McAvoy v Adani Mining Pty Ltd T/A Bravus Mining and Resources

This Federal Court decision arose from a dispute about alleged racial discrimination connected to public statements made by Adani Mining Pty Ltd trading as Bravus Mining and Resources. Mr Coedie McAvoy brought representative proceedings on his own behalf and on behalf of group members said to be members of his family. The pleaded case said Bravus had published statements on a public Facebook page and on a public website through media releases, and that those statements were reasonably likely to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate the applicant and group members because of race, colour, national or ethnic origin.

The judgment makes clear that the immediate fight was procedural. The Court was not finally deciding whether Bravus had in fact contravened s 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act. Instead, it had to decide whether the Federal Court proceeding had been brought on behalf of people who were actually within the earlier Australian Human Rights Commission complaint, and whether the allegations in court matched the complaint that had been terminated.

That point matters because this legal pathway does not begin in court. A complaint must first be lodged with the Commission. Only after termination can an application be made to the Federal Court. The Court therefore treated the Commission complaint as the starting point for deciding who could be part of the later case and what conduct could be pursued.

The extract says the Commission notified Bravus on 18 December 2024 that Adrian Burragubba had lodged a complaint under s 46P of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act. The complaint was brought for himself and as a representative complaint on behalf of nine family members and Custodians Ltd. The complaint alleged contraventions of ss 9 and 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act.

The complaint had two parts. The first part concerned events on 27 August 2023 and alleged that Bravus employees obstructed and prevented Mr Burragubba and other group members from accessing the Doongmabulla Springs. The second part alleged a pattern of conduct affecting Mr Burragubba and the group members arising from publications made by Bravus between 7 December 2022 and 22 September 2023, together with certain Facebook messages and comments.

The Court then examined the complaint materials in detail. On the complaint form itself, Mr Burragubba was identified as the complainant, and the form listed the details of nine identified individuals under the section asking for details of people on whose behalf the complaint was being made. No other persons were mentioned on the form as people on whose behalf the complaint was made.

However, the supporting submissions attached to the complaint also referred to Nagana Yarrbayn Wangan and Jagalingou Cultural Custodians Ltd. Mr McAvoy argued that this reference should be given significant weight and that the organisation operated as a representative body for additional family members. The Court admitted affidavit evidence explaining the role and function of Custodians Ltd because it was of some assistance in understanding who was said to be within the group before the Commission.

Even so, the Court focused on what the complaint materials themselves actually conveyed. The submissions described Custodians Ltd as a representative organisation established to enable Mr Burragubba and other Wangan and Jagalingou cultural custodians to undertake activities including on-Country spiritual and cultural practices, monitoring and caring for Country, and fulfilling their role under law and custom as cultural custodians. The Court considered that this description did not indicate that the organisation included other individual persons beyond those already named in the complaint form.

The central issue was whether Mr McAvoy could run a representative Federal Court proceeding on behalf of people who were not properly part of the terminated Commission complaint. Bravus argued that s 46PO(2A)(a)(ii) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act prevented Mr McAvoy from making an application on behalf of purported group members who were not affected persons in relation to the terminated complaint.

The judgment explains that an affected person is relevantly a person on whose behalf the complaint was lodged. That meant the Court had to ask whether the additional family members later sought to be included in the Federal Court proceeding had actually been included in the Commission complaint.

The Court also had to consider s 46PO(3), which requires the unlawful discrimination alleged in the court application to be the same as, or the same in substance as, the unlawful discrimination that was the subject of the terminated complaint, or to arise out of the same or substantially the same acts, omissions or practices.

An important feature of the judgment is its express statement that there is a difference between a representative application under s 46PO(2A) of the AHRC Act and a representative proceeding under Pt IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act. That distinction mattered in this case. The proceeding before the Court was a Pt IVA representative proceeding, but the Court still had to apply the limits imposed by the AHRC Act because the court case followed a terminated Commission complaint.

Bravus also raised an alternative argument under s 33ZF of the Federal Court of Australia Act, contending that if the matter should more properly have been brought as a representative application under the AHRC Act, the proceeding should be discontinued in respect of group members who had not consented in accordance with s 46POA. The catchwords record that this application was dismissed.

Justice Sarah C Derrington granted summary judgment in part. The formal order dismissed the applicant's claim for relief, brought by an amended originating application filed on 18 August 2025, on behalf of any person other than the applicant and a specified list of named individuals. Those named individuals were Adrian Burragubba, Lyndell Turbane, Sharon Ford, Renay Baira, Jahshua McAvoy, Coedie McAvoy, Nathan Baira, Sharon Ford, Keliy-Ann McAvoy, Sharah McAvoy and Meisha McAvoy.

