First Class Securities Limited v Global Future Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2)

This case sits inside a larger commercial dispute involving serious allegations of fraudulent representations and misleading or deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law. First Class Securities Limited alleged that Alande Mustafa Safi, personally and on behalf of Global Future Holdings Pty Ltd and Paragon Finance Group Pty Ltd, made a series of representations about his wealth, land identified for development of a new airport in Melbourne, an infrastructure project concerning that land, companies he purportedly owned, the nature of those businesses, and the returns the applicant would make on a loan to the first respondent.

The applicant said those representations induced it to enter a written agreement and advance about USD5 million, expecting a return of USD2.75 million. It alleged that only about USD550,000 had been repaid and that it had suffered losses in the order of USD7.2 million, with claims framed in contract, deceit and under section 236 of the Australian Consumer Law, along with equitable and statutory remedies.

But this judgment was not the trial of those allegations. It was a short procedural ruling delivered while the respondents were trying to obtain more time to file their defences. That procedural setting matters. Courts often decide interlocutory disputes by focusing on what is necessary to manage the case fairly and efficiently, rather than on the ultimate merits.

The proceeding was commenced on 29 December 2025. On 5 January 2026, a freezing order was made over the assets of the first to third respondents. The order remained in place and included an exception for reasonable legal expenses. On 5 March 2026, the court set a timetable requiring the applicant to file its statement of claim by 20 March 2026 and the respondents to file defences by 22 April 2026. The applicant complied. The respondents did not.

Instead, the respondents sought an extension and on 23 April 2026 obtained more time until 6 May 2026. They still did not file their defences by that extended date. On 11 May 2026, they filed another interlocutory application seeking a further extension until 15 June 2026. That second extension application was supported by affidavits from Safi, from Dr Kenneth Norman of Pario Solutions Group Pty Ltd, and from the respondents' solicitor.

The evidence filed for that application said, in substance, that Safi wanted to defend the proceeding but had encountered difficulties obtaining funding. He had applied to Pario for litigation funding on 27 March 2026. As at 16 April 2026, the solicitor said he was in the process of briefing senior counsel. On 1 May 2026, Safi was informed that funding had been approved in principle, subject to several matters. A 3 May 2026 letter from Dr Norman described a proposed USD10 million non-recourse private equity structured loan, said settlement and payment were expected for 25 May 2026, and said part of the proceeds could be used by Safi as sole beneficiary. The evidence also said that until funds were received from Pario, the respondents could not place their solicitor in funds sufficient to pay existing accounts and brief senior counsel.

The sequence of events is important because it explains why the court treated the funding evidence as a live issue. There were two missed defence deadlines. First, the respondents missed the original 22 April 2026 deadline. Second, after obtaining an extension to 6 May 2026, they missed that date as well. By the time the matter came before Goodman J on 20 May 2026, the court was dealing with a further request for indulgence after an earlier indulgence had already been granted.

That context made the reasons for delay especially significant. A court considering whether to extend time is not limited to asking whether a party would like more time. It can examine whether the explanation is genuine, whether the party has acted promptly, and whether the asserted obstacles are real. Here, the respondents' own evidence put funding, legal costs and the practical ability to prepare defences squarely in issue.

Before the extension application could be determined, the court had to deal with another interlocutory application. The applicant had served a notice to produce dated 11 May 2026. In response, the first to third respondents filed an application on 13 May 2026 seeking to set that notice aside.

The notice to produce sought eight categories of documents. They included any cost agreement, retainer or tax invoice issued by senior counsel in relation to the proceeding, trust account ledgers maintained by the respondents' solicitors, the loan application to Pario, correspondence from Pario to Safi, transaction documents relating to the proposed loan, the project management feasibility report submitted to Pario in February 2026, and the native form of the letter exhibited in Safi's affidavit. It also sought current bank statements for accounts held or controlled by the respondents or Safi, but that category was not pressed by the applicant.

The respondents argued that the notice to produce was an abuse of process because it sought documents that were not relevant to the issues in the proceeding and served no legitimate forensic purpose. They said the applicant already had enough material about available funds. In particular, they pointed to bank statements said to show about $24,000 available, Safi's evidence that he had no funds available other than from Pario, and the solicitor's evidence that no trust money remained and that accounts and disbursements were unpaid.

The applicant's position was that the documents were not redundant at all. It wanted to test whether the proposed Pario facility was likely to become available, whether it would actually fund the litigation, what steps had really been taken to retain senior counsel, and what funds were held by the respondents and their solicitor. That was the immediate procedural fight the court had to resolve.

The legal issue was narrow but important. The court had to decide whether the notice to produce had a legitimate forensic purpose. A notice to produce is not meant to be a fishing expedition. Goodman J referred to authority in the analogous subpoena context, including Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd, for the proposition that a notice may be set aside if it is cast in terms requiring production of documents that do not have apparent relevance to the issues in the proceeding.

The respondents tried to frame the issue tightly. They argued that the real purpose of the notice was to test whether Pario was the only source of funds available, and that this had already been addressed by the evidence they had filed. On that approach, categories 2 to 7 were said to be redundant, and categories 1 and 3 to 7 were said to be irrelevant to the availability of other money to pay for preparation of the defences.

The court rejected that narrow framing. Goodman J said the issues in the proceeding were not limited to those pleaded in the statement of claim. They also extended to issues arising on the present application for an extension of time. Those issues included the veracity of the reasons put forward as to why an extension ought to be granted.

That point is central for business readers. Once a party asks the court for procedural relief and supports that request with factual assertions, those assertions can themselves become issues in the proceeding for the purpose of that application. Relevance is then assessed against the procedural issue the court must decide, not only against the final causes of action in the pleadings.

