Woori International Pty Ltd, in the matter of TJM Holdings Group Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (No 2)

In Woori International Pty Ltd, in the matter of TJM Holdings Group Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (No 2) [2026] FCA 97, Cheeseman J dismissed an interlocutory application by Tony Metledge. He had asked the Federal Court to urgently restrain the liquidators of TJM Holdings Group Pty Ltd from taking any further steps in a Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding.

That NSW proceeding had been filed by the liquidators to terminate the winding up under s 482 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and to obtain approval of their remuneration. The Federal Court refused the injunction and ordered that the application be dismissed with costs.

The decision is a procedural insolvency case, but it has a clear commercial message. Courts are unlikely to grant urgent relief where the applicant is effectively trying to delay the next stage of a liquidation, where earlier challenges have already failed, and where the objections can be raised in the court already hearing the liquidators' application.

The immediate dispute was narrow. The liquidators had already filed a proceeding in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 19 December 2025. In that proceeding, they sought to terminate the winding up of TJM under s 482 and to obtain approval of their remuneration. Mr Metledge then came to the Federal Court and sought an urgent injunction preventing the liquidators from taking any further steps in the NSW proceeding without prior leave of the Federal Court.

Mr Metledge's position, as recorded by Cheeseman J, was that he was not in this application directly seeking to review, vary or set aside the Registrar's winding-up orders. Instead, he argued that the Federal Court should intervene because it had responsibility to supervise liquidators appointed under its own orders. He also submitted that the NSW Supreme Court was an inappropriate forum. In oral submissions, he said he wanted time to obtain advice from senior counsel about how he might challenge the validity of the winding-up order made in the Federal Court.

The Court recorded that Mr Metledge had briefed senior counsel, but that counsel was not available to provide advice until March 2026. That timing mattered because the NSW Supreme Court proceeding had already been listed, and the Federal Court application was presented as urgent.

The broader history was central to the result. Cheeseman J said there had been many applications in the Federal Court by Mr Metledge in relation to the winding up. Two earlier applications were especially important.

First, in September 2025, Halley J dismissed an application by Mr Metledge to commence proceedings to review winding-up orders made by a Registrar under s 35A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The reason was standing. Mr Metledge was not himself a party to the winding-up proceeding, so he could not seek review under s 35A in his own right.

Second, Mr Metledge had brought an urgent application before Owens J seeking, among other things, an extension of time to apply for review of the Registrar's decision. Owens J was not satisfied that the company had a reasonably arguable case for an extension of time. Owens J also declined to grant leave under s 198G(3) of the Corporations Act because the strength of the proposed review case was described as very weak.

The judgment also records that the Registrar's decision had been made on 12 February 2025 and that the review attempt came well outside the 21 day period referred to in r 3.11(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). By then, the winding up had all but concluded. Owens J had considered that all that remained was for the liquidators to make an application under s 482 to terminate the winding up and restore the company to Mr Metledge's control. Owens J also considered there was no practical difference between setting aside the winding-up orders and terminating the winding up.

Cheeseman J then set out a longer procedural history, drawn from Owens J's earlier summary. That history included an earlier s 482 application filed by Mr Metledge in February 2025, adjournments before Markovic J while the parties explored a consent position, later attempts to pursue review of the Registrar's decision, an appearance before Lee J as Duty Judge, the dismissal of the s 482 application by Markovic J in June 2025, a failed urgent application before Younan J concerning a property sale and distribution of proceeds, and the unsuccessful September 2025 application before Halley J.

That sequence mattered because it showed the Court was not dealing with a single fresh issue. It was dealing with another urgent application made after a long series of attempts to challenge, delay or reshape the consequences of the winding up.

The Court had to decide whether to grant urgent interlocutory relief restraining the liquidators from continuing with the NSW Supreme Court proceeding. That required Cheeseman J to consider several connected questions.

One question was forum. Mr Metledge accepted that the NSW Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the liquidators' proceeding, but argued that it was an inappropriate forum. His argument appeared to rest on the proposition that a liquidator appointed by a court is supervised only by the particular court that made the winding-up and appointment order.

Another question was whether the application was, in substance, just another attempt to re-litigate issues already addressed in earlier urgent applications. The Court referred to authority explaining that a second interlocutory application for the same relief may be an abuse of process unless there has been a material change of circumstances or new evidence, although the ultimate touchstone remains the interests of justice.

The Court also had to apply the ordinary requirements for interlocutory relief. Those included whether there was a serious question to be tried, whether refusal of relief would cause irreparable harm, and whether the balance of convenience favoured the injunction. Cheeseman J considered those issues in light of the whole procedural history and the practical reality of what the application was trying to achieve.

The judgment makes clear that the Court looked past the label attached to the application. Although Mr Metledge said he was not directly seeking to review or set aside the Registrar's orders, the Court considered it unclear what he sought to achieve other than delaying the determination of the s 482 application and mounting a further attack on the validity of the Registrar's order.

