Galinovic v Singtel Optus Pty Limited (No 2)

Galinovic v Singtel Optus Pty Limited (No 2) [2026] FCA 524 is a Federal Court decision about the mechanics of paying a costs order after an interlocutory application had already been dismissed. The case is not a substantive ruling on unfair contract terms. It is a practice and procedure decision about whether the Court should vary an earlier order so that the amount of costs was fixed and payment had to be made by electronic funds transfer.

The Court granted that variation. Meagher J held that the applicant's obligation arose from a court order, not from a contract, and rejected arguments that a posted promissory note or similar tender had already discharged the liability. For businesses, the practical point is straightforward: when money is owed under a court order, the safest path is actual compliance through a clear, orthodox payment method that can be proved.

Ms Galinovic had brought an interlocutory application against Singtel Optus Pty Ltd and Optus Billing Services Pty Ltd. On 22 May 2025, that application was dismissed and she was ordered to pay the respondents' costs. After that, the parties moved into a separate dispute about how those costs should be paid and whether the amount should be fixed.

The respondents' solicitors, Gadens, proposed payment by EFT into their trust account. The correspondence before the Court showed that Ms Galinovic challenged the insistence on EFT and asked for specific policy documentation that limited satisfaction methods to bank transfers only. She argued that standard commercial practice permitted various legally recognised methods of obligation satisfaction and said she would tender satisfaction through a legally valid instrument.

On 19 June 2025, Gadens wrote that the respondents' offer to settle the costs order required all terms to be accepted, including the amount, the payment date and the payment method. The amount then proposed was $8,292.44 inclusive of GST, payable by 20 June 2025 by EFT to the Gadens trust account. Gadens warned that if payment was not made in that way, the respondents would seek orders from the Court.

Ms Galinovic responded that she had already tendered payment by express post. She said full and final satisfaction had been tendered on 18 June 2025, gave an Australia Post tracking number and said she had sent $9,000, which exceeded the amount requested. She also relied on an earlier email from Optus' counsel stating there was no written policy mandating EFT only and that EFT was just the usual practice in such matters.

On 20 June 2025, the respondents withdrew their offer to settle on those terms and said the tender would be returned once received. Ms Galinovic then argued that the respondents had declined to accept her tender without first examining it and that refusal of a proper tender could amount to satisfaction of the debt. She also raised broader arguments about legal tender, promissory notes, estoppel, equity, unjust enrichment and solicitor conduct.

The respondents applied to vary the earlier costs order. They wanted the Court to amend the order so it fixed the costs at $9,364.10 and required payment by EFT into Gadens Lawyers' trust account. Ms Galinovic sought an oral hearing and opposed the variation. That set up the issues the Court had to decide in this judgment.

The first issue was procedural. Ms Galinovic wanted an oral hearing rather than having the variation application determined on the papers. She said the matter involved significant constitutional, federal legislative and equitable issues, and that as a self-represented litigant she needed the protection of an oral hearing for procedural fairness. The respondents argued the matter was straightforward and could be dealt with in writing under the Court's powers and rules.

The second issue was evidentiary. Ms Galinovic objected to parts of the respondents' solicitor affidavit, alleging hearsay, opinion evidence and selective quotation of correspondence. The Court had to decide whether those objections had substance.

The third and main issue was whether the Court should vary the earlier costs order under s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 40.02 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). That involved two practical questions. First, could the Court fix the costs in a lump sum for an interlocutory proceeding rather than leave them to later assessment or taxation? Second, could the Court specify the method of payment, namely EFT into the respondents' solicitors' trust account?

A related issue was whether Ms Galinovic's posted tender, described in the judgment as a purported promissory note, had any legal effect in satisfying the costs order. She argued that promissory notes were recognised under Australian law, that the original order did not specify a payment method, and that the respondents' conduct in retaining the instrument triggered contractual, equitable or estoppel consequences. The Court had to decide whether any of those arguments prevented it from making the variation sought.

Meagher J granted the oral hearing application. Although the respondents had argued the matter could be dealt with on the papers, the judge noted that the oral hearing application and the variation application were heard concurrently and decided, consistently with s 37M of the Act, to grant the oral hearing application.

The Court then rejected Ms Galinovic's evidentiary objections. The judge described the respondents' solicitor affidavit as an entirely orthodox affidavit in a matter of this kind. The Court said that contradiction between the parties' evidence did not make the affidavit inadmissible and that Ms Galinovic could not complain of selective quotation where the relevant correspondence had been annexed in full.

