UIL (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Wollongong Coal Limited (No 4)

This case is a procedural decision from the Federal Court of Australia about access to court documents. It does not decide the underlying commercial contract dispute between UIL (Singapore) Pte Ltd and the Wollongong Coal-related respondents. Instead, it deals with a later question that often matters in commercial litigation: when can someone who is not a party to the case inspect and copy documents on the court file?

The proceeding had been on foot since 2020. The trial commenced on 8 December 2025 and judgment was reserved on 10 February 2026. On that same day, a request for non-party access to documents was received by a Judicial Registrar. The request was made by Hall & Wilcox, acting for Trafigura Pte Ltd and Trafigura India PVT Ltd. The judgment states that those Trafigura entities were involved in separate proceedings in the Commercial Court of England and Wales against, among others, UIL.

The documents sought were not pleadings or originating process. They were written submissions filed in the Australian proceeding: outlines of submissions dated 10 November 2025, 24 November 2025 and 1 December 2025, plus both parties' closing submissions filed on 3 February 2026 and reply closings filed on 6 February 2026. The Court noted that the request itself mistakenly referred to some 2024 dates, but treated that as an obvious error because no submissions had been filed on those dates in 2024.

The key factual point was that all of the requested documents had been referred to and relied on during a trial conducted in open court. There were no relevant suppression orders sought or obtained in relation to them. That point drove the result.

A useful part of this judgment is the Court's clear explanation of rule 2.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). That rule separates court documents into two broad groups for non-parties.

First, some documents may be inspected by a non-party as of right after the earlier of the first directions hearing and the hearing. The judgment lists these categories from rule 2.32(2): an originating application or cross-claim, a pleading or particulars of a pleading or similar document, an interlocutory application, and certain native title materials. If a document falls into one of those categories, a non-party does not need special leave, subject to any confidentiality or publication restriction ordered by the Court.

Second, other documents are not available automatically. For those, a non-party must apply for leave under rule 2.32(4). The requested documents in this case were written submissions. Bennett J held that written submissions fall within this leave-required category. So the applicant for access could not simply inspect them as of right. It needed the Court's permission.

That distinction matters for businesses because it shows that not every filed document is immediately open to inspection. But it also shows that the leave question is not decided in a vacuum. Once a leave application is made, the Court looks at the surrounding circumstances, including whether the material has been used in open court and whether any suppression or confidentiality order applies.

The judgment also reminds readers that even documents otherwise accessible can be withheld if the Court has ordered they be confidential or restricted from publication to the relevant person or class of persons. In this case, however, there was no such order affecting the requested submissions.

The legal issue was narrow but commercially important. The Court had to decide whether to grant leave under rule 2.32(4) for a non-party to inspect and copy written submissions on the court file. The answer turned on the principle of open justice.

Bennett J referred to the well-known statement in Russell v Russell that court proceedings are ordinarily conducted publicly and in open view. The judgment explains that public scrutiny of court proceedings helps maintain confidence in the integrity and independence of the courts. That principle is also reflected in the Federal Court's Access to Documents and Transcripts Practice Note, which says that access will generally be given where documents have been read in open court.

The Court then linked that principle to more recent authority. It noted that leave will generally be granted to inspect a document, including an affidavit, if the document has been read or relied on in open court. It also relied on Castle v United States, where Mortimer J made clear that the same logic applies to written outlines of submissions filed by parties and relied on in court. The important practical point is that modern litigation often uses written submissions instead of fully oral argument. The move from oral to written advocacy does not change the public character of what is put before the Court in an open hearing.

So the real question was not whether written submissions are always open to inspection. They are not. They require leave. The real question was whether, in this case, leave should be granted because the submissions had already become part of an open-court hearing. Bennett J answered yes.

Both sides to the main proceeding opposed inspection, but neither objection succeeded.

The respondents took a minimal position. They said that, consistent with their position on previous requests, their preference was for the documents not to be released to a third party, and they made no further submissions. The Court noted that the earlier request had concerned documents that had not been relied on in open court. Different considerations applied here because the requested submissions had been used during an open hearing.

