First Class Securities Limited v Global Future Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3)

First Class Securities Limited v Global Future Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) [2026] FCA 633 is a short Federal Court case-management decision. The Court was asked whether the first to third respondents should receive more time to file their defences after they had already missed the original deadline and one extended deadline.

Goodman J granted only a short further extension to 5 June 2026, not the longer extension to 15 June 2026 that had been sought. The Court also ordered the respondents to pay the applicant's costs of the extension application and gave the applicant leave to apply for default judgment if no defence was filed by the new date.

This is not a merits decision. It does not decide the underlying commercial allegations, and it does not deal with unfair contract terms. Its value lies in showing how the Federal Court approaches repeated missed pleading deadlines, weak evidence explaining delay, and the need to move proceedings along efficiently.

The proceeding began on 29 December 2025 when First Class Securities Limited sued several respondents, including Global Future Holdings Pty Ltd, Paragon Finance Group Pty Ltd and Alande Mustafa Safi. The judgment does not set out the underlying commercial allegations in detail, but it does note that the allegations in the statement of claim were serious.

Very early in the proceeding, on 5 January 2026, Shariff J made a freezing order over the assets of the first to third respondents. That order remained in place at the time of this decision and included an exception for reasonable legal expenses. That detail mattered because it undercut any broad suggestion that the respondents were simply unable to spend money on preparing their defences.

On 5 March 2026, the Court set a timetable. The applicant had to file and serve its statement of claim by 20 March 2026, and the first to third respondents had to file and serve their defences by 22 April 2026. The applicant complied and filed its statement of claim on 20 March 2026.

The respondents did not comply with their deadline. Instead, they sought an extension and obtained one on 23 April 2026, moving the defence deadline to 6 May 2026. They still did not file their defences by that extended date. On 11 May 2026, they filed another interlocutory application asking for a further extension, this time until 15 June 2026.

That second extension application was heard on 20 May 2026. By then, the respondents' evidentiary position had narrowed considerably. They relied only on an affidavit from their solicitor. Other foreshadowed evidence from the third respondent and Dr Kenneth Norman was not ultimately relied on after the Court allowed the applicant to cross-examine those deponents and they were not made available.

A notable feature of the decision is the way the evidence unfolded. The respondents did not end up relying on affidavits from the third respondent and Dr Kenneth Norman. The applicant sought permission to cross-examine those deponents. Goodman J allowed that course, noting that cross-examination on an interlocutory application should be permitted sparingly, but considered it appropriate here because the proposed areas of cross-examination were distinct from the issues to be determined on the pleadings and because adequate notice had been given.

The hearing was then adjourned to allow the respondents' counsel to arrange for the third respondent and Dr Norman to be available for cross-examination. When the hearing resumed, counsel said the third respondent had a medical appointment and Dr Norman was in back-to-back meetings. The Court then offered a further indulgence by allowing them to make themselves available at 9:45 am on 21 May 2026. After another short adjournment, counsel indicated that the respondents would not rely on those affidavits.

That left the respondents relying only on their solicitor's affidavit evidence. The judgment records one specific point from that evidence: the solicitor did not hold funds in trust. The Court did not treat that as enough to explain the missed deadlines or to establish any inability to pay for the preparation of defences.

For business readers, this part of the case is practical and important. If you ask a court for procedural indulgence, the quality and availability of your evidence matters. If your application depends on evidence from directors, advisers or experts, those people may need to be available if the Court permits cross-examination. If they are not available, your application can become much weaker very quickly.

The issue before Goodman J was narrow. The Court was not deciding the commercial merits of the proceeding. It had to decide whether the first to third respondents should receive a further extension of time to file their defences, and if so, how long that extension should be.

That required the Court to exercise procedural discretion against the backdrop of section 37N(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The judgment refers to the obligation to conduct proceedings consistently with the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions, namely as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.

In deciding whether to grant more time, the Court considered several factors identified in the reasons. These included the complete absence of any explanation for missing the original deadline of 22 April 2026 and the extended deadline of 6 May 2026, the time that had already passed since the statement of claim was filed on 20 March 2026, the respondents' previous non-compliance with court orders, the absence of evidence showing inability to pay for preparation of the defences, the lack of direct prejudice to the applicant in the sense of losing hearing dates, the continuing prejudice caused by delay itself, and the fact that the respondents' solicitor and counsel had already been involved in the matter for some time.

