Lighthouse Building Permits Pty Ltd v Site Inspections Pty Ltd

This case came to the Federal Court in the middle of an existing defamation proceeding. Lighthouse Building Permits Pty Ltd and Jahan Trevena alleged that they had been defamed by video publications. The first and second respondents were said to have made the publication, but the applicants also sued the third and fourth respondents, Mr and Mrs Martens, on the basis that they were involved in bringing the publications about and later endorsing them.

That point is commercially important. In many business disputes, especially online disputes, people assume that only the person who uploads the content is exposed. The pleading described in this judgment was broader. It alleged that Mr and Mrs Martens encouraged the first and second respondents to produce the video, provided information for that purpose, and agreed to be interviewed so that the same or equivalent imputations could be conveyed about the applicants. It also alleged that it was the natural and probable consequence of their participation that the video would be widely published, and that after publication they adopted or endorsed it by posting links and engaging in other identified conduct. Similar allegations were made about a second, shorter video.

The judgment itself was not the final trial of those allegations. Instead, Justice Snaden was reviewing a registrar's earlier procedural decision. Registrar Legge had dismissed several interlocutory steps brought by Mr and Mrs Martens, set aside their notice to produce, ordered certain material removed from the court file, and ordered them to pay the applicants' costs on an indemnity basis. Mr and Mrs Martens then sought review of that decision under the Federal Court of Australia Act.

They also filed a separate application asking the Court to adjourn the review hearing because of asserted ill health. The Court considered the medical certificates and the surrounding circumstances, including the fact that the matter had already been delayed and that written submissions had still been prepared and sent to chambers. Justice Snaden refused the adjournment and proceeded to determine the review in their absence.

Justice Snaden had to deal with two applications before turning to the underlying procedural issues. The first was the adjournment application dated 1 April 2026. The question there was whether the hearing of the review should be postponed because Mr and Mrs Martens said they were unwell. The second was the review application itself, which required the Court to reconsider the registrar's orders afresh because a review under s 35A(5) proceeds as a rehearing de novo.

Within that review, the Court had to decide whether the registrar had been right to dismiss the January 2026 applications and set aside the February 2026 notice to produce. That meant looking at whether the applicants' statement of claim disclosed an arguable cause of action in defamation against Mr and Mrs Martens, whether there was any proper basis at that stage to seek leave to file and rely on documentary material, whether the notice to produce was in orthodox form, and whether indemnity costs had properly been ordered against them for pressing those steps.

The Court also had to separate two different costs questions. One was whether the registrar had been right to order indemnity costs for the earlier applications and notice to produce. The other was the costs of the review application and the adjournment application themselves. Justice Snaden upheld the registrar's earlier indemnity costs approach, but reserved the later costs question for short written submissions after the hearing.

The central issue was whether the applicants' pleading was legally arguable against Mr and Mrs Martens. They argued that the statement of claim did not allege the material facts needed to show any act of participation by them in publication in the sense required by law. Justice Snaden rejected that submission.

The reasons explain that the statement of claim alleged that Mr and Mrs Martens published a video making numerous allegations concerning the applicants, and then gave particulars of how they allegedly conduced to that publication. Those particulars included encouraging the first and second respondents to produce the video, providing information so they might do so, and agreeing to be interviewed in order that the same or equivalent imputations could be conveyed. The pleading also alleged that wide publication was the natural and probable consequence of their participation, and that after publication they adopted or endorsed it by posting links and other identified conduct. Equivalent assertions were made about a second shorter video.

Justice Snaden held that, whatever else might be said about the pleading, it reflected the existence of an arguable cause of action against Mr and Mrs Martens. The judgment is careful on the limits of that conclusion. The Court did not accept or suggest that the claim would succeed. The present question was only whether the applicants had the requisite prospect of success at trial. Because that would turn on mixed questions of fact and law, it was not appropriate to shut the case down at this stage.

For business readers, this distinction is critical. Early applications for summary judgment or strike-out are not decided by asking who is more believable. They are decided by asking whether the claim is so untenable that it should not continue. If the pleading sets out a legally recognisable pathway to liability and factual issues remain to be tested, the Court will usually let the matter proceed.

The Court then turned to the second January application, which sought leave to file and rely upon documentary material. Justice Snaden said it was unclear why that application had been made or what might be achieved by it. At that point, no orders had been made concerning the filing and service of evidence ahead of trial in the substantive matter. In other words, the case had not yet reached the stage where evidence was to be put on in that way.

