Goldwind Australia Pty Ltd v Ozlift Kranes Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 328

This proceeding grew out of a commercial breakdown between businesses working in and around a wind farm project. Goldwind Australia Pty Ltd and Goldwind Queensland Construction Pty Ltd said Ozlift Kranes Pty Ltd and its sole director, Beau Michel Hammerstein, had published social media posts making serious allegations about Goldwind’s conduct in connection with a former subcontracting relationship.

According to the judgment, Goldwind alleged the posts conveyed that Goldwind had treated Ozlift unjustly, unfairly and immorally, had unlawfully cancelled the subcontract, had not made timely payments, had failed to pay for new crane purchases, and did not support small or family-owned business. Goldwind said those representations were made in trade and commerce and were misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive. In the alternative, Goldwind relied on confidentiality obligations under the subcontract and said some matters raised by Ozlift were covered by a settlement deed.

Very early in the case, the Court made consent orders requiring identified social media posts to be removed and restraining republication until further order. That meant the immediate publication issue was stabilised, at least temporarily. But the judgment makes clear that the real commercial fight went beyond the posts themselves.

Ozlift filed a cross-claim for damages. It alleged that Goldwind Queensland had subcontracted Ozlift on 23 December 2022 to supply cranes for stage 1 of the Clark Creek Wind Farm Project in Queensland. Ozlift said Goldwind Queensland later gave notices of material default on 14 February 2024 and then terminated the subcontract on 29 February 2024. Ozlift’s case was that there had been no defaults, that the termination was invalid, and that the termination itself amounted to repudiation accepted by Ozlift.

The judgment records that Ozlift alleged open invoices of $1,323,192, orders totalling $724,036, and additional damages of $61,640,000. Stewart J observed that although Mr Hammerstein’s affidavit ranged across a broader history of dealings, the essence of the dispute was ultimately narrower: whether Goldwind Queensland lawfully terminated the subcontract or whether the termination was repudiatory, and what damages flowed from that.

That context matters because this judgment did not decide the final rights and wrongs of that commercial dispute. Instead, it dealt with a procedural question about representation. Ozlift is a corporation. Under the Federal Court Rules, corporations generally cannot conduct proceedings except through a lawyer. Mr Hammerstein, who was both Ozlift’s sole shareholder and director and also a respondent personally, wanted to continue representing Ozlift himself.

The central issue was whether the Court should dispense with the usual rule in r 4.01(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), which says a corporation must not proceed in the Court other than by a lawyer. The source of the Court’s power to relax that requirement was r 1.34, which allows the Court to dispense with compliance with the rules.

So the question was not whether companies generally have a right to self-represent through directors. They do not. The question was whether, in this particular case, justice favoured a conditional exception allowing Mr Hammerstein to represent Ozlift.

Stewart J approached that question by applying principles drawn from earlier authority, especially Southcorp Brands Pty Ltd v Australia Rush Rich Winery Pty Ltd. The judgment says the Court should be cautious before permitting a non-lawyer to represent a corporation, but the guiding principle is the attainment of justice. The Court then listed a range of relevant factors.

Those factors included the company’s financial capacity and the position of those standing behind it, the proposed representative’s skills and experience, whether the person understood court processes, the complexity of the case, whether the overarching purpose in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) would be promoted, whether the absence of professional disciplinary controls mattered, how the case had progressed so far, and whether the proposed representative was also a witness. The judgment also notes that a more liberal approach may sometimes be warranted where the company is defending a claim rather than bringing one, although Ozlift here was both a respondent and a cross-claimant.

The judgment gives a fairly concrete picture of Ozlift’s circumstances. Mr Hammerstein was the sole director, sole shareholder and company secretary. Ozlift had 13 employees, including crane operators, riggers, administrative staff, a contract manager, a site supervisor, an occupational health and safety supervisor, and one in-house legal counsel. The Court accepted that Ozlift had exhausted its available financial resources to sustain ongoing business operations and that incoming revenue was being used for operational expenses.

The Court also recorded that Mr Hammerstein had personally injected substantial funds into the business. He had drawn on personal superannuation and savings in the sums of $700,000 and $550,000 respectively, and had borrowed $530,000 secured against the family home. He was considering selling the family home and motor vehicles to meet further obligations. That evidence supported the conclusion that Ozlift was in constrained financial circumstances.

