Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd v Tickle

Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd v Tickle [2026] FCAFC 64 is a Full Federal Court decision about a women-only app, customer access controls and discrimination law. Roxanne Tickle was initially admitted to the Giggle App through an AI-based registration process, but her access was later restricted after an individual review process and was not restored.

The Full Court dismissed the company’s appeal, allowed Ms Tickle’s cross-appeal, replaced the earlier finding of indirect discrimination with a declaration of direct discrimination, rejected the special measures argument, and increased damages to $20,000. For businesses, the case is a reminder that service design, moderation rules, founder decision-making and complaint handling all need to be tested against discrimination law.

The commercial setting matters. Giggle was marketed as a women-only digital safe space. Users seeking access had to go through a registration process that included uploading a selfie. That image was assessed by third-party AI software designed to distinguish between male and female facial appearance. The accepted evidence was that the AI settings were intentionally less than maximally strict so the system would err on the side of inclusion. Ms Tickle passed that stage and was admitted.

She then used the app for a period between February and sometime in September 2021. Later, however, her access became limited. She could no longer use key features and received a "User Blocked" message when trying to purchase premium features. The evidence accepted by the Court was that the app also allowed a later examination of photographs that had already been accepted by the AI. A staff member could reach a different conclusion and deny access. The findings summarised in the appeal reasons were that Ms Tickle was most likely denied access through a general review process of AI acceptances, rather than because she had been individually targeted, and that this was probably done by Ms Grover herself, although she had no specific recollection.

Ms Tickle then tried to resolve the issue directly. She used the in-app contact form, sent a series of emails, provided her phone number when asked, later missed a call from Ms Grover, and then tried SMS and phone contact. The matter did not resolve. She complained to the Australian Human Rights Commission in December 2021. The respondents declined conciliation. After the complaint was terminated, she brought proceedings. There was also a procedural step in which she first brought and then discontinued a Federal Circuit Court proceeding before later commencing in the Federal Court with an extension of time.

The case therefore was not just about a written policy. It was about how a startup actually operated its customer access controls in practice, including AI settings, later review, complaint handling and founder involvement in user decisions.

The appeal raised three main questions. First, whether the primary judge was wrong to hold that the Giggle App was not a special measure under s 7D of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). Giggle and Ms Grover argued that the app was aimed at achieving substantive equality between men and women. Secondly, whether the primary judge was wrong to reject Ms Tickle’s direct discrimination case and instead uphold only indirect discrimination. Thirdly, whether the damages award should be changed.

A central issue in the direct discrimination analysis was the meaning of "gender identity" in the Act. The Full Court noted that the statutory definition includes gender-related identity and gender-related characteristics including appearance. That mattered because the primary judge had treated knowledge of Ms Tickle’s gender identity as a transgender woman as necessary to establish direct discrimination. The Full Court had to decide whether that was correct, and whether treatment based on gender-related appearance could itself satisfy the statutory test.

The Court also had to identify the proper comparator for less favourable treatment. The declaration ultimately made by the Full Court compared Ms Tickle with a person designated female at birth seeking access to the app. In addition, the Court considered whether the later refusal to restore access was itself part of the discriminatory conduct, not just the original exclusion.

The Full Court dismissed Giggle and Ms Grover’s appeal and allowed Ms Tickle’s cross-appeal. It set aside the earlier declaration of unlawful indirect discrimination and replaced it with a declaration of unlawful direct discrimination contrary to s 22 of the Sex Discrimination Act, read with s 5B(1).

The declaration is important because it states exactly what conduct the Court found unlawful. The Court declared that Giggle and Ms Grover excluded Ms Tickle from access to the Giggle App on the basis of her gender-related appearance, refused to restore her access on the basis of her gender-related appearance, and thereby treated her, as a transgender woman, less favourably than a person designated female at birth seeking access to the app.

The Court also held that the primary judge’s construction of s 7D was correct and that the Giggle App was not a special measure. The reasons summary indicates that the special measure argument did not succeed because the measure discriminated against another protected group under the Act.

On direct discrimination, the Full Court expressly disagreed with the primary judge’s view that knowledge of a person’s gender identity as a transgender man or transgender woman was a necessary element. The reasons summary states that no such knowledge requirement is implied. That is a significant point for businesses because it means liability may turn on the actual basis of treatment, including gender-related appearance, rather than on whether the decision-maker accepted or understood the person’s identity in the way the person described it.

The Court also made clear, by the terms of its declaration and summary conclusions, that the later refusal to restore access mattered in its own right. This was not only a case about the first blocking decision. The refusal to readmit formed part of the unlawful direct discrimination found by the Court.

On damages, the Court held that the primary judge had assessed damages on a materially wrong basis because the case should have been treated as direct discrimination and because the refusal to readmit also formed part of the unlawful conduct. The Court substituted a total award of $20,000, made up of $12,000 in general damages and $8,000 in aggravated damages. General damages addressed the loss and harm caused by the unlawful discrimination itself. Aggravated damages were awarded separately, and the catchwords and reasons summary note that issues relevant to aggravated damages included the conduct of the proceeding and public commentary on the proceeding. Costs were ordered in Ms Tickle’s favour on both the appeal and cross-appeal, each capped at $50,000.

