Wijaya v Matthews Brothers Engineering Pty Ltd

This Federal Court decision arose from the termination of an employee during probation. Supianto Wijaya said that on 11 November 2024 he was called into a meeting without notice and immediately told that his employment was terminated. When he asked why, he was told that his personality was not a good fit for the job. He also said he had not received any formal warning or performance review before the decision was made.

After obtaining a certificate under section 368 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), he commenced proceedings in the Federal Court on 3 February 2025. He relied on the general protections provisions, especially section 340, referred in broad terms to sections 341 and 342, and also alleged discrimination under section 351. Following correspondence from the employer's solicitor, he filed an amended statement of claim on 2 May 2025.

The employer did not wait for a full trial. Instead, it brought an interlocutory application on 9 May 2025 seeking summary dismissal of the proceeding. The argument was that the claim, even taken at face value, did not disclose a reasonable cause of action or otherwise amounted to an abuse of process. National Judicial Registrar Edwards accepted that argument and summarily dismissed the proceeding on 11 August 2025.

Mr Wijaya then exercised his right to seek de novo review by a judge. His review application was filed on 4 September 2025, three days late, so he also needed an extension of time. McElwaine J therefore had to decide both whether to extend time and whether the registrar's summary dismissal should stand.

The judge dealt with two practical questions. First, should the Court extend time for the review application, given it was filed three days out of time? Second, if time was extended, did the amended statement of claim disclose a reasonable cause of action so that the registrar's summary dismissal should be overturned?

The central legal issue concerned the structure of a general protections claim under section 340 of the Fair Work Act. The Court said that a claimant must first identify the workplace right relied on by reference to section 341. The claimant must then allege that the employer took adverse action because of that workplace right, or to prevent its exercise.

The judgment also referred to section 361, noting that before the statutory presumption can operate, the applicant must identify and establish as an objective fact the workplace right in issue and that adverse action was taken because of it.

The Court also had to consider the separate discrimination allegation under section 351. That required the employee to identify a protected statutory attribute and to plead why the termination was discriminatory in the sense required by the legislation.

The Court described the amended statement of claim as being in narrative form and as replicating several statutory provisions, including sections 336, 340, 341, 342 and 351. But repeating legislation is not the same as pleading a cause of action. The judge said the pleading then moved to three conclusions rather than properly articulated legal allegations.

Those conclusions were that the employer had terminated employment without exercising due diligence in undertaking a performance assessment, had failed to recognise the employee's workplace rights by not giving notice of a performance assessment and written notice explaining the cause of termination, and had terminated him because his personality did not suit the employer, which he said was discriminatory.

The Court found that these assertions did not identify the basis for the alleged workplace rights. There was also no pleaded causal connection between the termination decision and the employee having, exercising, or proposing to exercise a workplace right. That missing causal link was critical. A general protections claim is not made out simply by saying an employer acted abruptly or unfairly.

The judge also recorded that, when asked during the hearing to identify the workplace right, the employee said it arose because he had a contract of employment as a permanent employee. The Court held that this did not identify a workplace right within the meaning of the Fair Work Act.

On the discrimination point, the Court focused on the pleaded allegation that the employer said the employee's personality was not a good fit. The judge held that personality is not one of the statutory attributes referred to in section 351. The pleading also failed to explain why the termination was discriminatory in the legal sense required by that section.

McElwaine J granted the short extension of time. The employee had not provided an adequate explanation for the delay, but the extension was brief and the employer would suffer no prejudice. The Court therefore extended the time for applying to review the registrar's decision to 4 September 2025.

That procedural indulgence did not change the result. The Court dismissed the review application and confirmed the summary dismissal order. The judge said the registrar's reasoning was compelling and held that the statement of claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

In relation to section 340, the Court held that the pleading was wholly defective because it did not identify the asserted workplace rights with sufficient particularity and did not plead the necessary causal connection between any workplace right and the termination. In relation to section 351, the Court held that personality is not a statutory protected attribute and that the pleading failed to identify why the termination was discriminatory.

The Court also said the claim rose no higher than a complaint about the manner of dismissal which the employee considered unfair. Importantly for procedure, the judge concluded that the pleaded case was hopeless and that there was no prospect that any reasonable cause of action could be resurrected from facts that were not in issue. For that reason, this was not a case in which liberty to replead should be granted.

The judgment also restated the summary judgment standard under section 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act. The Court noted that it is not necessary for a proceeding to be bound to fail before summary judgment can be entered, although the judge considered that this claim did in fact reach that level.

For employers, the most useful point in this case is the distinction between a complaint about unfair treatment and a properly pleaded general protections claim. A worker may feel blindsided by a dismissal, especially during probation. They may complain about lack of warning, lack of review, lack of written reasons, or the use of vague language such as not being the right fit. Those complaints may still create practical risk, but they do not automatically satisfy section 340.

A general protections claim needs more. The employee must identify a workplace right recognised by section 341 and plead that the adverse action happened because of that right, or to prevent its exercise. The Court was explicit that the statutory presumption in section 361 does not remove the need to first identify the workplace right as an objective fact. That is a key point for businesses assessing the strength of a claim.

The case also shows the difference between a general protections claim and a discrimination allegation under section 351. A statement that an employee's personality is not a good fit may be unhelpful and commercially risky, but it is not, without more, an allegation tied to a protected statutory attribute. Businesses should still be careful with language because vague or subjective comments can inflame disputes and may, in another case, sit alongside facts that support a different legal claim.

None of this means employers can ignore process during probation. The Court did not say that sudden dismissal without warning is best practice. It said that this particular pleading did not identify the legal ingredients of the claims advanced. A poor process may still matter in other forums, under other causes of action, or in the broader employment relationship.

Businesses often assume that probation gives broad freedom to terminate with minimal legal risk. This case is a reminder to be more precise. Probation may affect some rights and practical expectations, but it does not itself answer whether a general protections claim can be brought. The real question is whether the employee can identify a workplace right and a prohibited reason for the adverse action.

That is why the distinction between claim types matters. A complaint that there was no warning, no review or no written explanation may sound like an unfair dismissal style complaint about process. A general protections claim is different. It is concerned with whether the employer acted because the employee had, exercised, or proposed to exercise a workplace right, or because of another prohibited reason recognised by the Act.

For employers, the case is also a useful example of when summary dismissal may be worth considering. Summary dismissal is not routine and courts approach it cautiously. But where a pleading is manifestly defective, does not identify the legal right relied on, and cannot realistically be repaired from the facts in issue, an early application may avoid the cost and distraction of prolonged litigation.

That said, businesses should not treat summary dismissal as a substitute for good employment practices. The better commercial approach is still to make decisions carefully, keep records, and ensure managers understand the difference between dissatisfaction with performance and reasons that may trigger statutory protections.

The employment was terminated on 11 November 2024. The Federal Court proceeding was commenced on 3 February 2025 after the employee obtained a certificate under section 368 of the Fair Work Act. An amended statement of claim was filed on 2 May 2025. The employer's interlocutory application for summary dismissal was filed on 9 May 2025. National Judicial Registrar Edwards summarily dismissed the proceeding on 11 August 2025. The employee's review application was filed on 4 September 2025, three days out of time.

McElwaine J delivered judgment on 20 February 2026, extended time, dismissed the review application, and confirmed the summary dismissal order.

The judgment is a Federal Court decision in the Fair Work Division. It is a procedural decision about pleading sufficiency and summary dismissal, rather than a final merits determination about the underlying workplace events.