UIL made a more detailed objection. It said Hall & Wilcox had asked in mid-January for voluntary provision of the documents and UIL had responded by asking for the basis of the request, saying it could not see the relevance to the Trafigura matter. UIL then argued that the reasons given in the formal request were insufficient. It pointed to references in the request to a freezing order and concern that attempts to dispose of or settle the Australian claim might diminish the value of an asset. UIL said that had not happened, so the reasoning fell away. UIL also referred to its liquidation and argued that even if Trafigura succeeded in the English proceedings, it would be an unsecured creditor proving in the liquidation like other creditors.

Bennett J rejected the premise of UIL's argument. The Court said it was misconceived to treat the application as one where the non-party requester had to identify an interest sufficient to justify access. Because the requested documents had been relied on in open court, public confidence in the administration of justice required significance to be given to transparency. The Court also stressed that the use of written submissions instead of oral submissions did not detract from that principle.

The absence of any suppression order was also important. The Court noted that no suppression order had been sought when the documents were filed, when they were referred to in open court, or by the date of the reasons. In those circumstances, the objections raised by the parties did not disclose any reason that might justify non-disclosure.

Bennett J granted leave to David Dickens of Hall & Wilcox to inspect and copy the requested documents in proceeding VID 312 of 2020. The orders covered the applicant's outline of submissions dated 10 November 2025, the respondents' outline dated 24 November 2025, the applicant's outline dated 1 December 2025, and both parties' closing submissions filed on 3 February 2026 together with reply closings filed on 6 February 2026.

The reasoning was direct. All of the requested documents had been referred to and relied on in the course of a trial conducted in open court. There were no relevant suppression orders. The principle of open justice therefore strongly supported access. The Court was satisfied that it was appropriate to grant leave to inspect and copy the documents.

The decision is also notable for what it does not say. It does not suggest that every restricted document should be released on request. Nor does it say that written submissions are automatically open to inspection. Instead, it shows that once written submissions have been used in open court, the case for access becomes much stronger, and objections based only on preference, relevance concerns, or dissatisfaction with the requester's stated reasons may not be enough.

For business owners and in-house teams, this is a litigation process case with practical consequences. The main lesson is that written submissions should be prepared on the assumption that, if they are relied on in open court, they may later be inspected by non-parties. That is especially important in disputes involving financing arrangements, insolvency, cross-border litigation, related-party claims, or commercially sensitive negotiations.

The case also shows the limits of reactive objections. If a business wants to protect genuinely sensitive material, it should think about that before the hearing or at least before the material is used openly in court. Once the submissions have been relied on in open court, the Court may treat them as part of the public administration of justice. At that point, saying that a third party has not shown enough interest, or that release would be inconvenient or strategically uncomfortable, may not be persuasive.

There is also a drafting lesson. Written submissions often contain more detail than is strictly necessary because they are prepared as advocacy documents rather than publication documents. But if they are likely to be used in open court, businesses and their lawyers should consider whether confidential detail can be reduced, summarised, or dealt with in a way that does not unnecessarily expand later access risk. That does not mean the Court will always permit confidentiality measures, but it does mean the issue should be managed deliberately.

Finally, businesses involved in parallel proceedings should assume that developments in one court may be noticed by parties in another. Here, the non-party requester was connected to separate English proceedings. The Court did not require that requester to prove a strong private entitlement once open justice was engaged. That is a reminder that litigation documents can have consequences beyond the immediate case.

The judgment was delivered on 27 March 2026. The main proceeding had commenced in 2020. The trial began on 8 December 2025 and judgment was reserved on 10 February 2026. The non-party access request was received on 10 February 2026 and reached the judge's chambers on 20 March 2026 after supporting documents were sought. At the time of this decision, judgment in the substantive dispute remained reserved.

That procedural timing matters. The Court was not deciding the commercial merits of the dispute. It was deciding a separate access question after the hearing had already taken place in open court. That is why the judgment should be read as an authority on court-file access and open justice, not as a substantive contract ruling.