Shariff J decided to make the third party freezing orders sought. First, the Court was presently satisfied that the applicant had a good arguable case against the respondents in the substantive proceeding. The judge said that, on the face of the material, the applicant had entered into the Investment Agreement, made the investment, and the amount owing had fallen due and payable but had not been paid.
The Court was also satisfied, to the extent relevant, that there was a sufficient prospect that a judgment would be registered in or enforced by the Court.
Second, on the risk question, the Court described the evidence as concerning. It said the material demonstrated that, despite the purpose of the Investment Agreement being that the money paid to Global Future Holdings was to be invested with a guaranteed return, a substantial portion of that money was not invested at all but was instead transferred to Ms Safi for use on personal expenses.
At this stage, and expressly on an ex parte basis, the Court was satisfied that the evidence was indicative of fraudulent conduct and gave rise to a risk of dissipation of assets such that a prospective judgment would be wholly unsatisfied.
Third, the Court considered whether there was a relevant process that might later require the third party to disgorge assets or contribute towards satisfying a judgment. It held that there was, and referred in particular to section 37A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW). The Court said it was enough to identify one such process. It was satisfied that there had been a relevant alienation of property by the voluntary transfer of about $1.2 million from the Global Future Holdings NAB account to Ms Safi's ANZ account.
The Court was also presently satisfied that an intention to defraud creditors could be inferred from the conduct of Global Future Holdings. The reasons given were that funds advanced in furtherance of the Investment Agreement were not used for an investment purpose but were transferred to Ms Safi's account to be used for personal expenses, and this occurred despite repeated demands for repayment and representations by Mr Safi that repayments would imminently be made.
The Court added that the evidence cast serious doubt on whether Global Future Holdings was ever in a position, at least from the funds available in the NAB account, to repay the funds in the way previously claimed.
The Court then turned to discretionary matters. It was satisfied that the application had been brought promptly after the applicant's solicitor reviewed the subpoenaed bank statements. It also considered whether there was utility in making a freezing order against Ms Safi even though the ANZ statements suggested she was unlikely still to hold the full amount in that account.
The Court held that there was utility, because the purpose of the order was both to preserve the position in respect of possible disgorgement and to preserve the position so that the third party might contribute towards satisfying a judgment or prospective judgment. The state of Ms Safi's other assets and liabilities was unknown.
The Court noted that in applications for freezing orders against third parties, courts ordinarily expect an undertaking to commence proceedings against the third party, especially where section 37A is relied on. Counsel for the applicant indicated that such an undertaking would be given, and the judge said that issue could be raised with the Duty Judge on the return of the matter. The orders were made, limited to the specified sum, until further order.