GGPG Pty Ltd (Receiver and Manager Appointed) v Golden Eagle Property Group Pty Ltd (No 3)

This judgment is about costs, not the substantive merits of the original commercial dispute. The court's reasons make that clear from the outset. The judge referred to earlier reasons for the long procedural history and explained that this matter had been managed alongside a related proceeding, QUD 93 of 2022, because the two cases were expected to overlap in evidence and issues.

That arrangement did not continue. In December 2025, the court set aside orders that the matters be heard together and listed this proceeding for trial starting on 9 February 2026. But the trial never happened. The respondents capitulated, the parties compromised the case, and consent orders were made on 9 February 2026. Those orders recorded that the applicant succeeded in its claims, the respondents' cross-claim was dismissed, and the respondents had to pay the applicant's costs, to be agreed or determined under the Federal Court's lump-sum costs procedure.

So the commercial fight had effectively ended, but the costs fight had not. The question for the court was how much the respondents had to pay. That is often where a business dispute still carries serious financial consequences, especially after years of interlocutory steps, evidence preparation, case management and trial preparation.

The costs applicants sought a revised total of $1,706,623.53 excluding GST. That figure was made up of three broad categories: professional fees of $1,171,533.30, counsel's fees of $483,096.18, and disbursements of $51,994.05. Their solicitor, Mr Maskell, explained that the professional fees claim had already been discounted by 40% from total solicitor-client costs incurred since 2022 of $2,824,072.81. The court described his affidavit as relatively brief, straight to the point and pitched at an appropriate level of detail for a lump-sum assessment.

The respondents argued for a much lower amount. Their position, based largely on the report of costs consultant Ms Drew, was that the total should be no more than $989,718.19 before a further 10% global discount, producing a figure of $890,746.37. Ms Drew criticised the scale of the claim, suggested it was disproportionate, raised concerns about overlap with the related proceeding, questioned the 40% discount methodology, criticised the level of seniority used for legal work, and challenged aspects of counsel's fees and disbursements.

The respondents also relied on an affidavit from their solicitor, Mr Cohen. That affidavit went much further into the detail. It analysed invoices, referred to affidavits in the related proceeding, expressed views about non-recoverable fees, examined counsel invoices, and attempted a reconciliation of the claim in a way the court said resembled the sort of objections usually seen in a taxation of costs.

That procedural choice became central. The court had to decide not only what amount was fair and reasonable, but also what kind of evidence and level of detail were appropriate in a lump-sum costs process.

The legal issue was how the Federal Court should quantify costs after the parties had already agreed that costs would be determined by the lump-sum procedure. The court had to decide whether the applicants' evidence justified the amount claimed, whether the respondents' criticisms showed that major reductions were needed, how to account for overlap with a related proceeding, and whether the respondents could effectively convert the process into a detailed taxation by filing a long affidavit of invoice-based objections.

The court also considered the broader procedural purpose of the lump-sum regime under the Federal Court's rules and practice materials. The judge emphasised that the process is meant to avoid delay, expense and aggravation, while still ensuring that unreasonable amounts are not pursued or awarded.

The court fixed the costs payable at $1,587,994 excluding GST and ordered that the three costs respondents be jointly and severally liable for that amount. It made no order as to the costs of the lump-sum costs hearing itself.

On professional fees, the court accepted Mr Maskell's evidence that the rates charged were within an acceptable range on a party and party basis and that the work performed was reasonably necessary to conduct the proceeding. The judge accepted that total solicitor-client professional fees were approximately $1.9 million GST exclusive and that a broad 40% discount was appropriate to reach a party and party figure. That produced an allowed amount of $1,170,000, rounded. The court then applied a further 10% discount to reflect unidentified work performed on the related proceeding before 30 November 2023, resulting in $1,053,000 for professional fees.

On counsel's fees, the court accepted the adjusted amounts in Mr Maskell's supplementary affidavit and allowed $483,000, rounded down. The judge rejected the argument that the National Guide to Counsel's Fees from June 2013 should control the assessment. In the court's view, that guide was now hopelessly outdated for work undertaken from 2022 onward, and the rates charged by senior and junior counsel properly reflected market rates at the relevant time.

On disbursements, the court accepted $51,994. That included the fee of a town planner, Mr Ovenden, whose report had been served but who was ultimately not called. The court held that this was not a reason to disallow the fee, because litigation often involves forensic decisions that make some prepared evidence unnecessary later.

