Kanevsky (Administrator), in the matter of MA Services Property Group Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2026] FCA 17

This case came before the Federal Court as an urgent duty application on 23 January 2026. MA Services Property Group Pty Ltd was already in administration. Its administrators, Glen Kanevsky and Jason Tracy, asked the court to appoint them as receivers of property held in the MA Services Property Group Trust.

The urgency came from the company's structure. The company had been acting as trustee of the trust, and the court said the trust deed contained a 'vacation of office' clause. That clause provided, subject to certain conditions, that the office of trustee was immediately vacated if the trustee entered external administration. In other words, the very event that triggered the administration may also have stripped the company of its active trustee role.

That matters because the company appears to have operated exclusively as trustee of the trust. The trust assets were not peripheral. They were the core commercial assets. The evidence showed that the principal assets were five properties in Thomsons Road, Keilor Park, Victoria. The company's liabilities totalled $7,605,177.31 and were mainly debts connected with those properties, together with an unsecured debt owed to a related entity that was also under administration.

The administrators were in contact with the sole director, Mr Micky Ahuja, who was also the trust's appointor. But at the time of the hearing it was unclear whether anyone was taking steps to appoint a new trustee. That uncertainty created a practical control problem at exactly the time the administrators needed to stabilise the position and work out what could be done with the assets.

The administrators were not asking the court to resolve a long-running factual dispute. They were asking for a workable legal mechanism so they could deal with trust property in a clear and commercially reliable way.

If the company had ceased to be trustee under the trust deed, it may have held the trust assets only as a bare trustee. The court said that reality had obvious ramifications for the administrators' ability to steer the company through or around its financial predicament. A bare trustee does not stand in the same position as an active trustee with full powers of administration. That can create uncertainty about possession, control, sale authority and dealings with secured creditors or buyers.

At the same time, the company still appeared to have an important right of indemnity from the trust assets for expenses incurred in connection with the trust's administration. The court noted that, under the trust deed and subject to limited exceptions not said to be relevant, the company enjoyed that right. The administrators wanted to realise the benefit of it.

This is the practical insolvency problem the application was designed to solve. The company may no longer have had ordinary trustee powers, but it still had an equitable interest that needed to be preserved and enforced. The administrators therefore sought appointment as receivers of the trust property so they could take possession of it, control it and, if necessary, sell it in order to realise the company's indemnity.

The court also noted that the sole director and appointor, ASIC and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia as mortgagee had been made aware of the application and its listing. That helped show the application was being brought openly and in a way that recognised the interests of affected parties.

The judgment is especially useful because it clearly identifies the legal pathway used. Justice Snaden said no question arose about the court's power to grant the relief sought. The application was brought under section 90-20 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations), which is Schedule 2 to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), and under section 57 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). No issue arose about standing.

The actual appointment of the administrators as receivers was made under section 57(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act. The court's reasons explain that where a company's office as trustee is vacated because of an insolvency process, it is generally appropriate for the insolvency practitioner appointed in consequence of that process to be appointed as receiver of the trust property under that section.

The purpose of that appointment is not abstract. It is so the officer may deal with trust property in order to enforce the equitable lien that continues for the benefit of the former trustee. The judgment refers to earlier authorities explaining that point, including Hosking, re Business Aptitude Pty Ltd (in liq), Re Knight, Re Cremin, Micheletto and Vouris.

After appointing the administrators as receivers, the court also made an order under section 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule. That order gave them all the powers of a liquidator under section 477(2) of the Corporations Act with respect to the trust property. The order specifically included the power to do all things necessary and convenient to enter into possession of, take control of and effect the sale of the trust property as if it were property of a company in liquidation to which they had been appointed as liquidators.

That combination of orders matters in practice. Section 57 supplied the appointment as receivers over the trust property. Section 90-15 supplied the court's power to make directions or orders in relation to the external administration, and here it was used to confer a practical suite of powers by reference to section 477(2). Together, those orders gave the administrators unambiguous authority to deal with the trust assets.