For business readers, one of the most useful parts of this case is that it shows how legal risk can arise from a chain of operational decisions rather than from a single formal policy. The relevant conduct included the app’s onboarding design, the AI settings, the later review process, the decision to block or restrict access, the handling of follow-up emails and calls, and the refusal to restore access after the issue was raised.

The Court’s factual summary also shows the importance of evidence about who actually made the decision. The findings reproduced in the appeal reasons were that Ms Tickle was most likely excluded through a general review process and that this was probably carried out by Ms Grover herself, although she had no specific recollection. In a founder-led business, that kind of evidence can matter a great deal. If the founder is the company’s controlling mind, there may be little practical separation between personal views, company policy and customer treatment.

The case also shows that public conduct during a dispute can matter. The catchwords and reasons summary identify the conduct of the proceeding and public commentary as relevant to aggravated damages. In other words, even if a business believes strongly in its position, the way it behaves once a complaint is made can increase the amount payable.

This decision is not limited to social apps. It is relevant to any business supplying services through a platform, membership model or gated community where access depends on identity-based criteria. If your business says a service is only for a particular group, you need to test not only the wording of the rule but also how the rule is applied in practice.

First, AI is not a shield. Here, the AI admitted Ms Tickle. The legal problem arose when a later individual review excluded her and access was not restored. Businesses using automated tools should therefore review the whole decision chain, including overrides, appeals and complaint handling.

Secondly, a business cannot assume that a safety-based or equality-based purpose will automatically make exclusion lawful. The Court rejected the special measures argument in this case. Whether an exemption or special measure is available depends on the legislation and the facts, not just on the business’s stated purpose.

Thirdly, direct discrimination may be found even where the decision-maker says they did not know or accept the person’s gender identity in a narrower sense. The Full Court’s declaration and reasons summary show that treatment based on gender-related appearance was enough for the direct discrimination finding made here, and that no knowledge requirement was implied.

Fourthly, complaint handling matters. Ms Tickle tried to resolve the issue directly before and after making a complaint. Businesses should have a process for reviewing disputed access decisions, identifying who can reverse them, and deciding when legal advice is required.

Finally, this case is a governance lesson for founder-led companies. Informal decision-making can become the company’s legal position very quickly. If your product promise depends on excluding some users, that is not just a branding issue. It is a legal design issue, a governance issue and a customer-support issue.

Businesses often ask whether this kind of case turns on the use of AI, on a founder’s personal beliefs, or on the wording of a customer policy. The answer from this decision is that all of those things can matter, but the Court looked at the actual conduct that led to exclusion and non-readmission. The fact that AI initially admitted Ms Tickle did not decide the case. The later individual review and refusal to restore access were central.

Another practical question is whether a business can avoid direct discrimination liability by saying it did not know the person’s gender identity. The Full Court rejected that approach on the statutory question before it. The reasons summary says no knowledge requirement is implied. That means businesses should be cautious about relying on a claimed lack of knowledge where the treatment is in fact based on gender-related appearance.

Businesses also ask whether a purpose framed around safety or equality is enough to justify exclusion. This case shows that the answer is no, not automatically. The Court upheld the rejection of the special measures argument. On the available reasons summary, the problem was that the measure discriminated against another protected group under the Act.

Does this case only matter for social media or dating-style apps? No. It is relevant to any business that supplies services through a gated platform, membership model or customer screening process. If access depends on identity-based criteria, the same kind of legal risk can arise.

Was the AI screening itself the unlawful conduct? The Court’s orders focused on the later exclusion and refusal to restore access. The fact that AI initially admitted Ms Tickle shows that automated screening did not determine the legal outcome.

Can a founder’s personal views become the company’s problem? Yes, potentially. The factual findings described Ms Grover as Giggle’s controlling mind. In a founder-led business, informal decisions and personal statements can become evidence of the company’s conduct.

What should a business do if a customer disputes an access decision? Have a documented escalation path, identify who can reverse the decision, keep records of the criteria used, and get legal advice early if the issue touches a protected attribute.

The Full Court judgment was delivered on 15 May 2026. The appeal was from Tickle v Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd (No 2) [2024] FCA 960. The orders show that the appeal was dismissed and the cross-appeal allowed. The available court text also records that the Giggle App ceased to be made available to anyone in August 2022, with the respondents asserting that this would remain the position unless and until their conduct was found lawful.

This page remains under review rather than final because the available court text is not complete. The published extract is detailed enough to explain the dispute, the legal issues and the outcome, but a full check of the complete reasons and any later appellate development is still sensible before treating the page as closed.

This page is based on the published Federal Court orders, catchwords and extracted reasons for Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd v Tickle [2026] FCAFC 64. The extract includes the Court’s orders, the issues identified on appeal and cross-appeal, a substantial factual summary and the Court’s summary conclusions on direct discrimination, special measures and damages.

Because the available text is not complete, this page does not go beyond what can be supported from those published materials. If a fuller version of the reasons becomes available, the page should be checked for any additional detail on the Court’s reasoning, especially on comparator analysis, the refusal to restore access, and the aggravated damages assessment.