Leung v Omnia Inclusive Employment Solutions Ltd [2026] FCA 606

This appeal came out of a short and difficult employment relationship between Ms Leung and Omnia Inclusive Employment Solutions. Ms Leung started work on 23 May 2022 as an Area Manager for North Sydney. By mid-August 2022, she had reached a three month performance review. The Court recorded that a series of meetings then took place on 18 August 2022 involving senior staff and the CEO.

According to the facts adopted on appeal, the CEO, Ms Lambourne, decided after those meetings to terminate Ms Leung’s employment while she was still on probation. But the decision was not communicated straight away. Ms Leung did not return to work after 18 August 2022. She first went on leave and then made a workers compensation application. The Court said that after Ms Lambourne was informed on 17 November 2022 that the workers compensation claim had been rejected, the earlier decision to terminate proceeded. A termination letter was then sent on 21 November 2022, although it recorded the date of termination as 17 November 2022.

That sequence became important. It created room for Ms Leung to argue that the real reason for dismissal was not simply performance or probation, but something connected to workplace rights or her absence from work. It also created a separate issue about whether the employer had complied with minimum notice obligations when ending the employment.

The case had two stages. First, Ms Leung sued in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Division 2. She alleged that Omnia had contravened section 340 of the Fair Work Act by taking adverse action because she exercised workplace rights, and section 352 by dismissing her because she was temporarily absent from work. The primary judge rejected those claims. However, the primary judge found that Omnia had contravened section 44 by terminating her employment before providing a termination letter and without paying in lieu of notice as required by section 117. Compensation of $10,000 was ordered.

Ms Leung then appealed to the Federal Court. She appeared for herself. The appeal was heard by Halley J. The Court granted leave to file a further amended notice of appeal except for one proposed ground, identified as proposed ground 5, which concerned an alleged denial of a fair opportunity to plead accessorial liability against individual managers.

The appeal therefore involved both substantive employment law issues and procedural fairness complaints. Ms Leung argued that the primary judge had intervened excessively, created unfairness, failed to consider material matters, and mishandled issues including joinder and accessorial liability. Omnia resisted the appeal. The Federal Court ultimately dismissed it and made no order as to costs.

The Federal Court described the central issue as whether the primary judge had denied a litigant in person procedural fairness and misapplied the Fair Work Act when dismissing Ms Leung’s section 340 and section 352 claims. That meant the appeal was not only about the dismissal itself. It was also about whether the hearing process had been fair.

On the substantive side, the primary judge had found that Ms Leung had not exercised any workplace rights before Omnia decided to dismiss her, and that neither her dismissal nor any other alleged adverse action was taken because of any alleged exercise of workplace rights. The primary judge had also found that Omnia had not dismissed her because she was temporarily absent from work. Those findings were central to the appeal.

On the procedural side, the Court had to consider complaints about judicial intervention, apprehended bias, amendment deadlines, and whether Ms Leung had a proper opportunity to put her case. The Court also had to deal with the attempted accessorial liability case against individual managers. That issue mattered because, in employment litigation, employees sometimes try to pursue not only the employer but also managers said to be involved in the contravention.

The judgment also refers to section 361 of the Fair Work Act and section 248 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) in the catchwords, showing that the appeal touched on the broader legal framework around reverse onus reasoning and workers compensation issues, even though the accessible reasons are clearest on the procedural fairness and dismissal findings.

One of the more practical parts of the judgment for business readers is the discussion about accessorial liability. Ms Leung wanted to pursue claims against individual managers. The Court traced the earlier procedural steps in some detail. In December 2023, the primary judge ordered Ms Leung to file an amended application and a proper statement of claim, including the joinder of any proper parties. In February 2024, she filed a statement of claim alleging that Ms Fraser and Ms Simic were involved in alleged contraventions by Omnia. Those allegations were struck out on 16 February 2024, but the primary judge gave directions allowing her to file a further amended statement of claim and a joinder application if she wished to pursue the issue.

Ms Leung then filed a joinder application and a further amended statement of claim on 15 March 2024. On 3 May 2024, the primary judge dismissed the joinder application, stating that the Court was not satisfied she had any genuine claim against the proposed additional parties under section 550 and that there was no utility in giving her yet another opportunity to file a proper pleading.

On appeal, Halley J treated that earlier decision as interlocutory and discretionary. The Court applied the usual principles for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment. It was not enough that another judge might have handled the matter differently. Ms Leung had to show sufficient doubt about the correctness of the decision and substantial injustice if leave were refused.

