Ogbonna v Link Workforce Pty Ltd (No 2)

This was a Federal Court case management decision in a proceeding between Celestine Ogbonna and Link Workforce Pty Ltd. The applicant had originally sued on two fronts in the same court file: a general protections claim under the Fair Work Act and a defamation claim. The judgment does not explain the underlying workplace dispute or the alleged defamatory conduct, so the commercial story available from the reasons is about procedure rather than liability.

The turning point was bankruptcy. After the case began, a sequestration order was made against the applicant’s estate and a trustee in bankruptcy was appointed. That triggered s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, which stayed the proceeding until the trustee elected in writing whether to prosecute or discontinue it. The trustee elected to discontinue the general protections part of the case, but considered that the applicant could continue with the defamation claim.

The proceeding then moved forward only on the defamation side. There was an unsuccessful mediation. The respondent filed a defence to the defamation claim. The applicant also made an unsuccessful application for judgment based on admissions, and an application for leave to appeal from the dismissal of that application was itself dismissed. Later, the case was adjourned to await the outcome of the applicant’s challenge to the sequestration order.

That challenge eventually succeeded. The appeal against the sequestration order was allowed in September 2025, and orders setting aside the sequestration order were made in December 2025. Once that happened, the case returned to the Federal Court for further management. The practical question then became whether the general protections claim, which had been discontinued by the trustee during the bankruptcy period, could be put back into the same proceeding.

At the same hearing, the Court also had to deal with the applicant’s conduct. The judge recorded lateness, an unsuccessful adjournment request, repeated interruptions, baseless accusations against judicial officers and court staff, and threatening behaviour towards the respondent’s counsel. So the judgment deals with two separate but important procedural issues: revival of a discontinued claim after the bankruptcy order was set aside, and the Court’s response to conduct that interfered with the administration of justice.

The timeline matters because each step changed what claims were on foot and what the Court had to decide next.

On 20 May 2022, the applicant filed the originating process and statement of claim, bringing both the general protections and defamation claims. On 20 September 2022, a sequestration order was made against his estate. By operation of s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, the proceeding was then stayed until the trustee elected whether to prosecute or discontinue it.

On 2 November 2022, the trustee wrote to the Court electing to discontinue the general protections claim. The trustee considered that the applicant could continue the defamation claim under s 60(4) of the Bankruptcy Act. After that, the case continued only as a defamation proceeding. On 15 August 2023, the respondent filed its defence to the defamation claim. Before that defence was filed, there had been an unsuccessful mediation. The applicant also unsuccessfully sought judgment based on admissions, and a later application for leave to appeal from the dismissal of that application was dismissed.

On 29 November 2023, the case management hearing was adjourned to await the outcome of the applicant’s appeal against the sequestration order. That appeal was allowed on 12 September 2025. Orders setting aside the sequestration order were then made on 3 December 2025. The case management hearing was re-listed for 12 March 2026, and judgment on the procedural issues was delivered on 19 March 2026.

The orders made on 19 March 2026 gave the applicant leave to amend the originating process and statement of claim to re-introduce the discontinued general protections claim. The Court also ordered the respondent to file and serve an amended defence by 23 April 2026, adjourned the case management hearing to 6 May 2026, reserved the costs of the 12 March 2026 hearing, and required the applicant to file any submissions and affidavit material by 2 April 2026 to show cause why the proceeding should not be stayed unless he gave a signed written undertaking about future conduct.

The first issue was whether the applicant could re-introduce the general protections claim into the same proceeding after the sequestration order had been set aside. The Court accepted that the trustee had authority to elect to discontinue that part of the proceeding under s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act while the sequestration order was in force. The Court also said that, although the discontinuance was not done in accordance with the Federal Court rule dealing with discontinuance, it was still effective because it operated through s 60(2) and the trustee’s written election.