On the costs issue, the Court accepted that r 40.02 applies to interlocutory costs and that the Court can award costs in a specified sum. The respondents had relied on s 43(3)(d) of the Act and authorities supporting lump sum costs where that is proportionate and efficient. They submitted that fixing the amount and requiring EFT would avoid an ongoing and counter-productive dispute and reduce the risk of further litigation. The Court accepted that approach.

The order was amended so that Ms Galinovic had to pay the respondents' costs of the application in the amount of $9,364.10 by electronic funds transfer into Gadens Lawyers' trust account. The Court also granted liberty to apply and directed written submissions on the costs of the oral hearing application and the variation application.

The Court rejected Ms Galinovic's substantive arguments. The judge said her reliance on contract principles was misguided because the obligation to pay costs arose from a court order, not a contract. The making of arrangements about the method of payment and the tender advanced in that regard was not contractual in nature.

The Court also held that the purported promissory note fell far short of the requirements for legal tender. It rejected the argument that retaining the instrument beyond a timeframe set by Ms Galinovic amounted to acceptance of her terms, or that it created estoppel, equitable satisfaction or unjust enrichment. The Court further rejected allegations that the respondents or their solicitors had engaged in a pattern of unconscionable conduct, instead finding that they had sought to provide clear communication and an orthodox method of compliance with the costs order.

Most businesses will never try to satisfy a costs order with a promissory note, but the case still carries a useful commercial lesson. Once a court order requires payment, the practical objective is not to win a side argument about payment theory. It is to comply in a way that is clear, provable and final. Courts are likely to prefer a payment method that results in actual funds being received and that avoids satellite disputes about whether payment was validly made.

That matters because post-judgment or post-interlocutory costs disputes can become expensive very quickly. A relatively modest costs amount can generate more correspondence, more affidavits, more hearings and more legal spend than the original issue warrants. The respondents persuaded the Court that specifying EFT would prevent an ongoing and counter-productive dispute and provide finality. Businesses should take that seriously.

The case also shows the limits of importing contract concepts into court-ordered obligations. In ordinary commerce, parties may negotiate payment methods, acceptance mechanics and consequences of silence. But where the obligation comes from a court order, one side cannot safely impose extra conditions and then argue that non-response or temporary retention equals acceptance. If there is a genuine disagreement about amount, timing or method, the proper course is usually to seek directions, a variation or another formal order.

For businesses and in-house teams, the operational message is simple. If you owe costs, ask for the exact amount, due date and account details in writing. Pay by an orthodox method that produces cleared funds and keep proof of payment. If you are receiving costs and there is a real risk of argument, consider whether to seek a lump sum order and a specified payment method. That can reduce enforcement friction and make later compliance easier to prove.

The judgment is also a reminder that courts look closely at the actual documents and conduct between the parties. Here, the correspondence mattered. The Court referred to the respondents' letters setting out the amount, deadline and EFT requirement, Ms Galinovic's notices of intention to tender satisfaction, the tracking details for the express post item, and the later arguments about whether refusal or retention had legal consequences.

The respondents also relied on affidavit evidence that Ms Galinovic had, in the earlier interlocutory application, exhibited attempts to make payment of Optus invoices by writing wording on invoices and sending them back by post. That background helped explain why the respondents were concerned that a purported payment might not result in actual Australian dollar funds reaching a nominated account. The Court accepted that concern as part of the practical context for the variation application.

Timing also mattered, but not in the way Ms Galinovic argued. She said the respondents had acted unfairly by rejecting her tender before the deadline they had given expired. The Court did not accept that this prevented the variation or transformed the dispute into one governed by contract or estoppel. Instead, the Court focused on the real issue: whether the costs order should be made workable and final by fixing the amount and specifying EFT.

For businesses, that is a useful reminder that process arguments about who said what first will not always carry much weight if the Court sees a practical need to make compliance clear. The stronger position is usually the one that can show a straightforward, orthodox and verifiable path to payment.

The judgment was delivered on 29 April 2026 by Meagher J in the Federal Court of Australia. The hearing took place on 31 July 2025. The orders show that the respondents' email application of 20 June 2025 to vary the earlier orders was granted, and that further written submissions were to be filed in May 2026 about the costs of the oral hearing application and the variation application.

The reasons clearly resolve the main issue about payment of the earlier costs order. The final paragraph of the reasons cuts off while referring to the respondents' wish to be heard on costs if the variation application was granted, but the operative orders already set the timetable for those further submissions.