The principal legal issues were identified by the Court in direct terms. First, was it a reviewable error to decide the s 35(4) confidentiality application on the assumption that the relevant practice directions applied to the surveillance material and medical reports whether or not they were privileged? Second, was it a reviewable error to decide that leave was required to rely on those materials irrespective of whether or not they were privileged?
The Court said yes. Feutrill J held that the question of legal professional privilege was the central issue the Tribunal was required to decide. It was necessary to decide that issue before applying s 35(4), the practice directions made under s 18B, and the principles relevant to excluding otherwise relevant evidence on the ground of late disclosure.
The judgment explains why that mattered. Legal professional privilege was described as a rule of substantive law and also as an important common law right or immunity. The Court referred to the orthodox distinction between advice privilege and litigation privilege. The extract also records that, although there was authority pointing against litigation privilege extending to Tribunal proceedings, the Court was prepared to accept, without deciding, that litigation privilege applied in the Tribunal context.
The Court then applied the usual interpretive principle that statutes are not construed as abrogating important common law rights, privileges and immunities unless Parliament makes that intention unmistakably clear. That principle informed the Court's analysis of the AAT Act provisions, including ss 35, 37, 38AA and 18B, and the practice directions. On the extract available, the Court considered that the statutory scheme did not unmistakably show an intention to abrogate litigation privilege in the way the Tribunal's approach effectively assumed.
This is the most important point for business readers: the case is about sequence. The Court did not hold that privilege definitely existed. It held that the Tribunal could not lawfully skip over the privilege question and proceed as if the material were simply ordinary late evidence governed in the usual way by practice directions and hearing management concerns. Privilege had to be addressed first because it could change the legal framework for the later decisions.
The Court also found that the Tribunal made material errors of law and failed to accord procedural fairness. In the Court's view, failing to decide the central privilege issue meant the Tribunal asked the wrong question and misapplied the legal framework it was supposed to use.