Domino v Allen (Liquidator), in the matter of Domino

This appeal was not a broad ruling about directors' duties. It was a practical bankruptcy enforcement case arising from a personal costs order. Emma Domino had been involved in Supreme Court litigation in Victoria. She brought an injunction application against various parties, including the liquidators of Torbeckin Pty Ltd (in liquidation). That application failed, and the Supreme Court made costs orders against her personally in favour of the liquidators.

The amount of the costs order was $17,480. That matters because the later bankruptcy notice was based on that debt. The Federal Court also recorded that Ms Domino was a director and shareholder of Torbeckin. So although the dispute had a company and liquidation background, the enforcement step in issue was directed at her as an individual.

Ms Domino then went to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) seeking to set aside the bankruptcy notice or, if that did not happen, to obtain more time to comply with it. Her position was tied to separate steps she was taking in the Victorian courts. She wanted the costs orders stayed and she wanted leave to appeal from those orders. In substance, she argued that the bankruptcy process should not continue until those applications had been heard.

That is the commercial setting in which many business owners find themselves. A dispute that starts in a company context can shift into personal exposure through costs, guarantees, or other personal liabilities. Once that happens, the question is no longer just who is right in the underlying dispute. It becomes a question of enforcement, timing and whether any court has actually granted protection from immediate recovery steps.

The immediate issue was narrow but important. Ms Domino wanted the bankruptcy notice set aside, or at least the time for compliance extended. She was not saying that the debt had already disappeared. Instead, she wanted the court to hold off while she pursued a stay of the Supreme Court costs orders and sought leave to appeal against them.

At the time of the hearing before the primary judge, she had not received any indication from the Supreme Court about when the stay application would be heard, and there was also no indication of when the Court of Appeal would hear her application for leave to appeal. That uncertainty was central to her request for relief. She was effectively asking the court to pause the bankruptcy process while those other steps remained unresolved.

The primary judge was not persuaded. The Federal Court's reasons record that the primary judge considered there was no proper basis to set aside the bankruptcy notice or extend time. Her Honour considered that Ms Domino had little prospect of persuading the Court of Appeal to overturn the costs order. Her Honour also considered that Ms Domino had delayed too long, possibly tactically, in seeking a stay of the costs order.

The primary judge also attached significance to the procedural stage the matter had reached. The reasons note that the creditor's petition stage had not yet been reached. In other words, refusing to extend time for the bankruptcy notice did not mean that bankruptcy itself would immediately occur. The primary judge considered there was still time for the stay application to be heard and determined before any creditor's petition would be heard and determined.

The appeal was filed by notice of appeal dated 16 March 2026. It challenged the primary judge's orders made on 13 March 2026 in the Federal Circuit and Family Court. The appeal was heard by McEvoy J in the Federal Court of Australia.

The judgment records some useful procedural detail. Ms Domino was self-represented on the appeal. The first respondent did not appear. The second respondent appeared in person. The solicitor for the first and second respondents was Mason Black + Mendelsons Lawyers. For business owners reading the case, this is a reminder that courts will still move matters forward even where one side is self-represented and appearances are mixed.

When the appeal first came on for hearing on 2 April 2026, there had been a development in the Victorian proceedings. Ms Domino had been informed by the Court of Appeal that the oral hearing of her stay application and her application for leave to appeal had been listed for 20 April 2026. In those circumstances, she sought to have the Federal Court appeal adjourned until about a week after that date.

The respondents ultimately agreed that the sensible course was to adjourn the appeal until 1 May 2026 and to extend the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice to 5:00 pm on 1 May 2026. McEvoy J made orders to that effect. This part of the story is important because it shows the Federal Court was prepared to accommodate the pending Victorian applications and give them a chance to be decided first.

It also mattered that, at the 2 April hearing, Ms Domino conceded that if the Court of Appeal heard and dismissed the stay application and the leave application, then the basis of her application to set aside the bankruptcy notice before the primary judge would fall away. That concession later became central to the outcome.

The Federal Court had to decide whether the primary judge's refusal to set aside the bankruptcy notice or extend time should be overturned. The appellant argued, in substance, that the matter should have been adjourned or time extended while the Victorian stay and leave applications were pending. She also argued that she had been denied procedural fairness because the respondents filed and served written submissions shortly before the hearing on 13 March 2026 and she said she did not have sufficient opportunity to consider and respond to them.

