as unfair to the other side. That is especially likely where the other side can point to specific things it would have done differently, such as obtaining expert evidence, preparing different factual evidence or seeking more security for costs.

This decision also shows that a proposed adjournment is not a universal cure. Courts are concerned with the efficient conduct of litigation. If the proposed fix would lengthen the trial, increase cost, require witnesses to be recalled and still leave some prejudice unresolved, the court may refuse it.

Importantly, this judgment does not say that a wasted expenditure claim can never be run, or that a party can never amend its case. It says that in this proceeding, at this stage, and on these facts, the Court would not revisit the earlier order limiting the use of evidence.

One of the most useful features of this judgment is that it links evidence use to the way the case has actually been conducted. The Court did not say the documents were inadmissible for all purposes. The issue was the use to be made of them. Under section 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the Court can limit the use of evidence if a particular use might be unfairly prejudicial to a party.

That matters in practice because businesses often assume that once a document is in evidence, it can be used for every available argument. This case is a reminder that the court may limit the purpose for which evidence can be used, especially where a new use would unfairly alter the shape of the case late in the process.

The judgment also highlights the importance of conduct over labels. The Court focused on how the proceeding had been run. It had been conducted on the basis of a loss of opportunity claim. That procedural history shaped the fairness analysis. In other words, what you have actually done in the litigation can matter as much as what you say later about your legal theory.

For businesses and their advisers, that means pleadings, witness statements, expert briefs, interlocutory positions and trial submissions should all be checked for consistency. If the case theory changes, the consequences need to be addressed early and openly rather than left until tender or final hearing.

The earlier order limiting the use of evidence was made on 16 February 2026. Quarter Turn's oral application to revisit that order was heard on 18 February 2026. Goodman J delivered judgment on 19 February 2026 and refused the application.

The decision is procedural in nature. It records the refusal of an application to vary an earlier order and should be read together with the earlier reasons in Quarter Turn Pty Ltd v Reinteractive Pty Ltd (No 5) [2026] FCA 102 for the fuller explanation of the original section 136 ruling.