That meant the Court was not deciding whether the earlier discontinuance was valid in a technical rules sense. It treated the discontinuance as effective and then asked the next question: should the applicant now be given leave to amend so that the discontinued claim could be brought back into the same case?

To answer that, the Court referred to the effect of a discontinuance and to the principles that can allow a discontinued or abandoned part of a claim to be re-introduced later in the same proceeding. The judgment referred to s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act, which sets out the overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure, and to authorities on amendment and discontinuance, including Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University and Frigger v Trenfield (Application to Discontinue).

The second issue was separate. Because of what happened at the 12 March 2026 hearing, the Court had to consider whether it should use its own procedural powers to stay the proceeding unless the applicant gave a signed written undertaking that he had read the Litigants in Person Practice Note and would comply with the standards of conduct described there. The Court identified powers under the Federal Court Rules and the Federal Court of Australia Act, including powers to act on its own motion, make interlocutory orders, and give directions about practice and procedure.

So the judgment sits at the intersection of bankruptcy procedure, amendment principles, Fair Work litigation and courtroom conduct. It does not decide the underlying employment or defamation allegations. It decides how the proceeding should be managed after the bankruptcy order was undone and after the hearing conduct raised concerns about the proper administration of justice.

Justice Feutrill granted leave for the applicant to amend the originating process and statement of claim so the discontinued general protections claim could be re-introduced. The Court said the reason for the earlier discontinuance and the reason for re-introduction were obvious from the circumstances. The discontinuance had been the act of the trustee in bankruptcy while the sequestration order was in force. Once that order was set aside, it was appropriate in substance to place the applicant back in the position he had been in before the sequestration order was made.

The Court also found there was no evident prejudice to the respondent or the public interest in allowing the claim back in. Link Workforce had known about the general protections allegations from the start of the proceeding. Although it had filed a defence to the defamation claim, the Court said that in substance no steps had been taken in the proceeding since November 2023, so only minimal costs would have been incurred during that period. The Court also noted that no relevant limitation period had expired.

The judge considered that refusing re-introduction would cause only minimal prejudice to the applicant in one sense, because he could theoretically start a new proceeding, but that course would create additional cost, delay and inefficiency. The Court said that forcing separate fresh proceedings would be contrary to the overarching objectives in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act.

At the same time, the Court protected the respondent’s position. The orders expressly stated that the leave to amend and the requirement to file an amended defence were without prejudice to any application by the respondent to strike out or seek summary dismissal of all or part of the applicant’s claim. In other words, the employer did not lose its ability to challenge the revived claim just because the Court allowed it back into the proceeding.

On the conduct issue, the Court did not immediately stay the proceeding. Instead, it ordered the applicant to show cause why such a stay should not be made unless and until he gave a signed written undertaking that he had read the Litigants in Person Practice Note and would comply with standards including acting respectfully and honestly, not shouting, swearing, threatening or being rude, contacting the Court only when necessary, copying correspondence to the other side, not sending multiple similar emails, complying with court orders, and attending hearings at the right place and time.

The Court also reserved the costs of the 12 March 2026 hearing. The reasons explain that the applicant’s conduct had delayed and prolonged what should have been a short routine hearing, and that his conduct was not consistent with the duty in s 37N(1) to conduct the proceeding consistently with the overarching purpose. The Court also discussed the interaction between that duty and s 570 of the Fair Work Act, which can limit costs orders in general protections matters.

The conduct part of the judgment is unusually direct and important for anyone involved in litigation. The Court recorded that when the matter was called, the applicant was not in attendance even though he was in the building. After the hearing resumed, he gave no apology for the delay. He then sought a four-week adjournment because he intended to make an application to the High Court, but no such application had been filed and he did not identify how it would affect the proceeding. That adjournment request was refused.