In practical terms, the Court cut back the representative proceeding. It did not allow the case to continue on behalf of a broader, unnamed family group beyond the applicant and the listed individuals.

The reasoning shown in the extract was that nothing in the complaint form or the supporting submissions could be construed as including extended family members who had not been specifically named in the complaint form. The Court considered that the description of Custodians Ltd in the submissions did not convey that it comprised a wider group than the named people already identified.

The Court also held that Custodians Ltd could not sensibly be treated as the subject of the pleaded racial discrimination in the way alleged. The extract states that a corporate entity does not have a race, colour or ethnic origin, nor can it ordinarily be offended, insulted, harassed or humiliated in the relevant sense. That was one reason the organisation could not operate as a vehicle for bringing in additional unnamed individuals.

The Court further accepted that the statement of claim extended beyond the substantive and temporal limits of the complaint. The complaint materials referred to publications between 7 December 2022 and 22 September 2023, and Attachment 1 indicated a slightly broader timeframe up to 1 May 2024. By contrast, the statement of claim identified alleged offending publications between approximately 7 December 2022 and approximately October 2024. The Court accepted that the temporal allegations in the statement of claim were wider than those in the complaint.

The matter was then listed for further hearing on a date to be advised administratively. That indicates some part of the proceeding remained on foot after the partial summary judgment order.

One of the most useful parts of this decision for businesses is how closely the Court examined the complaint documents. The Court did not treat the Commission process as a loose prelude to litigation. It looked at the complaint form, the attached submissions, the supporting attachment containing the media releases and Facebook posts, and the notice of termination.

The complaint form mattered because it identified the people on whose behalf the complaint was made. The submissions mattered because they were relied on to argue that Custodians Ltd brought in a wider body of family members. The attachment mattered because it helped define the publications and timeframe that were actually before the Commission. The termination notice mattered because it identified the members of the class on whose behalf the complaint had been accepted and progressed.

The Court also relied on authority explaining the purpose of the statutory scheme. The extract quotes the Full Court in Grigor-Scott v Jones for the proposition that the intention is to limit the complaint brought to the Court to the same complaint as was made to the Commission by the same complainants and against the same respondents. The reason is practical. The Commission acts as a filter and attempts conciliation before court proceedings are brought.

For businesses, this means process discipline matters. If your organisation receives a discrimination complaint, preserve the exact complaint package and every later communication about it. If the matter later reaches court, those records may support arguments that the court case has expanded beyond what was actually put before the Commission.

The case also shows that public communications can create discrimination risk. The underlying allegations concerned Facebook posts and media releases. Businesses often use those channels quickly during disputes with activists, critics, employees, customers or community groups. But statements made in those settings can become the basis of allegations under discrimination law, not just defamation or consumer law.

Businesses should read this case as a reminder that procedural points can materially change the size and shape of a dispute. Even where the underlying allegations are serious, a claimant still has to stay within the statutory pathway. If the Commission complaint identified only certain people, a later court case may not be able to expand to a much broader group. If the complaint focused on a particular set of publications and dates, a later pleading may not be able to stretch much further.

That does not mean a business should rely only on technical arguments. The merits still matter, and some claims remained on foot here. But the decision shows that scope objections can be important and commercially worthwhile where a later court case appears broader than the complaint that went through the Commission.

There is also a communications lesson. If your business publishes statements about sensitive disputes, especially where Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, cultural identity, heritage issues or community opposition are involved, build a review process before publication. The legal risk is not limited to obviously abusive language. Context, repeated messaging and the way a group is characterised may all matter.

In practice, businesses should separate the merits question from the scope question. One workstream should assess whether the communication should be corrected, removed, clarified or defended. Another should analyse whether the complainants and allegations in any later court filing are actually within the bounds of the terminated complaint. Both questions can affect litigation strategy, settlement posture and reputational management.

These steps do not guarantee a defence, but they put a business in a better position to respond both on the merits and on scope. This case shows that both can matter.

The complaint was sent to the Commission on 20 November 2024. The Commission notified Bravus on 18 December 2024. The President's delegate terminated the complaint on 10 June 2025 on the basis that there were no reasonable prospects of settlement by conciliation. Two Federal Court proceedings were then commenced following termination. This proceeding, QUD 542 of 2025, is the one addressed in the judgment. The judgment was delivered on 1 June 2026.

The orders show that summary judgment was granted in part and that the matter was listed for further hearing. So the case was not wholly finished by this ruling.