Justice Snaden granted the application. The court appointed Glen Kanevsky and Jason Tracy as joint and several receivers, without security, over all the assets and undertaking of the property of the MA Services Property Group Trust. The orders expressly included the five identified Keilor Park properties.

The court then ordered, under section 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule, that the administrators as receivers would have all the powers of a liquidator under section 477(2) of the Corporations Act with respect to the trust property. That included the power to enter into possession of the property, take control of it and effect its sale as if it were company property in a liquidation.

The reasoning was concise but clear. Justice Snaden said that where a company's office as trustee is vacated by reason of an insolvency process, it is generally appropriate that the officer appointed in consequence of that process should be appointed as receiver of the trust property under section 57(1). That is so the officer may deal with the trust property to enforce the equitable lien that endures for the benefit of the former trustee.

The court also adopted observations made in Walker (Administrator), in the matter of Goldin Australia Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed). Those observations emphasised that administrators and potential purchasers have more confidence in negotiations and sale processes when the administrators have unambiguous power over the assets. The court accepted that this can help achieve a better return for trust assets for the benefit of creditors and beneficiaries, especially where the trust assets are the only assets held by the company.

On the question of security or a guarantee, the court said that an appointment under section 57 may or may not be made conditional on filing a guarantee under rules 14.21 and 14.22 of the Federal Court Rules. But in matters such as this one, it is well established that the appointment should not be burdened by that requirement. The administrators were therefore appointed without security.

The court reserved costs and granted leave for any person affected by the orders, including any creditor of the company or beneficiary of the trust, to apply on seven business days' notice to have the orders varied or dismissed.

For business owners, this case is a reminder that trust structures can become legally awkward very quickly in insolvency. Many businesses hold property or trade through a trust with a corporate trustee. That structure may work smoothly in ordinary times, but the trust deed can change control of the assets the moment external administration begins.

If the deed contains a vacation of office clause, the company may stop being trustee immediately. That does not necessarily mean the trust assets are beyond reach. The former trustee may still have a right of indemnity and an equitable lien over those assets. But the insolvency practitioner may need a separate court appointment to turn that right into practical control and sale authority.

This matters commercially. Buyers want confidence that the person selling the asset has clear authority. Mortgagees want certainty about who is dealing with the property. Administrators need a legally secure basis to preserve value, negotiate with stakeholders and run a sale process. The court in this case accepted that unambiguous power can improve confidence in negotiations and sale outcomes.

The decision does not mean every administration involving a trustee company will require the same orders. But it does show the trigger points that should put directors and advisers on alert. If the company has only ever operated as trustee, if the trust assets are the only meaningful assets, and if the deed removes the trustee on insolvency, court intervention may be needed quickly.

From a governance perspective, the lesson is practical. Keep the signed trust deed and any amendments accessible. Know who the appointor is. Understand how a replacement trustee can be appointed. Keep a clear record of which assets are trust assets and which liabilities were incurred in the trustee capacity. If financial distress appears, review those documents before formal appointments are made, not after.

The application was filed on 20 January 2026. It was heard urgently on the afternoon of Friday, 23 January 2026, when Justice Snaden made orders in open court. Short reasons were later published on 27 January 2026.

The published reasons show an urgent interlocutory insolvency application rather than a final determination of every issue that might arise under the trust deed or in the administration. The orders were made with liberty for affected persons, including creditors and beneficiaries, to apply on seven business days' notice to vary or dismiss them.

That procedural setting is important when reading the case. The judgment is strong authority for the court's power and for the appropriateness of appointing administrators as receivers of trust property in this kind of situation. But it is not a detailed exposition of the trust deed or a complete history of the company's affairs.

This page is based on the published reasons and orders in Kanevsky (Administrator), in the matter of MA Services Property Group Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2026] FCA 17. The reasons identify the statutory basis for the application, the trust structure problem, the assets involved, the liabilities referred to by the court and the orders made.

Because the reasons are brief, they do not provide a full account of the trust deed, the affidavit evidence or any later developments in the administration. Readers should treat this as a practical explanation of the decision and the legal mechanism it illustrates, not as advice about any particular trust or insolvency arrangement.