The judgment shows why this was a difficult damages case. Much of the factual narrative was not disputed, but the key controversies concerned the inferences to be drawn from contemporaneous documents, diplomatic reports, ministerial communications, public Indonesian policy documents and aspects of the evidence of Dr Bayu Krisnamurthi, who held assistant ministerial positions in the Indonesian Government during the relevant period. The reasons for actions taken by Minister Suswono were also important.
The court specifically noted an important evidentiary limitation. The parties did not have access to internal communications between relevant Indonesian officials. That matters because the claim depended on proving how Indonesian decision-makers would probably have acted in a hypothetical world where the 2011 Australian ban had been replaced by a different order after consultation. Without internal records, the case had to be reconstructed from external indicators.
The extract summarises a substantial body of material about Indonesia’s long-standing food security and beef self-sufficiency agenda. It records that self-sufficiency in beef production was a long-standing Indonesian Government policy, that President Yudhoyono made a political commitment to food security through self-sufficiency after his 2009 re-election, and that Minister Suswono was tasked with advancing that agenda. The court also referred to the 2014 beef self-sufficiency program, a January 2010 blueprint, a strategic plan, a general guide, and a presidential instruction. Those materials contemplated increasing domestic cattle numbers, protecting farmer welfare, and reducing dependence on imported beef and feeder cattle.
The extract also records concrete restrictive measures before the 2011 ban. From January 2010, Indonesia began reducing the number of cattle imported. Import permits were significantly reduced. From March 2010, Indonesia enforced a 350 kg weight restriction on imported cattle, which had a serious impact on exports from Australia because heavier slaughter cattle had previously made up a meaningful share of imports. By the end of 2010, the quota for 2011 was 500,000 head, and imports in the first five months of 2011 were already down compared with the same period in 2010.
For 2012 and 2013, the extract points to census results, internal differences between the Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Trade, and DFAT reporting that repeatedly linked quota settings to the self-sufficiency program. The court also noted that the primary judge accepted the 2011 ban came as a shock and offended the Indonesian Government. But the issue was not whether Indonesia was upset. The issue was whether that event materially altered Indonesia’s policy course so that lower quotas were set later than would otherwise have been set.
For businesses, the evidentiary lesson is practical and immediate. Claims about lost future sales often fail not because the loss sounds implausible, but because the documentary record does not prove the counterfactual strongly enough. Where the missing link is a hypothetical decision by a third party, especially a foreign government, the proof task becomes much harder.