Nimhurchu v QBE Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 59

This case started as a Commonwealth workers compensation dispute and turned into a fight about process. Ms Doireann Nimhurchu had worked for Optus for about a decade. After her employment ended, she made a claim under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), alleging anxiety and stress caused by incidents during her employment. Optus was a licensee under the SRC Act, and QBE managed claims on Optus’ behalf.

QBE denied liability in February 2023. After reconsideration, it affirmed that denial in April 2023. Ms Nimhurchu then used the ordinary statutory pathway and applied to the Administrative Review Tribunal for review. Up to that point, the dispute was following the expected route for a contested Commonwealth workers compensation claim.

The procedural tension arose during the Tribunal matter. The judgment records several psychiatric assessments over time. Some were arranged by Ms Nimhurchu’s side and some by the respondents. They included telehealth examinations in June 2023, November 2023 and September 2024, and an examination by psychiatrist Dr Prabal Kar in November 2024. QBE later said there was considerable variation in the psychiatric opinions and sought a further in-person examination with another psychiatrist.

Ms Nimhurchu objected. Through her solicitors, she said there had already been enough medico-legal assessments and there was no utility in another psychiatric examination. She also raised concern that another report could unfairly delay resolution of the claim. That objection matters because it explains how the dispute moved from an ordinary evidentiary disagreement into a formal statutory issue under s 57 of the SRC Act.

On 4 March 2025, QBE wrote to say it intended to issue a determination under s 57 requiring attendance at an examination. The letter, as quoted in the judgment, said there were inconsistencies in the psychiatric opinions and that there had not yet been an in-person examination by an independent psychiatrist at Optus’ request. QBE also invited Ms Nimhurchu’s views on the psychiatrist to be selected and whether she needed a support person. That detail is useful because it shows the claims manager was not simply booking an appointment informally. It was moving into the formal statutory mechanism.

On 27 March 2025, QBE made a determination under s 57 requiring an in-person examination by psychiatrist Dr Victor Cheng in Western Australia. Shortly after, Ms Nimhurchu’s solicitors said she had relocated to Brisbane in late 2024 and that any in-person examination would need to occur there. The Tribunal hearing had also been listed for 1 to 4 July 2025, which added timing pressure to the dispute.

The judgment then records further correspondence about examination arrangements, including advice from the respondents in May 2025 about a telehealth examination with Associate Professor Mendelson and an in-person examination with Professor Richard Mattick in Sydney. The available text cuts off during the applicant’s objections to those arrangements, so the full later chronology is not reproduced in the extract. Even so, the opening paragraphs of the reasons make clear what happened next: on 19 June 2025, QBE determined that Ms Nimhurchu’s rights to compensation and to commence or continue proceedings under the SRC Act were suspended.

Rather than confining the challenge to the statutory review structure, Ms Nimhurchu commenced Federal Court proceedings on 14 July 2025. She sought declarations that she had a reasonable excuse not to attend a psychiatric appointment with Dr Frank T Varghese on 10 June 2025 and that the 19 June 2025 suspension determination was unlawful. That shift in forum became the central issue in the case.

The legal question was not simply whether QBE had acted fairly in requiring another examination. The Federal Court had to decide whether this was the kind of dispute it should determine at all. Ms Nimhurchu relied on s 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), which deals with declarations of right, and she also sought ancillary orders. The respondents argued that she should have pursued the review and appeal mechanisms available under the SRC Act and in the Administrative Review Tribunal.

The catchwords show two linked issues. First, the Court considered whether federal jurisdiction had been properly invoked. Secondly, even if some jurisdictional basis existed, the Court considered whether it should decline to grant relief because there was an available alternative remedy in a specialist tribunal. The catchwords also refer to jurisdiction and forum non conveniens, which signals that the Court was concerned with whether the Federal Court was the proper place for this dispute.

The judgment is also important because of the legislative context. The catchwords state that a determination made under s 57(2) of the SRC Act is included in the definition of a determination in s 60 following the Fair Work Legislation Amendment (Closing Loopholes) Act 2023 (Cth). The Court said this closed the loophole identified in Buck v Comcare. For business readers, the practical point is that Parliament had adjusted the review architecture, and the Court treated that as significant when considering whether the applicant should have used the specialist review route instead of seeking standalone declaratory relief.