The more serious issue was what happened during the hearing itself. The Court found that the applicant became agitated and aggressive, made numerous baseless and unfounded assertions of bias, racism, fraud and crimes against the presiding judge, another judge and a registrar, and repeatedly interrupted and talked over the judge. The Court described those assertions as objectively disrespectful, scandalous, abusive and insulting. The judge also recorded threats by the applicant to distribute allegations to members of Parliament and integrity bodies and to seek the judge’s removal and prosecution.

The reasons then describe an incident where, after the respondent’s counsel began making an oral application to dismiss the proceeding, the applicant stood up, interrupted counsel and approached him in a physically and verbally threatening and intimidating manner. According to the judgment, he pointed at counsel and threatened fraud and contempt proceedings and steps affecting counsel’s practising certificate. The hearing was eventually completed without court security being called, but the Court made clear that this conduct was unacceptable.

The Court linked that behaviour to the Litigants in Person Practice Note and to the statutory duties in ss 37M and 37N of the Federal Court of Australia Act. The judge said the conduct interfered with the due and proper administration of justice and, if it continued, could make it impossible or extremely difficult to give both parties procedural fairness at trial and future hearings. The Court also noted that what should have been a routine 15-minute case management hearing ran for about 45 minutes because of the delayed start, interruptions and irrelevant diatribe.

For business readers, the practical point is that the Court’s control powers are not limited to deciding claims and awarding costs. The Court can shape procedure to protect fairness, safety and efficiency. In a Fair Work matter, s 570 may make costs sanctions harder to obtain than in ordinary civil litigation, but that does not leave the Court powerless. The judgment shows the Court considering a stay as a case management response where conduct threatens the proper running of the proceeding.

For employers, the first practical lesson is to distinguish between a claim ending on the merits and a claim dropping out for procedural reasons. Here, the general protections claim had not been dismissed after a hearing. It had been discontinued because the trustee in bankruptcy elected not to pursue it while the sequestration order was in force. Once that surrounding bankruptcy position changed, the Court was willing to let the claim back in. If your business is defending a claim, do not assume that a procedural discontinuance means the issue has disappeared forever.

The second lesson is to watch the whole litigation environment, not just the pleaded allegations. Bankruptcy orders, appeals, stays, amendments and adjournments can all change the shape of the case. A respondent that has kept records, preserved evidence and maintained a clear chronology will be in a much better position if a claim is revived after a long pause.

The third lesson is that case management hearings matter. They are often where the Court decides whether pleadings can be amended, whether timetables will be reset, whether costs will be reserved, and whether conduct controls are needed. Businesses should prepare for those hearings carefully, even if they look procedural on paper.

The fourth lesson is that the Court may restore one party’s position while also protecting the other side. Link Workforce did not stop the claim being re-introduced at this stage, but it kept the right to seek strike-out or summary dismissal later. That is commercially important. If a revived claim appears weak, incoherent or legally defective, procedural challenge options may still be available even after amendment is allowed.

The fifth lesson is about conduct and communications. The standards set out in the Litigants in Person Practice Note are directed to self-represented parties, but the broader message applies to everyone involved in litigation. Respectful communications, compliance with orders, and disciplined use of court processes are not optional. Businesses should ensure that directors, managers and any staff involved in the dispute understand that aggressive or repetitive communications can complicate the case and affect how the Court manages it.

This page is based on the Federal Court judgment in Ogbonna v Link Workforce Pty Ltd (No 2) [2026] FCA 298, delivered on 19 March 2026 by Feutrill J. The judgment contains the orders made after the case management hearing on 12 March 2026 and the reasons for those orders.

The reasons are detailed on the procedural issues, including the effect of the trustee’s election under s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, the setting aside of the sequestration order, the principles relevant to re-introducing a discontinued claim, the Court’s powers to control its own process, and the conduct concerns that led to a show cause order about a possible stay.

The reasons do not provide a full factual account of the underlying employment allegations or the alleged defamatory conduct. For that reason, this explainer focuses on what the judgment actually decides: re-introduction of the general protections claim, preservation of the respondent’s procedural rights, and the Court’s response to hearing conduct.