The respondents' solicitor affidavit was a major procedural flashpoint. It ran to 17 pages with an annexure of more than 200 pages. The affidavit examined invoices in detail, referred to material from the related proceeding, expressed opinions about recoverability, and undertook what the court described as a reconciliation one would ordinarily expect to see in a detailed list of objections to a bill of costs for taxation.

The court refused to receive it. The judge held that the affidavit was contrary to the purpose and object of the lump-sum costs procedure. The parties had agreed to that procedure. The court's practice materials require a costs summary and costs response to be clear, concise and direct, and not to resemble a bill of costs or formal objections for taxation. In the judge's words, Mr Cohen's affidavit was the antithesis of those requirements.

The court accepted that, in some cases, a close inquiry into a particular issue or category of costs may be appropriate. But that did not justify allowing this assessment to become a protracted invoice-by-invoice dispute. The respondents had already engaged a costs expert. If that expert had not been sufficiently informed, the court said that was not a reason to permit a second, sprawling evidentiary route that undermined efficiency and finality.

This part of the judgment is especially important for businesses and litigation teams. It shows that a party cannot assume that every costs challenge will be entertained in whatever form it chooses. Procedure matters. If the court has directed a lump-sum process, the challenge needs to fit that process.

Several practical features of the evidence mattered. First, the court found Mr Maskell's evidence persuasive because it was direct, concise and grounded in his personal involvement in the litigation. He was a partner with more than 25 years' experience in commercial litigation and had personally undertaken a significant component of the work. The court accepted his evidence that there were no unusual costs arrangements underpinning the claim and that the hourly rates charged were within an acceptable range.

Second, the applicants were helped by evidence about how their firm recorded and divided time between this proceeding and the related matter. The court accepted evidence that the firm's practice management system provided for a division of solicitor time between the two proceedings and that the applicants were not seeking double recovery for the same work. That did not eliminate the overlap issue entirely, but it gave the court a workable basis for a broad-brush adjustment rather than a wholesale rejection of the claim.

Third, the court was not persuaded by unsupported generalisations. Ms Drew gave estimates of what party and party costs might usually look like for a four-day or 10-day trial, but the judge rejected that evidence because she did not disclose the basis for those estimates and did not grapple with the prolonged pre-trial history, the many interlocutory decisions, and the extensive case management in this litigation and the related proceeding.

Fourth, the court accepted that some work had been done by senior solicitors that might otherwise have been briefed to counsel, but found there was a practical explanation. For a considerable period the receiver was unfunded, so there was no option of engaging counsel. The court also rejected the suggestion that the case was relatively uncomplicated, pointing to the procedural history as evidence of complexity.

For business owners, directors and managers, this case is a reminder that litigation costs are not a technical afterthought. They are part of the commercial risk of the dispute itself. A business can avoid trial and still face a very substantial adverse costs order if the matter has already generated years of legal work, interlocutory disputes, evidence preparation and trial preparation.

The case also shows the value of disciplined record-keeping. Where there are related proceedings, related entities or overlapping factual issues, your lawyers should be able to explain how time has been allocated and why the same work is not being claimed twice. If they cannot, the court may respond with broad discounts that are difficult to challenge.

Another practical point is that costs strategy should match the court's procedure. If the court is using a lump-sum process, a business should not assume that a detailed invoice-by-invoice attack will be welcomed. The better approach may be to identify the real categories in dispute, support them with focused evidence, and explain why a broad evaluative reduction should be made.

Finally, this judgment is a warning against complacency about late settlement. The respondents capitulated before trial, but that did not protect them from a seven-figure costs order. Businesses should therefore ask hard questions early: what are we spending, what might we have to pay if we lose, how much overlap exists with other matters, and is there a commercially sensible point to resolve the dispute before costs escalate further?

The judgment was delivered on 16 March 2026 and the reasons were published on 19 March 2026. The relevant consent orders resolving the substantive proceeding were made on 9 February 2026. The court's reasons also refer back to earlier reasons published on 18 December 2025 in GGPG Pty Ltd v Golden Eagle Property Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] FCA 1620, which dealt with the procedural history and the relationship between this matter and QUD 93 of 2022.

The available material supports a strong public explanation of the costs ruling. It does not, however, provide a full narrative of the underlying commercial dispute, so this page should be read as a case note on costs procedure and costs quantification rather than a complete merits summary of the original claims.