Needham J gave judgment for the respondents. The formal orders were that judgment be given for the respondents against the applicant and that the applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the interlocutory application and the proceedings, as agreed or taxed. The Court therefore refused to grant the declarations and related relief sought by Ms Nimhurchu.

The catchwords and opening reasons show the Court reached that result on two bases. The primary finding was that federal jurisdiction had not been properly invoked. The alternative finding was that the Court should not exercise its discretion to grant relief. That means the applicant failed both on the threshold question of whether the Federal Court was properly engaged and, in the alternative, on the discretionary question of whether the Court should intervene even if it could.

Just as importantly, the Court did not use this proceeding to decide the underlying compensation claim. The available reasons show that the case was about the validity challenge to the suspension determination and the proper forum for that challenge. The Court’s approach reinforces the idea that where Parliament has created a specialist review structure, parties cannot assume they can sidestep it by reframing the dispute as a declaration application in the Federal Court.

The reference to the amendments concerning s 57 and s 60 of the SRC Act strengthens that point. The Court treated those amendments as closing an earlier gap in the review framework. So, on the available material, this was not a case where the Court saw a need to fill a remedial vacuum. Instead, it saw a statutory pathway that should have been used.

A business should read the outcome as a reminder that a strong procedural complaint can still fail if it is brought in the wrong forum.

For employers, insurers and claims managers, this case is less about the medical merits and more about process discipline. If a worker objects to a further examination, the immediate commercial instinct may be to focus on whether the objection is reasonable. That still matters, but this judgment shows that the next question is often just as important: what does the legislation say about how the dispute must be reviewed?

In Commonwealth workers compensation matters, a challenge to a determination under the SRC Act may need to stay within the statutory review structure. If a party starts separate Federal Court proceedings instead, the result may be delay, duplicated legal spend and an adverse costs order, without any progress on the underlying compensation entitlement.

The case also shows the value of a careful paper trail. QBE’s correspondence, as quoted in the judgment, identified why it said another in-person psychiatric examination was needed, referred to inconsistencies in the existing opinions, and invited views on the proposed examiner and support person arrangements. Whether or not a worker agrees with the request, that kind of documented process is important. It helps show that the decision-maker was acting under the statutory framework rather than making an ad hoc demand.

Location and logistics can also matter. Here, there was a dispute after Ms Nimhurchu said she had moved to Brisbane while an in-person examination had been arranged in Western Australia. Businesses should not treat those issues as minor administration. Travel, relocation, support person requests and timing against listed hearings can all become part of the later legal argument about reasonableness and process.

Another practical point is that the Court’s reasoning appears to have been shaped by the existence of a specialist merits review body. Courts are generally cautious about being asked to intervene where Parliament has set up a dedicated review pathway. That does not mean court proceedings are never available. It means businesses should not assume that declaratory relief is a shortcut around a statutory process. Before starting or defending court proceedings, check the exact character of the determination, the available review rights, and whether the legislation has been amended in a way that changes the review route.

Finally, costs risk is real. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs of both the interlocutory application and the proceedings. For a business, that is a reminder that procedural contests can become expensive very quickly, especially where the court concludes the matter should not have been brought there in the first place.

These documents mattered because they framed the dispute as one arising within a statutory compensation scheme, not as a free-standing private law disagreement. The more clearly a business can show that each step was taken under the legislation, with reasons and procedural fairness built in, the stronger its position is likely to be if the process is later challenged.

They also matter because chronology can decide forum disputes. Once there is a reviewable determination and an available specialist review path, later attempts to recast the issue as a declaration claim may face serious resistance.

The judgment was delivered by Needham J in the Federal Court of Australia on 6 February 2026. The matter was heard on 15 October 2025. The applicant’s submissions were dated 27 October 2025 and the respondents’ submissions were dated 30 October 2025. The Court’s orders show that judgment was entered for the respondents and that the applicant was ordered to pay costs.

The available reasons are sufficient to explain the commercial and procedural significance of the case, but the published extract available here is truncated. Readers who need the full doctrinal analysis of jurisdiction, accrued jurisdiction, alternative remedies and the effect of the amendments to the SRC Act should consult the complete reasons and the current legislation.