The court identified three specific matters to which the documents were clearly relevant: whether funds from Pario were likely to be available to the respondents, the steps taken to retain senior counsel, and the funds held by the respondents and their solicitor. Those were all matters going directly to whether the reasons advanced for a further extension should be accepted.

The respondents also relied on Dr Norman's evidence that the proposed facility was a genuine commercial arrangement. But the court said that did not end the matter. Testing of the evidence concerning the proposed Pario facility was not foreclosed by Dr Norman's assertion of genuineness. Rather, it was a legitimate purpose of the notice to produce to obtain documents that would allow an evaluation of his evidence.

Goodman J dismissed the respondents' application to set aside the notice to produce. The court held that the documents sought clearly were relevant to the extension application because they bore on whether the reasons given for a further extension of time should be accepted. In particular, the documents could assist in assessing whether funds from Pario were likely to become available, what had been done to retain senior counsel, and what funds were held by the respondents and their solicitor.

The court therefore accepted that the notice to produce had a legitimate forensic purpose. It was not an abuse of process merely because the respondents had already filed affidavit evidence about their financial position and the proposed funding arrangement. The applicant was entitled to test that evidence by seeking the underlying documents.

The court also ordered that the first to third respondents pay the applicant's costs of the set aside application. That is a practical reminder that interlocutory disputes about document production can carry immediate cost consequences, even before the main case is decided.

Importantly, the judgment did not determine whether the respondents would ultimately receive the further extension until 15 June 2026, nor did it determine the substantive ACL and fraud allegations. The ruling was confined to whether the notice to produce should stand. But even as a confined ruling, it sends a clear message about how courts approach evidence used to justify procedural delay.

For most businesses, the immediate lesson is about litigation conduct, not consumer law liability. The case shows that procedural explanations can create their own evidentiary burden. If your company asks for more time because a loan is pending, investors are delayed, legal fees are unpaid, or counsel cannot be briefed without fresh funds, those statements may invite targeted document requests.

That is especially relevant where the business is closely held and the distinction between company funds, director funds, project finance and legal expense funding is not always clean. In that setting, a court may want to know not just what a witness says, but what the documents show. Loan applications, correspondence with funders, transaction documents, trust ledgers and counsel retainers can all become relevant if they bear on whether the explanation for delay is genuine and sufficient.

The case also highlights the risk of putting forward ambitious funding narratives in litigation. Here, the evidence referred to a proposed USD10 million non-recourse private equity structured loan, legal and compliance review, cross-border banking issues, Swiss private equity interests, and a stated expectation of settlement by 25 May 2026. Once that level of detail is used to support a request for indulgence, the other side is likely to test it. A business should assume that the more specific the explanation, the more likely the court will permit scrutiny of the supporting documents.

That does not mean businesses should avoid making legitimate applications for more time. It means they should make them carefully. If the explanation depends on future funding, the business should understand exactly what has been approved, what remains conditional, who the parties are, what documents exist, and whether the funds can actually be used for legal costs. If the explanation depends on unpaid legal fees or inability to brief counsel, the business should be ready for the court to consider retainers, invoices and trust account records relevant.

There is also a broader credibility point. Courts often make procedural decisions quickly and on affidavit evidence. If the documents later show that the explanation was overstated, incomplete or internally inconsistent, that can affect more than the immediate application. It can influence costs, timetable management and the court's confidence in later evidence. Businesses should therefore treat every procedural affidavit as part of the overall credibility picture in the case.

Where a freezing order or other asset restraint is in place, precision becomes even more important. In this case, the freezing order included an exception for reasonable legal expenses. That meant the respondents' ability to fund their defence was already being considered against a legal framework that distinguished between restrained assets and permitted legal spending. Businesses in similar situations should expect close attention to how legal expenses are being funded and documented.

This decision is useful because it identifies the kinds of documents that may become relevant when a business relies on funding explanations in court. The notice to produce here targeted documents that could show whether the asserted funding pathway was real, sufficiently advanced and usable for the stated purpose. That included the loan application itself, correspondence from the proposed funder, transaction documents, a feasibility report submitted to the funder, and the native form of a key letter. It also sought legal cost and trust account material that could illuminate whether counsel had in fact been retained and whether the solicitor was in funds.

For business owners, that list is a practical checklist of risk areas. If your company is about to tell a court that it cannot meet a deadline because of funding constraints, ask first: what documents would the other side request if they wanted to test this? If the answer includes documents that are incomplete, inconsistent or commercially awkward, that should shape how the application is prepared.

It is also worth noting what the court did not say. The court did not say that every funding document will always be discoverable or producible. Nor did it say that a witness statement about funding is never enough. The point was narrower. In the circumstances of this extension application, the documents sought had apparent relevance to issues the court had to decide. That was enough to give the notice a legitimate forensic purpose.

Businesses should therefore focus on trigger points. The risk of document production rises when a party has already missed deadlines, seeks repeated indulgences, relies on detailed factual explanations, and puts financial capacity or legal funding directly in issue. Those are the moments when procedural evidence can become a battleground of its own.

The judgment was delivered ex tempore and revised. Goodman J gave judgment on 20 May 2026, and the reasons were published on 21 May 2026. The decision is reported as First Class Securities Limited v Global Future Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2026] FCA 632.

The catchwords identify it as a practice and procedure decision on an application to set aside a notice to produce. The application was dismissed. The judgment records the underlying substantive claims, including alleged misleading or deceptive conduct under section 18 of the Australian Consumer Law and loss claims under section 236, but those claims remain separate from the procedural ruling explained here.