Turner v Chandler Macleod Group Limited (Costs) [2026] FCA 458

This Federal Court decision is about costs after an earlier strike-out, not the full merits of the underlying workplace dispute. That distinction matters. The Court itself said these reasons should be read with the earlier judgment, and many of the background facts are only summarised here through the lens of the later costs application.

What the costs judgment does make clear is the commercial shape of the dispute. Mr Turner had brought proceedings against Chandler Macleod Group Limited and other respondents. In the earlier judgment, Needham J struck out the Originating Application and Statement of Claim against Chandler Macleod, made other orders sought by the remaining respondents, and made suppression orders.

The key issue, as recorded in the costs reasons, was a prior settlement deed called the CMG Deed. The Court said the claim against Chandler Macleod raised issues that had already been settled under that deed. The Court also said Chandler Macleod was covered by the deed’s release clause. Mr Turner appears to have asserted that the deed was “illegal”, but the Court said no proper grounds to set it aside had been pleaded or articulated in submissions beyond that bare assertion.

That is the practical story for business readers. A respondent relied on an earlier settlement deed and release to say the later claim should not proceed against it. The Court accepted that position strongly enough to strike out the claim, and those same findings then became central to the later costs decision.

The Court started with the usual position under the Fair Work Act. In employment proceedings of this kind, parties do not automatically face the ordinary rule that the loser pays the winner’s costs. Needham J repeated the policy reason for that approach. Workers with genuine grievances and an arguable evidentiary and legal basis should be able to bring proceedings without being deterred by the risk of an adverse costs order. The judgment described the power to award costs in this setting as exceptional.

But exceptional does not mean impossible. The Court explained that it first had to decide whether one of the statutory gateways in section 570(2) was satisfied. Relevant here were two possibilities. One was that the proceedings were instituted without reasonable cause. The other was that a party’s unreasonable act caused the other side to incur costs. Only if one of those gateways was met could the Court then move to the separate discretionary question of whether costs should actually be ordered under section 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act.

That two-step structure is important for businesses. Winning the case is not enough by itself. Even a successful employer or principal still needs to show that the case falls within one of the Fair Work Act exceptions before the Court will even consider making a costs order.

The immediate issue was whether Chandler Macleod could recover costs despite the Fair Work Act’s usual no-costs setting. Chandler Macleod argued both available gateways applied. First, it said the proceedings had been instituted without reasonable cause. Second, it said Mr Turner acted unreasonably in pursuing the matter after Chandler Macleod filed its application on 5 December 2025.

Those arguments were tied directly to the earlier findings about the CMG Deed. The Court had already found, in the earlier judgment as summarised in the costs reasons, that the claim against Chandler Macleod raised matters previously settled under the deed, that Chandler Macleod was covered by the release clause, and that the attempt to set the deed aside had not been properly brought. So the costs question was not floating free from the merits. It depended heavily on what the Court had already concluded about the deed and release.

There was also a practical procedural issue. Chandler Macleod did not just seek an ordinary order for costs to be assessed later. It asked the Court to fix costs in a lump sum of $20,000. That required the Court to decide whether the evidence before it was sufficient to make a fixed costs order, even though the applicant for costs had not referred to or complied with the Costs Practice Note in the usual way.

Needham J held that the jurisdiction to award costs was enlivened. On the first gateway, the Court was satisfied that the proceedings against Chandler Macleod were instituted without reasonable cause. The reasons were the earlier findings that the claim raised issues already settled under the CMG Deed, that Chandler Macleod was covered by the release clause, and that the claim to set aside the deed had not been properly brought. The Court stressed that this was not simply a case where a pleading failed in a routine way. The allegation that the deed was “illegal” had not been articulated beyond a bald statement.

On the second gateway, the Court also found that Mr Turner had acted unreasonably in pursuing the proceedings. The judgment records Chandler Macleod’s submission that, once its application was filed on 5 December 2025, it was clear the case lacked reasonable prospects. Needham J accepted that, given the lack of any proper ground to set aside the deed and the failure to bring evidence supporting the allegation of illegality, it should have been clear to Mr Turner that the claim was hopeless. The Court referred to a submission that he wished to identify the “human person” who instructed Ready Workforce to write the deed, and said that was not a reasonable basis for commencing proceedings where the deed’s terms restrained him from doing so.