Cheeseman J dismissed the interlocutory application with costs. The Court did not accept the submission that the Supreme Court of New South Wales was an inappropriate forum. In particular, the Court rejected the proposition that a liquidator appointed by a court is supervised only by the specific court that made the winding-up and appointment order.

The Court also said it did not accept that the arguments Mr Metledge wished to make about the conduct of the liquidators, including remuneration issues, were arguments that could not be made in the NSW Supreme Court in opposition to the s 482 and remuneration application. That was a practical point as much as a legal one. If the objections could be raised in the existing NSW proceeding, there was less reason for the Federal Court to intervene and freeze that proceeding.

The procedural history carried substantial weight. Cheeseman J emphasised the number of times Mr Metledge had brought applications before judges sitting as Duty Judges. The Court noted that urgent duty applications are meant for matters with sufficient urgency to justify being taken out of the usual docket or list arrangements. The judgment said the history demonstrated recurrent applications broadly seeking substantially the same relief.

The Court went further and said the procedural history suggested that Mr Metledge may have been seeking an advantageous outcome by having different judges consider his applications as the duty roster changed. The Court described that observation as particularly stark when comparing the application before Owens J with the application before Cheeseman J. Although the Court did not dispose of the matter solely on abuse-of-process grounds, it made clear that re-litigating the same interlocutory question is likely to be an abuse of process unless there has been a change of circumstances or new evidence.

On the evidence, the Court found there had been no material change of circumstances. Mr Metledge relied on the filing of the NSW Supreme Court proceeding as a further event. But Cheeseman J noted that Owens J had already taken into account that the liquidators were on the cusp of filing a s 482 application. The fact that the anticipated application had now actually been filed did not amount to a material change.

Cheeseman J then addressed the ordinary interlocutory relief criteria. Assuming for the purpose of the application that Mr Metledge had standing, the Court was still not satisfied that relief should be granted. The Court held that he had not established a serious question to be tried. He had not shown that he would suffer irreparable harm if the status quo were not preserved. And the balance of convenience did not favour the injunction. Looking at the whole of the circumstances, the Court concluded it was not in the interests of justice to grant the relief sought.

This case is not authority for the idea that liquidators can never be challenged, or that a winding-up order can never be revisited. It is a case about timing, process and repetition. The Court's concern was that the applicant had already made multiple attempts to challenge or delay the consequences of the winding up and was now seeking another urgent order without showing a meaningful change in circumstances.

For business owners, the first lesson is to act early. If you want to challenge a Registrar's winding-up orders, seek review, or ask the company to take a particular step, delay can be fatal in practice. The judgment records that the earlier review attempt came well outside the 21 day period referred to in the Rules, and by then the winding up had almost finished. Courts are much less likely to disrupt a process that is already near completion.

The second lesson is to identify the correct legal pathway. In this matter, standing was a recurring problem. One earlier application failed because Mr Metledge was not himself a party to the winding-up proceeding for the purposes of s 35A. Another issue was whether leave under s 198G(3) was needed to cause the company to seek review. Those are not technical side points. They can determine whether the court will even entertain the challenge.

The third lesson is to focus on the forum that can actually hear your objections. Here, the Federal Court was not persuaded that the NSW Supreme Court was an inappropriate forum for arguments about the liquidators' conduct or remuneration. If there is already a live proceeding in which your objections can be raised, a separate injunction application in another court may be seen as unnecessary or tactical.

The fourth lesson is that courts will look at substance over form. Calling an application an urgent injunction will not help if the court sees it as another attempt to delay the inevitable next step or to re-open an earlier failed challenge. Cheeseman J expressly said it was unclear what the application sought to achieve other than delaying the determination of the s 482 application and mounting a further attack on the validity of the Registrar's order.

The fifth lesson is cost and credibility. Repeated urgent applications can consume court resources and may attract judicial criticism. In this case, the Court highlighted the demands placed on the Court's resources and the repeated use of duty judge processes. For a business owner, that means a fragmented litigation strategy can increase costs, reduce credibility and make later relief harder to obtain.

The judgment was delivered by Cheeseman J on 13 February 2026. The interlocutory application being decided had been filed on 8 January 2026. The NSW Supreme Court proceeding that Mr Metledge sought to restrain had been filed on 19 December 2025.

The reasons also record that the next listing of the NSW Supreme Court proceeding was before Black J on 23 February 2026, after an earlier listing on 16 February 2026 was vacated on the morning of the Federal Court hearing. The Federal Court's order was simple: the interlocutory application was dismissed with costs.

The case is therefore best read as a decision about an unsuccessful attempt to interrupt the final procedural steps of a winding up, not as a final ruling on every issue that had arisen throughout the broader TJM litigation history.

This page explains the Federal Court's published reasons in Woori International Pty Ltd, in the matter of TJM Holdings Group Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (No 2) [2026] FCA 97. The judgment is an ex tempore decision revised from transcript and contains a concise but detailed summary of the procedural history relevant to the interlocutory application.

The reasons cite two earlier Federal Court decisions from 2025 and summarise a number of prior appearances before different judges. Those earlier decisions provide additional context, but the explanation on this page is confined to what is recorded in the published 2026 judgment itself.