That raised two issues. First, had the primary judge made an error in refusing relief at the time? Second, even if there had been some procedural unfairness, did that matter once the later Victorian applications had been decided?

The Federal Court approached the appeal by reference to the appellate function. McEvoy J said that the purpose of an appeal is the correction of error and that the court must decide for itself whether, in light of the claimed errors, the primary judge's conclusion was correct. That meant the court was not confined to asking whether there had been some arguable procedural problem on 13 March 2026. It also had to consider the position as it stood after the Court of Appeal had ruled on 20 April 2026.

By the time the appeal resumed on 1 May 2026, Richards JA had dismissed both the stay application and the application for leave to appeal. That later event changed everything. The Federal Court had to decide whether there was any remaining foundation for the relief Ms Domino had originally sought. The answer was no.

McEvoy J dismissed the appeal. The key reason was straightforward. Once the Court of Appeal dismissed the application for a stay of the costs orders and the application for leave to appeal, the entire premise of Ms Domino's application before the primary judge had fallen away. She had wanted the bankruptcy notice set aside or delayed until those applications were heard. They were heard, and they failed.

The Federal Court therefore held that her application before the primary judge was now without foundation. The judgment notes that Ms Domino had effectively conceded this at the 2 April hearing, and it was on that basis that the adjournment had been granted. The court rejected her later submission that the appeal had been misunderstood and was not hopeless.

The court also dealt with the procedural fairness complaint. McEvoy J said that even if it were accepted that the primary judge denied procedural fairness by determining the matter after late written submissions were filed and served without giving Ms Domino sufficient opportunity to respond, nothing would turn on that failure. The later dismissal of the stay and leave applications meant the primary judge's conclusion was correct in any event.

The appeal was therefore dismissed with costs. The Federal Court ordered Ms Domino to pay the respondents' costs of and incidental to the appeal, including the costs reserved by earlier orders made on 2 April 2026, fixed in the sum of $7,254.00. The court described the respondents' short form bill of costs as modest and reasonable, and observed that the amount might have been higher on a taxation.

The judgment also notes that Ms Domino sought to rely on an affidavit of Mr Jeremy Stanley Rowell affirmed on 30 April 2026, which sought to agitate further aspects of disputes with the liquidators of Torbeckin. The court said there was no reason to grant leave to rely on that affidavit and no basis for the additional orders she sought.

For business owners, this case is best read as a warning about personal enforcement risk and the limits of procedural arguments once the commercial foundation of a case disappears. The appellant's complaint about process did not save the appeal because the later Victorian decisions meant there was no longer any practical basis to interfere with the bankruptcy notice.

The first lesson is to distinguish clearly between company liabilities and personal liabilities. The respondents were liquidators of a company in liquidation, and the appellant was a director and shareholder of that company. But the costs order was against her personally, and the bankruptcy notice was directed to her personally. Directors and founders often move between company and personal roles in litigation without fully appreciating when they have become individually exposed.

The second lesson is that timing matters. If your strategy depends on a stay or an appeal, you need to know whether it has actually been filed, when it will be heard, and whether any interim protection has been granted. Courts may be unwilling to stop enforcement merely because another application is pending, especially if there has been delay or if the prospects of success appear weak.

The third lesson is that enforcement stages matter. The primary judge considered it relevant that the creditor's petition stage had not yet been reached. That does not mean a bankruptcy notice can be ignored. It means courts may assess urgency differently depending on where the matter sits in the enforcement process.

The fourth lesson is practical case management. Keep copies of the judgment debt, any bankruptcy notice, any stay application, listing notices, and any orders extending time. If you are self-represented or partly self-represented, procedural discipline becomes even more important. Courts will expect you to identify exactly what relief you seek and what event would justify it.

Finally, this case shows that once the event you were waiting for has occurred, your position may need to be reassessed immediately. If the stay is refused and leave to appeal is refused, a strategy built entirely on waiting for those applications may collapse at once.

The appeal was from orders made on 13 March 2026 in the Federal Circuit and Family Court. The notice of appeal in the Federal Court was dated 16 March 2026. The appeal first came on for hearing on 2 April 2026, when it was adjourned to await the Victorian Court of Appeal's determination of the stay and leave applications. Those applications were heard and dismissed on 20 April 2026 by Richards JA. McEvoy J then dismissed the Federal Court appeal on 1 May 2026, with reasons published on 4 May 2026.

As a result, the primary judge's refusal to set aside the bankruptcy notice or extend time remained in place, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondents' appeal costs fixed at $7,254.00.