The court set out the statutory pathway for a vesting order after disclaimer. Section 568F allows the court to order that disclaimed property vest in, or be delivered to, a person entitled to the property, a person in or to whom it seems appropriate that the property be vested or delivered, or a trustee for such a person. The application can be made by a person who claims an interest in the property or is under a liability in respect of the property that the Act has not discharged. The court must also hear from such persons as it thinks appropriate.
Drawing on earlier authority, the judge said there are three conditions that must be satisfied before a vesting order can be made. First, there must be property that has in fact been disclaimed. Second, the application must be brought by a person who claims an interest in the disclaimed property or is under an undischarged liability in respect of it. Third, the court must be satisfied it has heard from the persons it thinks appropriate.
The first condition was straightforward here because the tenements had plainly been disclaimed. The real work was in the second and third conditions, and then in the court's discretionary decision about whether vesting was appropriate.
On standing, the court stressed that the class of people who may apply should not be read narrowly. A person does not need to have already proved the claim to have standing. But the claim must be bona fide and have a reasonable legal and factual foundation. In this case, the companies said they had an interest because if the sale completed they would receive sale proceeds. They also said they had liabilities connected with the tenements because they were parties to forfeiture proceedings and, according to the Department's position in those proceedings, remained liable for arrears relating to the tenements. The court accepted both points and held that KLP and KLI had a bona fide claim to an interest and sufficient liability for the purpose of section 568F(2).
The judge also said, although it was not necessary to decide the point, that the liquidators themselves likely had a separate bona fide claim sufficient for standing. That was because any sale proceeds would be paid to and controlled by the liquidators in the liquidation, and because liquidators may have an equitable lien over assets under their administration in respect of outstanding fees.
On discretion, the court referred to factors identified in earlier cases. These included whether the property had previously been vested in the applicant, whether the disclaimer had been properly made, whether circumstances had changed since disclaimer, whether the change could now produce a return to creditors, whether seeking recovery of the property was consistent with the liquidators' duties, what would happen if no order were made, the position of other interested parties, and what the applicant proposed to do with the property if vesting occurred.
The court also noted the unusual feature of the case: the liquidators were asking for the same property to be vested back in the same companies that had previously disclaimed it. The judge held that the text of section 568F does not exclude that result.