The Court also observed that the material for which leave was sought was, on its face, gratuitously prejudicial. The reasons did not say that the material could never be admitted. Instead, the point was that the occasion for dealing with it had not yet arisen. On that basis, the registrar had been correct to dismiss the application and order that it and the supporting affidavit be removed from the court file.

The notice to produce failed for a different reason. Justice Snaden explained that a notice to produce is available to compel production of documents referred to in other court processes, such as a pleading or affidavit. The notice used by Mr and Mrs Martens was not confined in that way. It appeared to be directed to documents at large. The Court said it was perhaps better described as an application for discovery, which the Court could entertain at the appropriate time if necessary. Because it was not a proper notice to produce, it should have been, and should remain, set aside.

These are practical procedural points that matter in real litigation. Courts expect parties to use the correct mechanism for the relief they want. If a party uses a notice to produce as a broad fishing exercise, or tries to put on evidence before the case is ready for evidence, the Court may reject the step outright.

The adjournment application is also worth noting. The medical certificates relied on by Mr and Mrs Martens stated in summary terms that they were unfit to continue their usual employment or meetings for certain periods. Justice Snaden said those certificates offered no firm foundation for an adjournment and no helpful information of any kind. The Court also noted the inconsistency between the asserted inability to prosecute the application and the fact that written submissions and correspondence had still been prepared and sent. Given that the orderly progression of the matter had already been delayed, including postponement of a scheduled mediation, the Court found there was insufficient basis for further delay.

That part of the decision is not a general rule that illness will never justify an adjournment. It is a reminder that if a party seeks to delay a hearing, the supporting material must actually explain why the hearing cannot fairly proceed. Bare certificates and unexplained assertions may not be enough, especially where the case has already been delayed.

The strongest practical warning in the case concerns costs. Justice Snaden said there could be no question that the registrar had been correct to order costs against Mr and Mrs Martens for the earlier applications. The real issue was whether indemnity costs were appropriate. The Court referred to an affidavit from the applicants' solicitor setting out a series of letters sent to Mr and Mrs Martens. Those letters explained why the summary judgment application was defective, protested the filing of documents without service, warned that their conduct might justify indemnity costs, explained why the notice to produce was vulnerable to being set aside, and noted that no authority had been cited in support of the summary judgment application.

Against that background, Justice Snaden held that each of the processes pursued by Mr and Mrs Martens lacked any reasonable prospect of success and ought never to have been pressed. Their dismissal was inevitable. The Court expressly said they could not be shielded from the consequences merely because they were self-represented. For business owners, that is a serious point. Running your own case does not lower the standard expected when you choose to file applications that affect the other side's time and costs.

This case is not an employment ruling, but it is highly relevant to businesses that deal with complaints, online criticism, industry disputes and public allegations. If your business is involved in a video, post, interview or campaign about another business or person, legal exposure may extend beyond the account holder or production company. Directors, staff, contractors and associated individuals may all become relevant if they helped shape the message, supplied allegations, agreed to be interviewed, or later promoted the content.

That does not mean every participant will always be liable. The Court was careful not to decide liability here. But it does mean businesses should think broadly about publication risk. Internal communications, interview arrangements, briefing notes, messages sending official source, and later social media sharing can all become important in a dispute.

The case also shows that procedural aggression is not a substitute for a good defence. Businesses sometimes respond to claims by trying to strike them out immediately, file evidence early, or demand documents before the case is ready. Those steps can be legitimate in the right matter, but only if the legal basis is sound and the timing is right. If they are used prematurely, they can increase costs, distract from mediation, and damage credibility with the Court.

Justice Snaden noted that the matter was scheduled to proceed to mediation in early May 2026 and described that as a sensible course with which all parties should energetically engage, ideally without the distraction of unhelpful interlocutory skirmishing. That is a useful commercial message. In many business disputes, preserving resources for mediation or settlement can be more productive than launching weak procedural side battles.

The judgment was delivered on 8 April 2026 and the reasons were published on 9 April 2026. The orders dismissed the third and fourth respondents' interlocutory application dated 1 April 2026 and their interlocutory application dated 11 March 2026. The Court also gave both sides leave to file short written submissions and any necessary affidavit material on the remaining question of costs for the adjournment and review applications.

Importantly, the substantive defamation proceeding was still on foot. The Court noted that the matter was scheduled to proceed to mediation in early May 2026. So this decision should be read as a procedural ruling made during the life of the case, not as the final chapter in the dispute.