But financial pressure did not end the analysis. Stewart J noted that Ozlift was still a significant commercial undertaking that actively participated in the commercial life of the nation. The fact that Mr Hammerstein was the only shareholder meant the Court did not need to protect the interests of other shareholders if he were effectively allowed to represent the company. Even so, the Court said there were other interests to consider, especially employees and creditors, and the Court should have an eye to protecting them by ensuring the company was competently represented.

The Court also looked directly at Mr Hammerstein’s own capacity. He was not a lawyer, was not legally trained, and by his own admission was not knowledgeable or experienced in court processes. He had, however, already represented Ozlift at several hearings with limited leave for that purpose, and had done so in a manner that was not criticised. Almost all relevant communications by and to Ozlift had been conducted by him, and he was directly involved in the disputes.

Importantly, the Court found that Mr Hammerstein did not have the capacity on his own to adequately represent the company. That is one of the most significant parts of the judgment. The dispensation was not granted because the Court thought he could simply replace a lawyer. It was granted because the Court accepted a more limited arrangement in which he would continue to obtain legal assistance on a task basis, including for any contested hearing.

The applicants opposed the application on the basis that it appeared to proceed on a false premise. They argued, in substance, that Ozlift’s submissions and pleadings seemed to have been drafted by or with considerable assistance from a lawyer, and that if Ozlift could afford that assistance then it should be required to engage a lawyer formally. Stewart J described a paradox in that objection. The very fact that Ozlift had been willing and able to obtain legal help from time to time meant the proceeding had so far been conducted in a reasonably professional and constructive manner.

The Court also considered the nature of the dispute. Stewart J said the case was not particularly complex. The real dispute was relatively narrow. The injunctive part of the case did not appear to be truly contested anymore, and although Goldwind mentioned damages, it had not pleaded a detailed damages claim. The judge accepted that complicated questions of quantification might arise later, especially if Ozlift maintained a claim exceeding $61 million, but at that stage the case was still manageable.

Another important factor was that Mr Hammerstein would be a critical witness. Ordinarily, that would weigh substantially against allowing him to represent the company. Here, however, the Court gave that factor less significance because a lawyer would be engaged to conduct any contested hearing. That reduced the practical risk of a key witness also trying to run the advocacy at the hearing itself.

Stewart J concluded that justice was best served by granting a dispensation from r 4.01(2), but only on conditions. The Court ordered under r 1.34 that Ozlift did not have to proceed only by a lawyer, provided that three conditions were met. First, Mr Hammerstein was to represent Ozlift. Secondly, he had to obtain the assistance of a lawyer for the purpose of preparing and filing any document in the proceeding. Thirdly, a lawyer had to appear for Ozlift in any contested hearing.

The costs of Mr Hammerstein’s interlocutory application dated 18 February 2026 were ordered to be costs in the cause, and the application was otherwise dismissed. The matter was determined on the papers, and the judgment was delivered on 23 March 2026.

The Court’s reasoning on the overarching purpose is especially useful for businesses. Stewart J accepted that the disputes would probably be resolved most efficiently if Ozlift were represented by a lawyer. But the judge was not persuaded that the matter would be resolved any less quickly if Ozlift were not fully represented, or that the applicants would be materially worse off in costs. By contrast, it would clearly be less expensive for Ozlift if it did not have to retain lawyers for every step. The Court also considered that justice favoured dispensation because Ozlift appeared to have at least an arguable claim and might not be able to pursue it if full legal representation were mandatory throughout.

The judgment also notes that Mr Hammerstein would in any event be a litigant in person because he was personally a party to the proceeding. So, whether or not Ozlift had a lawyer on the record, the case would still involve an unrepresented party with the usual difficulties and inefficiencies that can bring. That practical reality formed part of the Court’s assessment.

This was therefore a middle-course solution. The Court did not give Ozlift unrestricted permission to run the case however it liked. Nor did it insist on a full traditional retainer for every aspect of the proceeding. Instead, it approved a structured hybrid arrangement designed to preserve the quality of filed material and the proper conduct of hearings while reducing the cost burden on the company.