The Court was not persuaded. It held that proposed ground 5 did not justify leave. Importantly, the Court also noted that the earlier orders did not actually prevent Ms Leung from making a fresh joinder application if new information later came to light. The judgment records that she did not make any application to join Ms Fraser, Ms Simic or Ms Lambourne after receiving affidavits on 2 August 2024. The Court also considered that the practical prejudice was limited, because the main consequence would have been the opportunity to seek civil penalty orders against managers, and if Ms Leung had otherwise succeeded on other appeal grounds the matter likely would have been remitted anyway.

For businesses, this part of the case is a reminder that managers can become part of the litigation story even where they are not ultimately joined. If managers are involved in meetings, recommendations, drafting or communications around dismissal, their roles should be clear and accurately recorded.

The accessible reasons deal in detail with Ms Leung’s complaint that the primary judge intervened excessively and made the hearing unfair. The Federal Court approached that issue by asking whether she had a proper opportunity to advance her case, and whether the interventions created a real danger that the trial was unfair when viewed in the context of the whole hearing.

One complaint concerned the primary judge’s intervention during Ms Leung’s cross-examination. The judge had told her that if she answered questions unresponsively it would affect his assessment of her credit, and at one point said that the correct answer to a question was yes. Halley J accepted that the warnings were strong, but held they were directed to the need to answer responsively rather than to force simple yes or no answers. The Court concluded that the intervention did not impair her ability to answer questions.

Another complaint concerned comments made while Ms Leung was cross-examining witnesses. The primary judge had said there was no issue about sections 44 and 117 because the breach was admitted, and referred to Ms Simic as not being the corporate mind. The judge also said it was perfectly apparent that Ms Leung was not on workers compensation. Halley J held that these observations did not deny procedural fairness or deprive Ms Leung of a reasonable opportunity to present her case. The Court noted that she was still allowed to ask questions directed to whether Ms Simic contributed to the termination decision.

A further complaint concerned strong comments made during closing submissions about Ms Leung withholding company property. The Federal Court accepted that the comments were confrontational and reflected a negative view, but held that Ms Leung was given multiple opportunities to respond and did respond. The Court pointed to exchanges where she explained that she had safety concerns about returning the property and where the primary judge expressly invited her to say more. The fact that the response came in submissions rather than evidence did not, in the Court’s view, create procedural unfairness. The Court also rejected the suggestion that the primary judge had not listened, noting that the primary reasons showed the explanation had been considered but not accepted as credible.

So, while the Federal Court acknowledged the forceful nature of some of the trial judge’s comments, it did not accept that the hearing crossed the line into legal unfairness.

The appeal was dismissed. That left standing the primary judge’s key conclusions. Omnia had not contravened section 340 or section 352 on the findings upheld in the appeal. But Omnia had contravened section 44 by failing to comply properly with section 117 notice requirements, and the $10,000 compensation order remained significant.

For employers, the practical message is straightforward. A business can successfully defend the allegation that a dismissal was for a prohibited reason and still lose on the mechanics of termination. Here, the Court’s summary of facts shows a decision made in August, a letter sent in November, an earlier termination date recorded in that letter, and payment in lieu of notice not made until January. That is exactly the kind of sequence that creates avoidable legal risk.

The case also shows why businesses should separate different issues that often become tangled together in real life. Performance concerns are one issue. Leave and illness are another. Workers compensation developments are another. Return of company property is another again. If those matters are allowed to overlap without clear records and lawful process, the employer may face allegations that the stated reason for dismissal was not the real one.

Probation does not remove statutory protections. Nor does frustration with an employee’s conduct remove the need to comply with minimum notice obligations. If a manager or CEO decides to terminate, the business should be able to prove the date of decision, the reason for decision, the person who made it, the date it was communicated, and how notice or payment in lieu was handled. Those records should line up with payroll, correspondence and internal file notes.

The Federal Court judgment was delivered on 15 May 2026 by Halley J. The appeal was heard on 9 April 2026, with last submissions on 28 April 2026. The Court granted leave to file a further amended notice of appeal except for proposed ground 5, dismissed the appeal, and made no order as to costs.

This page should be read as a practical case explainer based on the judgment text presently accessible. It covers the commercial story, the procedural sequence, the issues clearly addressed by the Court, and the practical implications for employers.