The Court also noted that the allegations in the statement of claim were serious. But it rejected any suggestion that seriousness alone justified the longer extension sought. The reasons say that it did not follow that any defences required the involvement of senior counsel, and there was no suggestion that the respondents' existing solicitor and counsel were unable properly to prepare defences.

Goodman J granted a further extension, but only a short one. The Court extended the time for the first to third respondents to file and serve their defences until 5 June 2026. That was materially shorter than the extension to 15 June 2026 that the respondents had requested.

The Court's language is important. The extension was described as an indulgence. That signals that the respondents were not being rewarded for a satisfactory explanation. They were being given one final, limited opportunity despite a poor procedural history.

The reasons make clear why the Court was reluctant. There was no explanation for the failure to file by 22 April 2026 and then by 6 May 2026. The absence of any explanation weighed heavily against a favourable exercise of discretion. The Court also pointed to the time that had passed since the statement of claim was filed, the respondents' non-compliance with previous orders, and the absence of evidence that they could not pay for the preparation of their defences.

At the same time, the Court accepted that the extension sought would not endanger any interlocutory or final hearing dates and that the applicant already had the benefit of freezing orders. But that did not end the matter. The Court accepted there was still prejudice in the general sense that any further extension would delay the resolution of the proceeding.

The Court therefore made three practical orders. First, it extended time only until 5 June 2026. Second, it ordered that if the first to third respondents, or any of them, failed to file and serve a defence by that date, the applicant would have leave to file an application for default judgment. Third, it ordered the first to third respondents to pay the applicant's costs of the interlocutory application filed on 11 May 2026.

Just as important is what the Court did not decide. It did not make substantive findings about the underlying commercial dispute. There are no final findings in this judgment about liability, breach, loss, or the content of any contract. The outcome is procedural only.

For a business owner, the main lesson is that court timetables are real deadlines, not placeholders. A defence is a foundational document. It tells the Court and the other side which allegations are admitted, denied or not admitted, and it shapes the issues that will be fought about. If your business does not file it on time, the Court may become increasingly unwilling to indulge delay unless there is a clear, evidence-based reason.

This case shows that repeated non-compliance is especially risky. Missing one deadline may be recoverable. Missing a second deadline without a proper explanation can lead to a short final extension, a costs order, and the possibility of default judgment. That combination can put a business under immediate pressure, even before the merits of the dispute are tested.

The decision also shows that courts look closely at the evidence used to justify delay. If your business says it needs more time because of funding constraints, unavailable personnel, document collection problems or complexity, those matters should be addressed directly in affidavit evidence. The Court here specifically noted the absence of evidence of inability to pay for the preparation of defences.

Another practical point is that the seriousness of the allegations does not automatically justify delay. The Court accepted that the allegations were serious, but still said that did not mean senior counsel was required or that the existing legal team could not prepare defences. In other words, complexity may be relevant, but it is not a substitute for evidence and progress.

Finally, this case is a reminder that procedural applications can turn on witness management. If your application relies on affidavits from directors, experts or advisers, make sure they are available if the Court permits cross-examination. If they are not, the Court may be left with a much thinner evidentiary record than you intended.

Businesses often ask whether a missed deadline can simply be fixed by asking for more time. The answer is sometimes yes, but not casually. Courts can extend time, but they expect a proper explanation and evidence. The longer the delay and the more deadlines that have already been missed, the harder it becomes to persuade the Court to grant further indulgence.

Another common question is whether the other side must show major prejudice before the Court will refuse an extension. This case shows that direct prejudice such as losing a hearing date is not the only kind of prejudice that matters. Delay itself can be prejudicial because it slows the resolution of the proceeding and conflicts with the Court's case-management objectives.

Businesses also sometimes assume that if allegations are serious, the Court will allow extra time automatically. This judgment shows that seriousness alone is not enough. The Court still expects parties and their lawyers to progress the case efficiently and to explain any inability to do so.

If your business is already under pressure from freezing orders, cash flow issues or document collection problems, those matters should be raised early and with evidence. Leaving them vague or unsupported can make an extension application much less persuasive.

The judgment was delivered on 21 May 2026 by Goodman J in the General Division of the Federal Court of Australia, New South Wales Registry. It is a short procedural decision in a commercial proceeding. The orders concern only the timing for filing defences, the applicant's ability to seek default judgment if those defences were not filed by 5 June 2026, and the costs of the interlocutory application.

Because the judgment does not contain substantive findings on the underlying dispute, it should not be read as a ruling on the merits of the parties' commercial positions. It is a case-management decision about delay, evidence and compliance with court orders.