One of the more memorable parts of the judgment is the discussion of the applicants’ objection to what they called a 'Clayton’s solicitor'. Their point was that if a lawyer was helping Mr Hammerstein behind the scenes, that lawyer should formally enter an appearance and go on the record. They relied on a New South Wales Supreme Court authority in support of that submission.

Stewart J dealt with that argument directly. The judgment explains the colloquial Australian meaning of 'Claytons' as a substitute or imitation. But the practical legal answer was short: the Court did not consider it necessary for a lawyer assisting Mr Hammerstein from time to time, or acting on a direct instruction for the limited purpose of appearing at a contested hearing, to enter an appearance formally. The judge said that was not a requirement of the Federal Court Rules, referring to CPJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.

For business owners, the practical effect of this part of the judgment is more important than the phrase itself. The Court accepted that legal assistance can be limited in scope. A lawyer may help prepare and file documents, and may appear at contested hearings, without necessarily being on the record for every aspect of the matter. But that does not mean a company can simply organise informal legal help and ignore the rules. The arrangement worked here because the Court expressly dispensed with r 4.01(2) and imposed conditions.

So the concise takeaway is this: the Court did not endorse a free-form workaround. It approved a controlled, court-supervised hybrid model.

This case is most useful for businesses as a reminder that litigation procedure can shape commercial outcomes. A company may have a real grievance or a strong defence, but if it cannot navigate the court’s representation rules, that can affect whether it can practically pursue or defend the case. Stewart J expressly considered that point here when assessing whether Ozlift would be able to pursue an arguable cross-claim if full legal representation were required at every step.

At the same time, the judgment is not a general invitation for directors to run Federal Court litigation themselves. The Court found that Mr Hammerstein did not have the capacity on his own to adequately represent Ozlift. The exception was granted because of the combination of constrained finances, a relatively narrow dispute, the way the matter had already been conducted, and the safeguards of lawyer-assisted drafting and lawyer appearances at contested hearings.

There is also a governance angle. The dispute began, at least publicly, with social media posts about a former commercial relationship. Once a dispute reaches that stage, businesses need to think beyond the underlying contract issue. Public statements may trigger claims about misleading or deceptive conduct, confidentiality, settlement obligations, or injunctive relief. Directors should be careful about who is authorised to speak, what documents govern confidentiality, and whether public commentary could complicate the litigation.

The judgment also shows that courts look at the company as a separate entity, not just as an extension of its owner. Even where there is only one shareholder, the Court may still consider the interests of employees and creditors when deciding whether the company will be competently represented. That is a useful reminder for founders and sole directors who are used to making operational decisions personally.

If legal cost is the real problem, this case suggests a practical path that may sometimes be available: limited-scope legal assistance. That can include drafting support, advice on evidence and procedure, and representation at contested hearings, while the director handles some day-to-day aspects of the matter. But the important word is 'sometimes'. Whether that approach is acceptable depends on the court, the rules, the facts, and whether the court grants permission.

Businesses should also remember that this ruling was interlocutory. It did not resolve the substantive dispute between Goldwind and Ozlift. So the case should be read as guidance on representation and case management, not as authority on who was right about the subcontract termination or the alleged losses.

If your company is already in Federal Court, or is likely to be, this judgment suggests a number of practical questions to work through early. These are not substitutes for legal advice, but they reflect the issues the Court treated as important in deciding whether a company could proceed through a director on a conditional basis.

The more clearly a business can explain its financial position, the proposed role of the director, the scope of legal assistance, and the likely conduct of hearings, the easier it will be to assess whether a court might accept a structured alternative to full representation.

The judgment was delivered by Stewart J on 23 March 2026 in the Federal Court of Australia. The proceeding number was NSD 2204 of 2025. The matter was determined on the papers, with the date of last submissions recorded as 12 March 2026.

The orders dealt only with Mr Hammerstein’s interlocutory application about Ozlift’s representation. The substantive claims between the parties remained unresolved by this judgment. Readers should therefore treat the case as a procedural authority on corporate representation in the Federal Court, not as a final determination of the underlying commercial dispute.