Having found the statutory threshold met, the Court then turned to discretion. The judgment recognised that costs in Fair Work Act matters are exceptional and that the applicant was self-represented. Even so, the Court decided it was appropriate to award costs. The order made was that Mr Turner pay Chandler Macleod’s costs in the fixed amount of $20,000 under rule 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules. The proceedings were otherwise dismissed.

The Court also accepted the request for a lump-sum costs order. This is a useful procedural point. The catchwords and reasons show that Chandler Macleod had not referred to or complied with the Costs Practice Note in the usual way, but the Court considered the evidence filed in support of the application sufficient to justify fixing costs at $20,000 anyway. In other words, non-compliance with the practice note did not stop a lump-sum order where the material before the Court was adequate.

For business readers, the most important feature of the case is that the deed and release were central at both stages. They were central to the earlier strike-out decision, and they were central again to the later costs order. The costs judgment repeatedly ties the result back to the Court’s earlier findings that the claim had already been settled under the CMG Deed, that Chandler Macleod was protected by the release, and that no proper case had been brought to set the deed aside.

That matters because not every failed claim will justify costs. The Court was careful to say that a failed application does not automatically mean it was commenced without reasonable cause. The question is whether there was reasonable cause at the time the proceedings were started. Here, the Court considered the deed issue decisive. On the Court’s view, the claim was barred by a clear release and the challenge to the deed had not been properly articulated or supported by evidence.

The applicant’s conduct after Chandler Macleod filed its application also mattered. The Court accepted that continuing to prosecute a hopeless case can amount to an unreasonable act. This was not treated as a situation where a party simply ran a difficult but arguable point and lost. The Court considered that, in context, it should have been clear the claim could not succeed against Chandler Macleod.

There was also a procedural point about evidence. Mr Turner was given 28 days to file evidence and submissions in response to the costs application but did not do so. The costs issue was then determined on the papers. On the other side, Chandler Macleod filed evidence in support of the amount it sought. The Court specifically accepted that the evidence filed was sufficient to support a fixed amount of $20,000, despite the lack of usual compliance with the Costs Practice Note.

This case should not be read as a sign that costs are easy to recover in employment litigation. The Court said the opposite. Fair Work Act costs orders are exceptional, and the no-costs setting remains the starting point. Businesses should therefore avoid assuming that a successful defence will automatically produce a costs recovery.

The stronger lesson is about settlement architecture and early case assessment. If your business resolves a workplace dispute through a deed, the drafting needs to be precise. The release should clearly identify the parties protected by it, the claims being released, and any related entities intended to benefit. Records should also be kept showing the context of the settlement and the parties involved. If a later claim is filed, those documents may be the foundation for an early application to strike out or dismiss the claim.

The case also shows the value of distinguishing between a weak claim and a claim that is barred in a more fundamental way. Courts are cautious about costs in workplace matters because they do not want to deter genuine claims. But where a claim has already been settled, a release clearly applies, and there is no properly articulated basis to undo the settlement, the risk profile changes. In that narrower category of case, a costs application may be realistic.

Finally, there is a practical point about the form of the order. If your business seeks costs, think about whether a lump-sum order is worth pursuing. A fixed amount can avoid the time and expense of a separate assessment process. This case shows the Court may make that kind of order where the evidence is sufficient, even if the usual practice note steps have not been followed perfectly.

The costs judgment was delivered on 17 April 2026. It followed an earlier substantive judgment delivered on 27 February 2026. The costs application was determined on the papers after Mr Turner did not file evidence or submissions in response within the 28 days allowed. The Court’s final orders in this costs decision were that Mr Turner pay Chandler Macleod’s costs in the fixed amount of $20,000 and that the proceedings otherwise be dismissed.

Because this page is based on the costs judgment, it should be read as an explanation of the costs outcome and the findings about the deed and release as they are described in that judgment. Readers wanting the full underlying dispute history should also review the earlier substantive reasons referred to by the Court.